Category: Uncategorized

Posted by Michael R Bussell Sat Jun 18 15:07:32 2011.
Message: When facing the IED threat, we know that the device builder may use a variety of means to function the device. In Iraq, the use of jamming equipment was useful, while back in Afghanistan, jamming equipment has less of an impact because the enemy quickly adapted to counter some of our protocols. What can we learn from this?

We can learn that we should never underestimate the capabilities of our foes or the elements which we are in. We can learn that thrests are everchanging, and that we must, too, be everchanging. Though the methods used in one place at one time may pay off, we must realize that these efforts will inevitably be thwarted in some way, if not by our foe, then by the shear nature of the elements. This is true, not only in facing IEDs in the mid-east, but everywhere in our lives in any given situation. To combat this, we must work harder, better, faster and stronger through the adoption of better tactics, furthering our knowledge and simply “thinking outside of the box”.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

Question 16 (Worth 20 points)

For the last question set up and diagram an Incident Command System for the following scenario. Define all the roles and responsibilities for each function area that would be included in this scenario.

SCENARIO: At 10:05a.m. today, a hurricane/earthquake/tornado/flood hit the community of Edenton. The downtown area was hardest hit. People have reported damage to homes, and businesses have been affected as well. No fatalities have been reported. Three people with injuries have been taken to the Edenton Community Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. As many as 10 people are missing.

The downtown fire station is destroyed/inoperable. Two other fire stations are operational.

Other posssible effects:

A large fire has broken out in downtown
Water mains are cut
10 percent of the population has sustained injuries
Utility lines are down
Animals in the zoo have escaped from their cages
Looters are rampaging downtown
Sewers have backed up, endangering public health
Many houses are destroyed/inhabitable and shleters will be needed
A hazardous spill has occured
A major road has been affected.

ESSAY SUBMISSION

In this incident there would be a unified command (UC) established at the designated EOC–unless it was downtown, in which case the designated secondary-EOC would be used. At the UC level would be the EM director and the community’s top-level elected official(s). Branching off of the UC would be the PIO, safety, and liaison. Below the UC would be the Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG), and Finance/Administration (ADMIN) levels.

OPS would be represented by a head of each agency or department; or represented by an EM staff member, council-member/magistrate. Each OPS member would be charged with collecting/supplying information to/from in-field OICs. Recommended OPS structure would be as follows:

• OPS Chief (representative of all OPS branches)
• FIRE branch
• LAW enforcement branch
• HEALTH branch
• ANIMAL control branch
• public WORKS branch
• UTILITIES branch

PLAN would be represented by either an EM staff member or council-member/magistrate. PLAN would work close with UC, LOG and OPS in gathering information and redistributing SITREPs for all levels. Would also work closely with PIO and top-level liaison.

LOG would be represented by EM staff or council/magistrates. LOG would work with UC, OPS, and PLAN in locating/supplying needs. LOG would work with PLAN to locate the additional support for OPS branches that do not already have MOAs/MUAs with outside agencies; otherwise requests to other agencies are under respective OPS branches. Once LOG/PLAN has gotten an outside agency to agree to assist, the outside agency is forwarded to

ADMIN for filing of MOU/MOA for incident and attached to the respective OPS branch.
ADMIN would be represented by EM staff, council/magistrate. Another possible candidate for this position would be the governing body’s attorney(-ies). ADMIN would work closely with UC, LOG, and PLAN in keeping records on operations, filling/filing/forwarding other necessary documentation, and giving estimates on costs/damages.

In this incident, I would recommend the following actions (not necessarily in this order):

• All available fire units be dispatched to downtown fire. As looting/rioting is taking place and could potentially spread—and as additional fires may occur outside the focal area—I would recommended that at least one engine and it’s minimal accompaniment (unless this is a small community) remain at the outer-lying stations. FIRE should contact outside community departments with agreements for assistance.

• WORKS needs to be contacted with regard to main supply lines to downtown area. As a large fire has broken out, this area is a priority. If sections of town can be separated or routed to use other sources, then that switch should be made. Other priorities for water will be care facilities.

• HEALTH needs to get report of hospital situation. Recommend setting up local health department as triage for non- life-threatening injuries. An ambulance needs to be at health department for additional support/supplies and to provide transport to hospital if a life-threatening injury happens to arrive.

• UTILITIES need to be contacted for status. Electric to EOC, dispatch & repeater sites, and hospital are a priority. Other care facilities and emergency services are secondary [making assumption that these facilities have backup generators and can wait, if not will be covered by LOG]

• ANIMAL control will work with zoo officials in locating/capture/holding of lost animals.

