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The following writing was originally submitted in response to a homework assignment:

Week 5 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG340

Christian Kazmierczak

11/09/2012

I.  INTRODUCTION

In a prior course, students were given the following scenario to respond to on the final exam:

SCENARIO: At 10:05a.m. today, a hurricane/earthquake/tornado/flood hit the community of Edenton. The downtown area was hardest hit. People have reported damage to homes, and businesses have been affected as well. No fatalities have been reported. Three people with injuries have been taken to the Edenton Community Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. As many as 10 people are missing.

The downtown fire station is destroyed/inoperable. Two other fire stations are operational.

Other possible effects:

• A large fire has broken out in downtown
• Water mains are cut
• 10 percent of the population has sustained injuries
• Utility lines are down
• Animals in the zoo have escaped from their cages
• Looters are rampaging downtown
• Sewers have backed up, endangering public health
• Many houses are destroyed/inhabitable and shelters will be needed
• A hazardous spill has occurred
• A major road has been affected.

Students were asked to develop an Incident Command System for the scenario, defining roles and responsibilities for the functions that should be included. For this week’s assignment I am offering a similar response^[1] to the one I had given for the aforementioned scenario.

II. – SCENARIO RESPONSE

Establishing Command

With the events at Edenton being as described above, recommendation should be made for the establishment of a Unified Command (UC) at the community’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). In the event that the primary EOC is located in the downtown area, command should take place at the designated secondary EOC location; if by chance a secondary EOC has not been previously designated, then a temporary base of operations for the EOC needs to be located. Potential secondary locations may include schools, civic buildings, empty factories/warehouses—any location that has relatively easy access to utilities and can be secured if necessary. The relocation of the EOC to a secondary site is advisable, as the primary—assuming it is located downtown—may be affected by the fires and looting.

Structure of Command and Sections

The UC structure of the EOC would be comprised of the local EM director and applicable top-level government heads—mayor and/or judge-executive or local government equivalents and their respective deputies/assistants. Prior to this event, the UC has been structured so that one member is designated as overall IC, while the remaining act in traditional top-level command staff capacities—PIO, safety, liaison.

Below the UC are established the following sections: Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG) and Finance/Administration (ADMIN).

OPS could potentially have a section chief, or could operate without one; operating without a section chief may create difficulty in OPS branches communicating with the IC and UC, but is feasible. OPS section chief should be someone experienced in managing a crisis and knowledgable of communication and practices of the OPS branches—communication issues should be negligible as plain-language is supposed to be used across the board. Potential candidates for OPS Chief are the Deputy EM or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate sitting over public safety. The OPS section would be comprised of several operating branches for this incident, each headed by their respective chief/top-level administrator:

• FIRE branch;
• LAW enforcement branch;
• public HEALTH branch;
• ANIMAL control branch;
•  public WORKS branch;
• UTILITIES branch.

The remaining sections would not necessarily have the need for branches; supporting staff might be advisable to aid in any “gopher” activities.

Structure and Duties of Sections

PLAN could easily be filled by an EM staff member or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate. PLAN would work closely with UC, LOG and OPS in compiling information and keeping all sections and command briefed with SITREPs. PLAN would also work closely with the PIO in gathering and distributing information to and from the public.

LOG could be staffed in a manner similar to PLAN. LOG would be in constant communication with OPS and PLAN for the purposes of locating and supplying any necessary resources or materials. LOG would be responsible for locating outside sources for assistance that do not already have an MOU/MOA with OPS branches (agencies with pre-existing MOU/MOA would be contacted by the respective OPS branch); should an agency be located, LOG would forward said agency to ADMIN for event-specific MOU/MOA processing.

ADMIN could be staffed similarly to PLAN and LOG; however recommendation should be made for the city/county attorney to fill this position. ADMIN would work closely with OPS, PLAN, LOG and the UC for record keeping, document processing/filing as well as tallying costs and damages.

Operations and Functions of Branches and Sections

In regards to particular actions to take in this incident, recommended actions are—though not necessarily in this exact order:

FIRE should dispatch available units to control and suppress the fires downtown. Since the possibility exists that looting and fire could spread to other locations, FIRE should attempt to keep at least one engine and its crew at out-lying stations; this is, of course, at FIRE’s discretion. FIRE will have notified outside agencies with established MOU/MOA per SOP/SOG; additional fire support may be located by LOG.

