EDMG340 Week 5 Assignment – Managing the Event

Summarize how the ICS process might be used in a disaster.

Student is to either make-up a scenario or utilize a historical incident and discuss ICS utilization within that event. In so doing student should give thought and supporting discussion to the history and inception of ICS along with each of its component organizational elements and how they are / or might be employed given a particular situation.

Work should be a minimum of 500 words and should utilize APA formatting.

Student is encouraged to download and complete the following Federal Emergency Management Agency courses accessible via the E-Reserve list found in the online library at the EDMG340 Consequence Management | Course Guide page (under Web Resources Tab / Online Training). Completion of courses or selection to not partake will not impact assignment grade.

· National Incident Management System (NIMS), An Introduction (IS-700) – Onlinecourse (http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system).

· National Response Framework, An Introduction (IS-800.B) – Online course (http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/Is/is800b.asp).

Save your work as a Microsoft Word or WordPerfect document entitled:
“EDMG340 Week 5 YourLastName.doc” (i.e., EDMG340 Week 5 Jones.doc) and upload as your Week 5 written assignment.

…and a note I sent to my instructor:

This assignment is based on a previous work of mine, so it will likely show a high score of matching an assignment both submitted to APU and published on the web. My original work can be found here: https://kg4vma.wordpress.com/2012/11/09/edmg340-assignment-5-managing-the-event/

1. INTRODUCTION

In a prior course, students were given a doomsday like scenario to respond to on the final exam; for the purposes of this assignment, I have used portions of that scenario as a premise, and retooled it to be more “over the top” and to fit my hometown. The revised scenario is as follows:

SCENARIO:

At 09:17 today, an earthquake shook the city of Cynthiana, Kentucky; this coming on the heels of a storm system that struck the community a day prior. The previous evening’s events unleashed a torrential amount of rain downstream, bringing rising floodwaters overnight. In addition, what appears to have been an F-2 tornado skirted and touched down along the southern portion of the city, in the commercial shopping district at approximately 03:33 hours; an NWS survey team is scheduled to arrive later this afternoon. The downtown area—primarily the buildings along Pike Street—seem to have suffered the greatest quake damage. Multiple reports of damage to homes, and businesses have been made to varied agencies and social media outlets. So far, no fatalities have been reported from any of the events. Thirteen people with injuries sustained from debris and partial collapse of Walmart were taken to the Harrison Memorial Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. Reports of injuries and damages are only starting to come in, related to the quake. An estimated 100 people may have been at work in the Pike Street area—estimates for occupied residential apartments in the area are presently unknown. Two people have been reported missing from Walmart in relation to the tornado event; the school district reports two families truant—five children from the Southside district, specifically—and two of the local nursing homes cannot account for three of their patients.

The City of Cynthiana’s downtown fire station has been temporaily rendered inoperable due to collapse and mechanical failure of the doors; fortunately all engines stationed were still on scene at Walmart—equipment not already in the field from this station will be unavailable. The city’s other fire station and all county stations are operational. All other emergency services are fully functional and operational.

Other effects and simultaneous events occurring:

• A large fire has broken out at the Rohs Opera House.
• Water mains along Pike Street between Main and Walnut are damaged.
• 10 percent of the population has sustained injuries.
• Multiple utility lines are down, including electrical and phone.
• Animals from a traveling circus have escaped from their cages at the 4-H fairgrounds.
• Looters are moving through the west-side of town, in the areas of Louis Stout Way and Poplar Streets.
• Sewers have backed up, endangering public health in the aforementioned area.
• Many houses are assumed to be destroyed/inhabitable and others will be evacuated; shelters will be needed.
• A hazardous spill has occurred on Main & Pike; a fuel tanker turning right from Main onto Pike received damage from a falling utility pole at the time of the quake.
• One of the aforementioned animals—an elephant—made it to the roundabout, laid down, and has gone into labor between the US27 South exit and the US27 North business exit.

 

In response to the original scenario, students were asked to develop an Incident Command System for the scenario, defining roles and responsibilities for the functions that should be included, much like the prompt of this assignment. As such, I am offering a somwhat similar response[1] to the one I had given—tailored, of course, to my new outrageous scenario.