• LOG will contact Fish & Wildlife for additional ANIMAL control.

• LAW will respond to downtown area with sufficient officers to make presence known. LAW will not stop active looting until additional support arrives—no need to become a martyr. LAW will safeguard buildings that have not been looted.

• LOG will request National Guard for additional LAW, FIRE, HEALTH, WORKS support.

• WORKS will need to gather more information on damage to sewers. LOG may be able to locate supply of emergency above ground lines and pumps for sewage, storm water.

• FIRE should dispatch one qualified unit (or one of the aforementioned engines on standby) to HAZMAT area for spill/release identification. Use ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA for recommended evacuation area and evacuate. Contact area HAZMAT team.

• LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for status and forward them to WORKS. Highway should be closed at junctions nearest the damage and surveyed. If possible, the highway should be opened for emergency vehicle traffic only until proper clearing/repair efforts are made.

• LOG should contact local schools, churches, civic buildings for sheltering possibilities. LOG should contact Red Cross for shelter opening. LOG should locate/supply any needs for sheltering (food, water, cots, blankets, portable toilets, etc.). LOG/PLAN should have/designate a representative at shelter for updates.

Points earned on this question: 20

The following scenario would, to my knowledge, be one of the largest table-top exercises conducted in Harrison County. In attempting to think of a disaster scenario, I couldn’t help but think of something on a larger scale than what was requested. The reason behind my thoughts of a larger disaster lies with my beliefs of how ill-prepared the community actually is. To my knowledge, there has never been a disaster scenario played to this scale, nor do I believe that there had ever been a good review of the incidents that had taken place in 1997.

I do know that much has changed since that time, and that there are many unwritten plans of action; however I do not believe that everyone is truly aware of what each other has in mind. I also do not believe that our agencies know how to function if a key member in their organization is absent—a point which would be inserted into sub-scenarios of this larger scenario.

Another hole that I know exists in our community’s plans involve what to do should our dispatch center lose communication. Granted, if the phone lines go down, there isn’t much that can be done; however, what is to be done when there isn’t any CAD ability? All of the radios are routed through a computer based system, and, to my knowledge, there still aren’t any “physical” radios on site—what then?

I believe that I may develop this plan further, and turn it into my EM director and see if it becomes one of the next exercises. I worry, though, that by the end it may turn into something resembling a game of Dungeons and Dragons…

DATE: 		IRRELEVANT
TIME: 		IRRELEVANT
LOCATION: 	MUCH OF CYNTHIANA AND PORTIONS OF HARRISON COUNTY
EVENT: 		“100-YEAR” FLOODING

NARRATIVE:      A large powerful storm system has moved across the US,
                pulling moisture from the gulf, and has stalled over the
                area, releasing copius amounts of rain in a fashion
                similar to that experienced in March of 1997. Cynthiana
                and Harrison County is experiencing flooding akin to that
                of 1997. The main highways are inaccessible once again.
                Fresh and waste water treatment plants have been shut
                down. The western side of Cynthiana is flooded and
                inaccessible. The phone system is down due to AT&T’s
                switching station being flooded.
                One factor of this storm system differed from the one
                previously experienced — high winds skirted along a
                smaller system that preceded this rain event. Winds from
                the line preceding the rains caused structural damage to
                the roof of city hall; however this wasn’t discovered
                until the following rains came, leaking through the
                building into the dispatch center, rendering most of the
                equipment useless. EOC is assumed to have been partially
                self-activated by EMA; however other officials are not
                present.

OBJECTIVES:     1.) Communications are down and infrastructure has been
                crippled. Appropriate measures must be taken to fully
                activate EOC. Establish alternative methods for
                communication with all applicable agencies and public,
                and solve the issues of infrastructure whilst a public
                panics. Alternate agency contact information *may* be
                located in the ERIL section of the EOP and in dispatch
                SOG/SOP. Other necessary items or equipment may be
                readily available or promptly procured from EMA.
                2.) All agencies within Cynthiana exist on eastern side
                of town. An appropriate number of response units and a
                base of operations for these units must be made on
                western side of town. Decide an appropriate number, find
                a location for operations, direct units how to reach
                western side with the existing road closures.
                3.) Contact needs to be made with hospital and care
                facilities to check status of operations and rations.
                Locate means of providing support.
                4.) Contact needs to be made with the city of Berry for
                status. Attempt to provide mayor with any necessary
                supplies.