WORKS should make attempts to feed water to mains in downtown area for FIRE activities. Water supply to HEALTH facilities are next priority. All areas of town outside of the active FIRE area should be restricted, limited, or shut-off at WORKS discretion. WORKS may attempt to patch or divert sewage systems to keep issues from occurring at HEALTH facilities. LOG may be able to locate emergency above-ground lines and pumps for both potable and non-potable water systems.

HEALTH should obtain a SITREP from the local hospital and establish satellite medical centers for the purposes of First Aid and lower priority medical cases; potential locations for these satellite medical centers are established clinics and health departments. At least one ambulance—if the service(s) allow capacity—should be located at each satellite center for emergency transport and assistance should a case present itself with higher degree of trauma at a satellite. HEALTH should coordinate with PLAN and LOG for acquisition of additional supplies and personnel.

UTILITIES will coordinate with all public service utilities—save those covered by WORKS—for SITREPs. Electricity and communications lines to the EOC, dispatch and repeater sites as well as HEALTH sites will be priority. Emergency services bases and satellites will be secondary, prioritizing by location’s capacity and ability to generate alternate power. UTILITIES will want to coordinate with LOG for locating generators and fuel for these affected locations should they not be previously equipped.

ANIMAL control will assist with the operations at the local zoo for the locating/capture/holding of lost/escaped animals. ANIMAL will receive additional assistance from Fish & Wildlife—Fish & Wildlife will be contacted by LOG.

LAW will establish a presence in the areas affected by looting; however, LAW will not make any arrests or use force to counteract the looting in progress—any such maneuver may incite additional rioting. Instead, LAW will act to protect properties that have not been looted.

LOG will contact National Guard for additional support for LAW, FIRE, HEALTH and WORKS; most Guard units—especially engineer battalions—are trained for all of these situations.

FIRE—if not equipped as a HAZMAT team—should dispatch one qualified unit to the HAZMAT area for identification. FIRE unit will make use of ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA software for recommendation of evacuation/SIP area. FIRE will coordinate with PLAN for contacting NRC/state EOC/NWS with SITREP of HAZMAT incident, per established SOP/SOG. Evacuation of area shall be conducted by LAW. HAZMAT operations will be conducted by team sent by NRC/state EOC.

LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for SITREP and forward highway department to WORKS. Affected highway should be closed at junction/intersect nearest reported damage; damage will be surveyed. If possible, highway will be restricted to emergency traffic until proper clearing/repairs are made.

LOG will contact schools, churches and civic buildings for potential sheltering operations. LOG will contact Red Cross and/or Salvation Army for sheltering support and staff. Red Cross/Salvation Army will coordinate with LOG for additional supply/support. LOG/PLAN will designate a representative at each shelter site as a point of contact for SITREPs and communication needs.

III. – EXPLANATION & REVIEW

ICS is typically seen as a simple type of hierarchal command; one Incident Commander (IC) is charged with the overall control of the situation at hand, while other functions branch off below. In my model of response, I do not stray from this traditional view/use, with the exception of declaring a Unified Command (UC). In my studies—through those at this school and those taken at varying EM workshops—I have heard and seen issue related to the declaration of “who’s in charge” in multi-agency efforts; NIMS recognizes these issues as well (DHS, 2008). Enter the Multi-Agency Command System (MACS)/ICS and UC/ICS concepts, as applied to NIMS ICS.

The traditional IC structure and nomenclature work perfectly fine in individual agency settings, yet when multiple agencies begin to work together—especially with governmental heads overseeing the events—the desire to point fingers and place blame, or steal credit when matters go favorably, grows. To combat the potential bickering and scope of responsibility, we simply adjust the terminology—without dramatic change to the structure—and perform an interesting psychological play; instead of saying one man is in charge, we declare that there is a Unified Command with an overall IC, a Safety Officer (SO), Public Information Officer (PIO) and a Liaison (LNO). The National Incident Management System (NIMS) allows for this variation in ICS, so long as compliance with NIMS standards are met (DHS, 2008). In the MACS/ICS system with a UC, OPS must have a designated OPS Section Chief (DHS, 2008).

