EDMG340 Week 6 Assignment – Managing Crisis and Response to NBC Incidents (Chemical & Biological)

In his statement to a Senate Subcommittee, Dr. Peter Chalk—policy analyst for the RAND Corporation’s Washington D.C. office—posited that the United States is ill-equipped to handle terrorist action against the nation’s food industry (2001). Dr. Chalk outlined numerous areas of concern, relating to how easily one could infect the nation’s food supply, the potential national and global economic impacts of an infection, as well as the limits of current policies and control procedures.

Dr. Chalk suggests that a portion of the nation’s lack of attention toward these issues relates to there not yet being a “major” disruption in agriculture and food-supply. Chalk believes evidence of said neglect is easily viewed in under-developed agricultural response plans and in what he calls  “woefully inadequate” security and surveillance systems at numerous food-processing facilities nationwide (Chalk, 2001). Additionally, Chalk notes low numbers of trained professionals available to recognize certain animal and agrarian disease, as well as a decline in numbers of professionals capable of performing diagnostic medicine in the veterinary field. Chalk further discusses how easily a terrorist might contaminate food sources—through direct or indirect contamination of vegetation consumed by the population, or otherwise poisoning livestock through the introduction of a toxin or poison. As an example, Chalk explains how quickly an infection could spread among dairy cattle in any of the nation’s major dairy farms. Following up, Chalk discusses the difficulty of conducting a recall of contaminated products; said discussion continues to that of the nation’s produce.

Economically speaking, Chalk addresses how contaminating the food-supply might affect other linear and non-linear services, such as the food service industry and the shipping and transport industries. Food service—grocers and restaurants alike—would receive a rather obvious impact from the inability to provide goods they once carried, and would likely feel the effects of an alarmed and frightened consumer base. Transport and logistics industries would also be impacted through less-frequent shipment of goods. From here, Chalk hints to a potential “domino effect” across the majority of the economy, including those of foreign nations’ economies that rely upon exportation of American produce.

Countering these potential threats, Chalk proposes a number of solutions. First, Chalk underlines the need to strengthen sectors responsible for treatment, diagnosis & control, and planning & preparation of natural and man-made disasters; intensification of these areas would come from increasing numbers of and furthering the education of personnel. Additionally, Chalk suggests restructuring the curriculum of veterinary sciences, placing emphasis on mass-effect distribution and the treatment of foreign/exotic disease. Related, Chalk states that greater influence is needed for veterinarians to be involved in USDA emergency planning and management operations. (Chalk, 2001)

Regarding concerns of security and insurance, Chalk suggests a national plan of insurance for compensating farmers that might find themselves in need in a disaster like one of those identified. Though policies exist for crops affected by natural, meteorological disasters, none exist for necessary destruction of crops or livestock due to large-scale disease or contamination. Development of such an insurance plan could possibly aid in developing incentives or mandates for inclusion, which could bring about changes related to Chalk’s final suggestion: the need for heightened surveillance and security in farming and food production/distribution. A national policy for insurance could require that farms and facilities establish protocols for reviewing and keeping record of employees and facility access, as well as establishing preventative actions and developing mitigation plans.

Personally, I do not believe that any of Chalk’s suggestions would do much to deter acts of terrorism; although I do agree with the points discussed. It is a rather sickening thought that it would be relatively easy for a person can enter a facility or walk onto a farm and affect our nation’s food supply. Such potential for danger shouldn’t be overlooked; yet we have for decades—and the public has seen example of these possibilities so many times while watching the evening news. Numerous times we have seen “inside” reports from food processing plants from the viewpoints of animal rights activists, extremists, and journalists; many of these reports have been conducted covertly, with a person entering the facility under the guise of being a regular employee. This kind of espionage appears to be fairly easy to perform, and exemplifies the ease at which a person could enter a factory and deliver hazardous or otherwise poisonous agent.

To the contrary, however, I’m comforted that one can be able to enter such a facility with such ease; the unintentional allowance for the entrance of an outsider enables a certain type of transparency. Many of these covert operations, along with numerous “whistle-blowers” have given the public knowledge of events that would have otherwise been kept quiet. In some ways, I suppose that Dr. Chalk’s pleas for security could be to our detriment; still, if one were determined to taint an element of the food supply, it could be done regardless of heightened security.

References

Chalk, P. Dr. (2001, October 10). Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection, and the U.S. Food and Agricultural Sector. Testimony given before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate. Retrieved January 17, 2016 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20170221051515/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399957.pdf