DIRECTIONS:     Complete objectives by utilizing all available plans and
                by brainstorming to fill any gaps in plans. For areas
                which are decided on the spot without an established plan
                backing the decision, city/county attorney(-ies) may
                provide advice if decision could have legal ramifications.
                EM deputies and attornies will be assigned to represent-
                atives of EOC to record decisions and provide further
                information on departmental decisions from a randomized
                list of sub-scenarios—EXAMPLE: EMS dispatches two EC units
                to western side; deputy assigned to EMS in scenario
                announces to EMS representative that one EC has arrived in
                x-minutes while other EC has experienced mechanical
                trouble along the way.
                Notes will be collected and compiled at the end of the
                scenario. Review of the scenario will be conducted next-
                day, with discussion.

Initially, there would be two somewhat separate IC operations going on until a Unified Command was established with the activation of the EOC. IC-1 would be the EMA preparing for the rains, assumedly a week or so in advance—this timeframe estimation comes from the recent history of the NWS communicating with KYEM and local EM agencies on forthcoming weather events. During the EM preparation the EOC would be partially activated. IC-2 would involve the damage within the dispatch center. During this phase, dispatch would be attempting to return to a non-preferred working state. Concurrently EM would be continuing efforts in relaying messages to the county Judge-Exec and Cynthiana mayor’s office and assumedly assisting in bringing dispatch online. As the waters continue to rise, dispatch would come back to a crippled operating state (likely relying upon spare mobiles and HTs) and attempts would be made to contact other officials and bring the EOC to full activation.

All representatives in the EOC would fulfill Operations and some Planning roles. In regard to the exercise itself, additional staff or volunteers would act in planning capacities in order to keep the exercise going to provide additional documentation of the actions taken for the following day’s critique.

Logistics would primarily be headed by the EM, with communications between the agencies taking place in the EOC for additional brainstorming. All actions under logistics, unless the responsibility of another agency or another agency volunteers, would be the responsibility of EM.

Finance/Administration would be handled by the heads of the governments and/or their appointed representatives/staff. How this would be handled with the event affecting two to three governmental bodies (Berry, Cynthiana, and Harrison County) would be questionable and likely an issue which would need to be addressed—part of the point of an exercise. One could speculate that Berry would not be present and rely upon Harrison County, and that the county and Cynthiana would work mutually for the entire event while keeping separate records.

Other elements of ICS would be the responsibility of respective agencies.

Since I have the opportunity to share these items with a new audience…
NOTE: This post is not serving as my graded submission–it will come later. I just wanted to get in on a little show and tell. 😉

As you know, many agencies and organizations are required, or have made it part of their normal operations, to perform table-top and full-scale drills and exercises. When we have had the ability to, our EM has taken photographs or video of the events. Below are some of the photos and videos that I’ve had time to publish online.

1999 – Motor vehicle accident w/ multiple injuries and casualty.

This exercise involved members of the Harrison County Volunteer Fire Department, Browns Ambulance Service, and Harrison Memorial Hosptial. The incident was staged outside of city limits, so city fire and police were not involved directly. Victims were transported and “treated” at HMH. Actors were members of KY51 AFJROTC.

2003 – Shooting situation at school function w/ multiple injuries and casualties.

Please excuse the quality of the videos–this was recorded before I had a nice camera and computer with enough power to edit/process videos.
WARNING: Audio for the videos is extremely LOUD–you may want to turn your volume all the way down and then slowly bring it up…

This incident was perhaps one of the largest (and most entertaining) exercises conducted to date. Agencies involved were the Cynthiana Police Department, Cynthiana Fire Department, Harrison County Sheriffs Office, Harrison County Fire Department, Browns Ambulance Service, Harrison Memorial Hospital, Harrison County Board of Education, and the Harrison County Coroner. Actors were members of the local police and fire explorers, and emergency management.

2007 – Motor vehicle accident involving school bus w/ multiple injuries and casualties.

This incident was tailored more toward fire-rescue involvement, whereas the last major exercise had been tailored more for law enforcement. Agencies involved in this incident were the Cynthiana Police Department, Cynthiana Fire Department, Harrison County Sheriffs Office, Harrison County Fire Department, Browns Ambulance Service, and Harrison Memorial Hospital. Actors were junior members of Harrison County Fire.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

Global warming; it’s a very hot topic. (Pun half-intended.)

Personally, I buy it.

Though there are those that say we are merely repeating old weather patterns that haven’t been seen in some time and theories that it’s simply our movement in space–theories that do make sense, as well–I believe in the theories and evidence of our roles in the climatic changes. Unfortunetly, I am not capable of saying much more than that, as it isn’t a topic that I’ve read much on.