The example of ICS use given above shows how complex—yet simple—structuring and organizing efforts can be. To a lay-person, the example given would likely seem to be an over-expanded and drawn out mess—why not simply state that law enforcement can go about their business while fire services do theirs, etc.? The truth is, this model does state that; however it ensures that there isn’t any confusion or replication of services that could potentially lead to making the situation more damaging and costly. The system also ensures that resources are being placed in a prioritized fashion, without having any one agency respond to a situation in one location when a greater threat exists elsewhere. Additionally, the system allows for the creation of points of contact, where agency representatives can communicate with another clearly and effectively, stating which needs are being met, which needs aren’t, and what additional actions or resources are necessary.

Again, the lay-person or member of an outside agency may question the structuring of this ICS, wondering how a MACS stylized ICS affects the normal operations and individual ICS structure of involved agencies. Honestly, it doesn’t; all agencies are independently working together, following their own hierarchy—an ICS, even if it is not named such within the organization—with the addition of the respective agency’s IC reporting to the MACS/ICS/UC back at the EOC.

The ICS is a system that simply works when applied properly—as such, ICS and slight variations had been employed by many agencies and governing bodies across the nation prior to the establishment and direction of NIMS (“NIMS and the Incident Command System”, n.d.). The only differences between these pre-existing ICS versions and variations and the ICS concept as described by NIMS is the attempt at better clarification and designation of ICS structure and terminology across the entire nation, reinforcing the concepts of ICS—a common, understandable organization of personnel and resources without duplication and confusion.

IV. – FINAL THOUGHTS

The ICS described in response to the scenario given is, for the most part, NIMS compliant. Some functions are not fully described or included in this example; this is due—in part—to the length at which this paper was written versus the brevity that was requested—the author has responded to a 500 word minimum with over 2,000 words! Comparing the ICS supplied, however, with the system described in NIMS Appendix B (DHS, 2008) reveals an understanding of NIMS requirements. Review of NIMS Appendix B also shows how complex a task of writing a description of an ICS structure for a particular scenario can be.

For additional information on ICS structure, and visual representation of the ICS organizational tree, review of NIMS Appendix B is recommended.

References

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Incident Management System. Web. Retrieved November 9, 2012 from: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

“NIMS and the Incident Command System.” (n.d.). Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt

Palmer, J. (2011). Incident Command – Final Exam. Web. Retrieved November 9, 2012 from http://kg4vma.wordpress.com/2011/06/22/incident-command-8211-final-exam/

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The following post was originally submitted as a homework assignment:

Week 3 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG340

Christian Kazmierczak

11/08/2012

For the purposes of this assignment, students were asked to compare and contrast domestic and international terrorist groups or individuals; attempting to satisfy the domestic terrorism element of this assignment became a challenge. Researching domestic terror groups can prove to be a difficult task, assumedly due to the desire to keep current investigations quiet; groups and individuals that have been prosecuted or publicly named, however, are easier to research by the public. A brief search for domestic terrorists did not yield any list of published groups or individuals, other than those published on the FBI’s “Most Wanted” list; as of the time of this writing, only seven “domestic terrorists” were listed.

Though it may seem that domestic terrorism isn’t much of an issue—where so few results were discovered—other sources reveal that the existence and threats of domestic terrorism are quite real and an area of concern. In a document obtained by George Washington University’s National Security Archive (Richelson, 2012), it is seen that the FBI still actively trains their agents and law enforcement for domestic terrorism—domestic terrorism defined as U.S. nationalists committing terroristic acts “at home”, as opposed to foreign or alien nationalists committing acts on U.S. soil. In this document—A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism 2005-2006—the bureau references the “classic” examples of domestic terrorism: anarchists, extremists, activists, supremacists and militia groups (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). Of these examples, two organizations are specifically named under the activist/extremist category; these named organizations are also associated with three of the seven individuals listed as “most wanted” by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation: Domestic Terrorism, 2012).