1. – SCENARIO RESPONSE

Establishing Command

With the events in Cynthiana being as described above, recommendation should be made for the establishment of a Unified Command (UC) at the community’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC), if these plans have not yet been executed. Fortunately, Cynthiana’s primary EOC location has been established on the northeastern side of the community on Oddville Avenue, away from the action described in the area above. Were the events described taking place in the area of Oddville Ave., command would take place at a temporary base of operations—perhaps one of the elementary schools, or Harrison County Fire Station 1—as there is no designated location for a secondary EOC, and no other administrative facilities that would not potentially be affected. Other potential secondary locations may include schools, civic buildings, empty factories/warehouses—any location that has relatively easy access to utilities and can be secured if necessary.

Structure of Command and Sections

The UC structure of the EOC would be comprised of the local EM director and applicable top-level government heads—Mayor James Smith, Judge-Executive Alex Barnett, and their respective deputies/assistants. Prior to this event, the UC has been structured so that one member is designated as overall IC, while the remaining act in traditional top-level command staff capacities—PIO, safety, liaison.

Below the UC are established the following sections: Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG) and Finance/Administration (ADMIN).

OPS could potentially have a section chief, or could operate without one; operating without a section chief may create difficulty in OPS branches communicating with the IC and UC, but is feasible—and very likely as Cynthiana is such a small community. The OPS section chief should be someone experienced in managing a crisis and knowledgeable of communication and practices of the OPS branches—communication issues should be negligible as plain-language is supposed to be used across the board. Potential candidates for OPS Chief are the Deputy EM or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate sitting over public safety. The OPS section would be comprised of several operating branches for this incident, each headed by their respective chief/top-level administrator:

• FIRE branch;
• LAW enforcement branch;
• Public HEALTH branch;
• ANIMAL control branch;
• Public WORKS branch;
• UTILITIES branch;
• SAR

 

The remaining sections would not necessarily have the need for branches; supporting staff might be advisable to aid in any “gopher” activities.

Structure and Duties of Sections

PLAN could easily be filled by an EM staff member or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate. PLAN would work closely with UC, LOG and OPS in compiling information and keeping all sections and command briefed with SITREPs. PLAN would also work closely with the PIO in gathering and distributing information to and from the public.

LOG could be staffed in a manner similar to PLAN. LOG would be in constant communication with OPS and PLAN for the purposes of locating and supplying any necessary resources or materials. LOG would be responsible for locating outside sources for assistance that do not already have an MOU/MOA with OPS branches (agencies with pre-existing MOU/MOA would be contacted by the respective OPS branch); should an agency be located, LOG would forward said agency to ADMIN for event-specific MOU/MOA processing.

ADMIN could be staffed similarly to PLAN and LOG; however recommendation should be made for the city/county attorney to fill this position. ADMIN would work closely with OPS, PLAN, LOG and the UC for record keeping, document processing/filing as well as tallying costs and damages.

Operations and Functions of Branches and Sections

In response to the previous events, it would be assumed that the EM director had self-activated earlier in the day in response to a potential weather threat, as this is his usual practice, and the typical practice of all Kentucky emergency managers. Customarily, the NWS and KYEM work very closely in monitoring weather upcoming situations, and alert all counties of what’s to come; similarly, the local EM director places himself in an “activated” state hours beforehand, and camps out at his office, which is located at the EOC. Here, we can see that certain elements of the process were already in play, prior to the rest of this morning’s unforeseen events.

In regards to what actions to take in this morning’s event scenario, recommended actions are—though not necessarily in this exact order:

FIRE should dispatch available units to control and suppress the fires downtown, as well as the HAZMAT incident. FIRE may have to shift any focus that they have on SAR operations at Walmart to accomplish this—further mention of SAR to follow. FIRE will have notified outside agencies with established MOU/MOA per SOP/SOG; additional fire support may be located by LOG. Since a possibility does exist that looting and fire could spread to other locations, FIRE should attempt to keep at least one engine and its crew at out-lying stations; this is, of course, at FIRE’s discretion, and may prove difficult, as the City of Cynthiana has but only two stations. Harrison County does, however, have one unmanned station near the area that is currently being looted; this station is also a few blocks away from the HAZMAT incident.

