The following post was authored in response to a classroom forum:
Week 5 Forum Post your response to the week 5 forum question here. Do you support the analyses, conclusions and recommendations of the author? State your agreement / disagreement. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit. |
After reading both “From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command” by Donald P. Moynihan and “Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S.â by Donald P. Moynihan”, please answer the following questions in terms of each article:
⢠Do you support the author’s analyses; his conclusions; his recommendations? If you disagree with his positions â so state. ⢠Why do you agree / disagree? Both articles are available under “Course Tools”. Follow the “Lessons” link and look for the Week Five Lesson. |
In review of Moynihanâs articles, it would seem that there is no clear recommendation other than that of practice and review of the ICS model for implementation in multi-agency disaster response; such a statement is painfully obvious, however desperately in need of constant reiteration. Many of the nationâs lower governments and responders have expressed frustration with coordination in times of crisis; since the advent of the DHS and NIMS, blame is placed upon the gamut of NIMS directivesâincluded is the use of ICS. Moynihan authors his papers to discuss the reasoning behind the declared use of ICS, offers examples of where ICS implementation has succeeded and failed, and finally delivers criticism for the better use of ICS.
The federal government made a wise choice in supporting and requiring the use of ICS. The expectation, however, that all governments and services would be able to implement the structure was somewhat immature; but is this the fault of our federal government? Moynihan has pointed out on numerous occasions in From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina that many entities outside the fire service knew of the ICS concept prior to NIMS; example is given with the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma. During this disaster, coordination between agencies was made possible through establishing a modified Incident Command System, where each service took control of a specific issue and reported back to a centralized command.
Opposing the Oklahoma example, giving what still remains the greatest example of misuse and poor application of ICS, is the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Though the local, state, and even federal governments had been required to develop and practice action plans implementing ICS, none of the involved organizations had a clue of what needs had to be met. Some of this confusion is blamedâsomewhat appropriatelyâon the fact that the mandates were still relatively new; additional confusion came from the restructuring and organization of FEMA under the DHS umbrella, as well as assignment of resources such as military units to Homeland aligned operations.
Finally, Moynihan shows example of how agencies without experience in coordinating efforts possess the ability to implement such a structure in Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools. In this article Moynihan reviewed the use of ICS in the Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) outbreak of 2003. Initially, agencies struggled in organizing efforts as they continued to operate under their normal, respective procedures. Eventually, a networked structure was created; showing the effectiveness of ICS âa system typically considered to be centralized and hierarchal in designâin situations that arenât traditionally considered for such a system. Interestingly, this example effectively shows how the original concepts of ICS implementation were ignorantly instituted, yet still completely valid.
A portion of the original idea of mandating ICS was the creation of a simple, no-fuss solution of command and responsibility; the ICS structure was chosen for its wide use and assumed effectiveness in the fire service. It has been argued that these beliefs were premature; furthermore, analysis and critiques have been given, stating that the traditional concepts of an ICS are neither modular nor adaptable to any given situation. In his END example, Moynihan shows that through simple modification, an ICS can exist and operate effectively, given the time and resources necessary to implement, practice and make adjustments as necessaryâa concept which was behind the intent of ICS implementation.
I agree that the stiff definition of an ICS may not work in all situations; ICS will work, however, if it is not seen as a centralized command with a single head. A modified approach, viewing ICS as a management system with a unified command is, perhaps, the most appropriate method for organizing efforts during multi-agency operations. Practice of such a system is also a must for successful implementation in a time of crisisâagencies asking for assistance in understanding the concepts as events are unfolding will cause great delay and further confusion.
References
Moynihan , D. (2007). From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command System. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7
Moynihan , D. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. Crises Management. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administrations, and Institutions, 21(2), 205-229. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-
One thought on “EDMG340 Week 5 Forum — Managing the Event – Incident Command System”