Animal rights activist/extremists are noted to hold the belief that animals are not of the rights of man; many—particularly those on the extremist side—are not against taking action against those seen as exploiting animals. Eco-terrorists have similar views as the animal rights extremists, with regard to—as the name suggests—the exploitation of earth’s natural resources, flora and fauna. Both groups of activists/extremists may work in unified sects or individually, and can potentially use elevated force or violence in order to gain attention or prove a point. Named examples of such activist/extremists are the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF). The FBI notes that these organizations typically attempt to cloak communications via unknown Internet sites and protocols unaffiliated with known/published sites claiming to be “official” or otherwise; as such, many of those involved are young and somewhat “tech-savvy”. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007)

Though there might be some decline in animal and eco- terrorism—due in part to the enacting of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act—the Bureau warns that the fanaticism of the respective groups’ members will not allow for the dampening of spirits (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007); instead groups may find alternate avenues to relay points to those committing acts against animals and nature, until a time when a corporation or scientist “goes too far.”

Researching international terrorism seems to be quite an easy task, as it seems the government hasn’t much fear in allowing the world to know of our enemies. The FBI has listed a number of individuals wanted for terrorism—the majority having ties to various Muslim/Islamic organizations, save a few communist and Columbian terrorists. The Department of State has also published a listing of terrorist organizations, the vast majority being Islamic as well, with the exception of a few Columbian, communist organizations and two factions of the Irish Republican Army (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

There is no real difference between the actions of domestic and international terrorists with regards to methods of action; both of these broad classes act in violent or forceful manners, wreaking havoc upon a community and deeply affecting others lives. Differences, however, do exist in the targets of terroristic acts; for example:

Joseph Mahmoud Dibee, Rebecca J. Rubin and Josephine Sunshine Overaker—three of the FBI’s wanted domestic terrorists—were indicted for terroristic acts, including arson; the three are/were members of an ALF/ELF group known as “The Family”. Rubin and Overaker were named in connection of the burning of structures at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado (Cable News Network, 2008; Federal Bureau of Investigation: Eco-Terrorist Sentenced, 2012; PR Newswire, 2006). This sort of action is fairly common of an animal extremist/eco-terrorist; the property involved was that of a profit organization and not a government entity. Had there not been notification and claims of responsibility made to local media (Cable News Network,1998), the case would have most likely been investigated as an act of domestic terrorism anyway.

Husayn Muhammad al-Umari, a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim, has been wanted by the FBI since 2009 for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 830 on August 11, 1982 (Federal Bureau of Investigation: Most Wanted Terrorists, 2012). Al-Umari, though not the direct perpetrator of the event, is wanted for his role in connection to the bombing. The bombing of Flight 830 was conducted by Mohammed Rashed, a.k.a. Rashid Mohammed, for the 15 May Organization—a faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – External Operations (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). The 15 May Organization, like many Palestinian radical/extremist groups, target Israeli and American civilians and governmental leaders over Israel’s “right to exist”. Al-Umari is the founder of the 15 May Organization.

Personally, when it comes to acts of terrorism, I see domestic terrorism as a greater risk than those of international terrorism; while there may be a greater number of potential acts and actors on the international spectrum, there tends to be a greater unknown on the domestic side. International terrorists will most likely select targets which are representative of, or facilitate governmental function or policy. Due to the patterns and targets of international terrorists, our nation has been able to implement a number of policies and protocols for investigating and gathering intelligence related to international terrorism. Domestic terrorists, on the other hand, have the greater potential of evading preventative measures and going unnoticed. Additionally, domestic terrorists are more likely to be the “guy next-door”—a notion which I find quite unsettling.

Others may disagree, and say that someone overseas, acting in a capacity akin to Osama bin Laden is the greatest danger; personally, I’d prefer a bin Laden-like character over Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, or the latest breed of domestic terrorist—James Eagan Holmes.