SAR will most likely have been conducting efforts at the Walmart scene, in conjunction with FIRE, up until the quake incident. It will be assumed that overnight SAR had contacted other teams for additional manpower and equipment, per SOP/SOGs, and would have been coordinating with FIRE, as well. With the new quake event, local SAR operations will have now become further strained as much of the SAR team is comprised of FIRE personnel that have now been activated for the newly active FIRE events. SAR will contact and coordinate with LOG once more, to acquire additional resources for the location of the nursing home escapees and for SAR operations at the quake damaged structures, once FIRE has extinguished and established control at the FIRE and HAZMAT scenes.

WORKS should make attempts to feed water to mains in downtown area for FIRE activities. Water supply to HEALTH facilities are next priority. All areas of town outside of the active FIRE area should be restricted, limited, or shut-off at WORKS discretion, in order to guarantee adequate flow to the FIRE areas. WORKS may attempt to patch or divert sewage systems to keep issues from occurring; it would be recommended, however, to hold off on doing so, until LAW has established order in the active looting area; furthermore, quick judgment must be made as to the severity of the sewage problems, as this area is flood-prone. LOG may be able to locate emergency above-ground lines and pumps for both potable and non-potable water systems.

HEALTH should obtain a SITREP from the local hospital and establish satellite medical centers for the purposes of First Aid and lower priority medical cases; potential locations for these satellite medical centers are the HMH Physicians’ Clinic on North Pleasant and the Harrison County Health Center on Oddville Avenue. At least one ambulance—if the service(s) allow capacity—should be located at each satellite center for emergency transport and assistance should a case present itself with higher degree of trauma at a satellite. HEALTH should coordinate with PLAN and LOG for acquisition of additional supplies and personnel.

UTILITIES will coordinate with all public service utilities—save those covered by WORKS—for SITREPs. Electricity and communications lines to the EOC, dispatch and repeater sites, as well as HEALTH sites will be priority. Emergency services bases and satellites will be secondary, prioritizing by location’s capacity and ability to generate alternate power. UTILITIES will want to coordinate with LOG for locating generators and fuel for these affected locations should they not be previously equipped. Most repeater sites in Cynthiana and Harrison County are already equipped with or have allocated for them portable generators; a person should be designated by LOG to make rounds to check generator status and repeater functionality.

ANIMAL control will assist with the operations at the fairgrounds for the locating/capture/holding of lost/escaped animals. ANIMAL will have to receive additional assistance from Fish & Wildlife, where Harrison County has one animal control officer—Fish & Wildlife will be contacted by LOG.

LAW will establish a presence in the areas affected by looting; however, LAW will not make any arrests or use force to counteract the looting in progress—any such maneuver may incite additional rioting. Instead, LAW will act to protect properties that have not been looted.

LOG will contact National Guard for additional support for LAW, FIRE, HEALTH and WORKS; most Guard units are trained for all of these situations. With any luck, KYARNG will activate the unit located in Cynthiana without hesitation.

FIRE should dispatch at least one qualified unit to the HAZMAT area for identification and verification of the fuel spilling from the tanker. FIRE unit will make use of ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA software for recommendation of evacuation/SIP area. FIRE will coordinate with PLAN for contacting NRC/state EOC/NWS with SITREP of HAZMAT incident, per established SOP/SOG. Evacuation of area shall be conducted by LAW; though it is very likely that any persons located within the area have already evacuated the nearby structures in order to gain a “better view”. This may make crowd-control concerns difficult, and make efforts to verify building occupancy more difficult. Where this HAZMAT incident is of capacity that local FIRE can handle, initial efforts could be handled by FIRE, further HAZMAT operations should be conducted by team sent by NRC/state EOC. PLAN/LOG should coordinate with NRC/state EOC to see if the additional FIRE units contacted via MOU/MOA are equipped for HAZMAT, in order to refrain from duplicating resources.

LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for SITREP and forward highway department to WORKS. Roads leading to the roundabout should be limited to emergency traffic, in order to keep the area surrounding the birthing elephant calm. Traffic from US 27 South traveling northward into Cynthiana may be diverted onto the “old” section of highway, in order to bypass the elephant; further south, traffic on US 27 South should be diverted to the access road—KY 918—before the fairgrounds. Other affected highways—if any—should be closed at junction/intersect nearest reported damage; damage will be surveyed. If possible, highways will be restricted to emergency traffic until proper clearing/repairs are made.

LOG will contact schools, churches and civic buildings for potential sheltering operations; potential candidate structures are Cynthiana Baptist, Cynthiana Christian, Cynthiana Presbyterian and the elementary schools. LOG will contact Red Cross and/or Salvation Army for sheltering support and staff. Red Cross/Salvation Army will coordinate with LOG for additional supply/support. LOG/PLAN will designate a representative at each shelter site as a point of contact for SITREPs and communication needs.

III. – EXPLANATION & REVIEW

ICS is typically seen as a simple type of hierarchal command; one Incident Commander (IC) is charged with the overall control of the situation at hand, while other functions branch off below. In the model of response supplied here, I do not stray from this traditional view/use, with the exception of declaring a Unified Command (UC). Throughout my studies—those at school and those taken at varying EM workshops—I’ve seen and heard so many times mention of the issue related to declaration of “who’s in charge” in large multi-agency efforts; NIMS recognizes these issues as well (DHS, 2008). Enter the Multi-Agency Command System (MACS)/ICS and UC/ICS concepts, as applied to NIMS ICS.

The traditional IC structure and nomenclature work well in individual agency settings, however when multiple agencies begin to work together the tendency to point fingers and place blame, or steal credit when matters go favorably, grows. In order to combat potential bickering and define a scope of responsibility, adjustment is made to the terminology—without any dramatic change to structure—and we thus perform an interesting psychological play; instead of saying one man is in charge, we declare a Unified Command with an overall IC, a Safety Officer (SO), Public Information Officer (PIO) and a Liaison (LNO). The National Incident Management System (NIMS) allows for this variation in ICS, so long as compliance with NIMS standards are met (DHS, 2008). In the MACS/ICS system with a UC, OPS must have a designated OPS Section Chief (DHS, 2008).

The example of ICS use given above shows how complex—yet simple—structuring and organizing efforts can be. To a lay-person, the lengthy, yet brief example given would seem to be an over-expanded, drawn out mess; why not simply state that law enforcement can go about their business while fire services do theirs, and so on? Truth is, this model does state that; however it ensures that there isn’t any confusion or replication of services that would lead to making the situation more damaging and costly. This system also ensures that resources are being placed in a prioritized fashion, without having any one agency respond to a situation in one location when a greater threat exists elsewhere. Additionally, the system allows for the creation of points of contact, where agency representatives can communicate with another clearly and effectively; stating which needs are being met, which needs aren’t, and what additional actions or resources are necessary.

Again, the lay-person or member of an outside agency may question the structuring of this ICS, wondering how a MACS stylized ICS affects the normal operations and individual ICS structure of involved agencies. In reality, it doesn’t; all agencies are independently working together, following their own hierarchy—an Incident Command System, even if it is not named such within the organization—with the addition of the respective agency’s Incident Commander reporting to the MACS/ICS/UC back at the EOC.

ICS is a system that simply works when applied properly—as such, ICS and slight variations have been employed by many agencies and governing bodies across the nation prior to the establishment and direction of NIMS (“NIMS and the Incident Command System”, n.d.); the only differences between those pre-existing ICS variations and the ICS concept as described by NIMS is the clarification and designation of ICS structure and terminology across the nation, reinforcing the concepts of ICS—a common, understandable organization of personnel and resources without duplication and confusion.

1. – FINAL THOUGHTS

The ICS described in response to the scenario given is, for the most part, NIMS compliant. Some functions are not fully described or included in this example; this is due—in part—to the length of at which the author wished to take for such an odd scenario of events—at over 3,000 words we’ve still yet to cover all of the response, and haven’t touched on a bit of recovery! Comparing the ICS supplied, however, with the system described in NIMS Appendix B (DHS, 2008) reveals an understanding of NIMS requirements. Review of NIMS Appendix B also shows how complex and difficult a task of writing a description of an ICS structure for a particular scenario can be.

For additional information on ICS structure, and visual representation of the ICS organizational tree, review of NIMS Appendix B is recommended.

 

 

References

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Incident Management System. Web. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

“NIMS and the Incident Command System.” (n.d.). Web. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from: http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt

Palmer, J. (2011). Incident Command – Final Exam. Web. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from https://kg4vma.wordpress.com/2011/06/22/incident-command-8211-final-exam/