References

Cable News Network. (1998). Group claiming credit for Vail fires says the aim was to help lynx. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from:

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2007). A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism 2005-2006. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/402525-doc-30-threat-assessment-domestic-terrorism.html

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Eco-Terrorist Sentenced: Help Us Find Remaining Operation Backfire Fugitives. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20160604205007/https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/march/eco-terrorist_032012/eco-terrorist_032012

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Wanted by the FBI: Domestic Terrorism. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Wanted by the FBI: Most Wanted Terrorists. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists

PR Newswire. (2006) Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front Members Sentenced in Oregon for Acts of Eco-Terrorism in Five Western States. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20160111103240/http://www.prnewswire.com:80/news-releases/animal-liberation-front-and-earth-liberation-front-members-sentenced-in-oregon-for-acts-of-eco-terrorism-in-five-western-states-57884802.html

Richelson, J. (2012) Documenting the FBI: Declassified Documents Provide New Detail on Confronting the Terrorist Threat – from al-Qaeda to Skinheads. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 386. National Security Archive, George Washington University. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB386/

U. S. Department of Justice. (2006). Jordanian Man Sentenced In 1982 Bombing Of Pan Am Flight From Tokyo To Honolulu. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06_crm_172.html

U. S. Department of State. (2012). Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20190514225518/https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

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The following post was authored in response to a classroom forum:

In review of Moynihan’s articles, it would seem that there is no clear recommendation other than that of practice and review of the ICS model for implementation in multi-agency disaster response; such a statement is painfully obvious, however desperately in need of constant reiteration. Many of the nation’s lower governments and responders have expressed frustration with coordination in times of crisis; since the advent of the DHS and NIMS, blame is placed upon the gamut of NIMS directives—included is the use of ICS. Moynihan authors his papers to discuss the reasoning behind the declared use of ICS, offers examples of where ICS implementation has succeeded and failed, and finally delivers criticism for the better use of ICS.

The federal government made a wise choice in supporting and requiring the use of ICS. The expectation, however, that all governments and services would be able to implement the structure was somewhat immature; but is this the fault of our federal government? Moynihan has pointed out on numerous occasions in From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina that many entities outside the fire service knew of the ICS concept prior to NIMS; example is given with the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma. During this disaster, coordination between agencies was made possible through establishing a modified Incident Command System, where each service took control of a specific issue and reported back to a centralized command.

Opposing the Oklahoma example, giving what still remains the greatest example of misuse and poor application of ICS, is the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Though the local, state, and even federal governments had been required to develop and practice action plans implementing ICS, none of the involved organizations had a clue of what needs had to be met. Some of this confusion is blamed—somewhat appropriately—on the fact that the mandates were still relatively new; additional confusion came from the restructuring and organization of FEMA under the DHS umbrella, as well as assignment of resources such as military units to Homeland aligned operations.

Finally, Moynihan shows example of how agencies without experience in coordinating efforts possess the ability to implement such a structure in Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools. In this article Moynihan reviewed the use of ICS in the Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) outbreak of 2003. Initially, agencies struggled in organizing efforts as they continued to operate under their normal, respective procedures. Eventually, a networked structure was created; showing the effectiveness of ICS –a system typically considered to be centralized and hierarchal in design—in situations that aren’t traditionally considered for such a system. Interestingly, this example effectively shows how the original concepts of ICS implementation were ignorantly instituted, yet still completely valid.

A portion of the original idea of mandating ICS was the creation of a simple, no-fuss solution of command and responsibility; the ICS structure was chosen for its wide use and assumed effectiveness in the fire service. It has been argued that these beliefs were premature; furthermore, analysis and critiques have been given, stating that the traditional concepts of an ICS are neither modular nor adaptable to any given situation. In his END example, Moynihan shows that through simple modification, an ICS can exist and operate effectively, given the time and resources necessary to implement, practice and make adjustments as necessary—a concept which was behind the intent of ICS implementation.

I agree that the stiff definition of an ICS may not work in all situations; ICS will work, however, if it is not seen as a centralized command with a single head. A modified approach, viewing ICS as a management system with a unified command is, perhaps, the most appropriate method for organizing efforts during multi-agency operations. Practice of such a system is also a must for successful implementation in a time of crisis—agencies asking for assistance in understanding the concepts as events are unfolding will cause great delay and further confusion.

References

Moynihan , D. (2007). From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command System. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

Moynihan , D. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. Crises Management. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administrations, and Institutions, 21(2), 205-229. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-

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