Whether or not global warming is real, and whether or not the effects can be reversed, I do believe that we should act as if it is a real threat. Making efforts for conservation, clean energy, reducing “carbon footprints”, etc., is not only good for the environment, but good for the person as well.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

On the evening of August 11, 2010, the Cynthiana E-911 Dispatch Center received a call at 19:31 from the Cynthiana-Harrison County Airport of a downed aircraft. According to the contact person at the airport, the pilot of a 2003 Cirrus SR22, #N160EU, left the airfield radar approximately one mile northwest of the field after having made radio contact regarding the need of an emergency landing. The pilot reported that while at an altitude of 8,000 feet the “engine started to sputter and oil leaked” from the engine compartment onto the windshield (HCEMA, 2010). The pilot managed to blindly find and make a landing on the runway, finally coming to rest off the end of the runway in a neighboring crop of soybeans.

Cynthiana Police Department (CPD) unit 33 arrived on scene at 19:36. Shortly after 33′s arrival, Cynthiana Fire Department (CFD) and Brown’s Ambulance Service were dispatched to the scene. Deputies from the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office (SO) also announced that they were en route. At 19:44 Brown’s EC-5 arrived on scene, and Harrison County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) unit 806 advised he was en route. Shortly thereafter CFD Engine 2 and Unit 4 arrived on scene with 274 declaring Officer in Charge (OIC) for CFD. SO units 370 and 383 arrived at 19:46. CFD, after investigating the scene, left at 20:00. EC-5 left the scene as well, after making sure the pilot was fine at 20:03, three minute before 806′s arrival. The final units to leave the scene were 370 and 383 at 20:19, 379 and 33 at 20:35 and 806 at 20:39. (HCEMA, 2010)

During the event, members from many of Cynthiana and Harrison County’s emergency services were activated. Initially, CPD unit 33 was dispatched to investigate the call; an EC unit, CFD, SO and EMA units were later dispatched for additional support and management of the incident. Within their separate agencies elements of ICS were present. Overall, a variation of ICS was also present. As with most traditional interpretations of ICS the first to the scene was placed as the incident command until a more qualified representative arrived. In this incident, 33 was the first to arrive, giving an idea of direction to other agencies upon arrival. Overall, 33 remained in an IC capacity until the arrival of 806, at which time 33 resumed his primary role of law enforcement. During 33′s role as IC, he coordinated with dispatch the relay of information to 806, who then relayed the necessary and available information to the Commonwealth Emergency Operations Center’s (CEOC) duty officer. As this was a fairly large incident involving multiple agencies involving an aircraft, the CEOC had to be made aware in order for the FAA and NTSB to be notified. Upon notification of the incident, the CEOC contacted the Area EM Manager – EM-47—as well as the FAA, Kentucky State Police, and Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (HCEMA, 2010).

Where the incident did not involve any larger damage to life or property, the response to the incident was allowed to de-escalate. Agencies involved were also allowed to follow their normal lower-scaled operations and leave the scene when their services were no longer needed. The remainder of the operations were closed by the local EMA and the scene was left for an FAA representative to investigate the following day (HCEMA, 2010).

Communications and general Operations for the event were initially handled by the E-911 Dispatch Center and unit 33. Overall, these communications and handling of information went well, with the exception of dispatch taking time to notify unit 806. Unit 806 should have been notified of the incident almost immediately after the call was received, as the situation required notification of agencies outside of the area and there was the potential of a “hazmat” and ecological situation with the release of any fluids from the craft. The delay in notifying 806 may have been related to an influx of calls in the dispatch center—this is merely speculation based upon other inconsistencies in the E-911 Computer Aided Dispatch Incident Report. Fortunately, 806 is also a member of the city and county fire departments and was already aware and en route prior to being notified. While en route, 806 handled the remainder of the communications with outside agencies by notifying the CEOC.

Planning for the incident was initially handle by 33 and then handed to 806 upon his arrival. During the event, planning elements such as gathering information was handled by 33, with more being gathered and reported back from units 274, 370, 383 and EC-5.
Logistics were initially handled by the dispatch center, through the activation of the various local agencies per standard operating procedures. Once the respective agencies were notified, unit 806 planned and prepared for the possibility of further needs by contacting the CEOC. Fortunately, there weren’t any other needs to be met in this incident.

In general, this incident was handled well. All agencies were notified and responded in a relatively timely manner. Coordination of efforts went fairly smoothly; however, as seems to be the case, the local agencies were not able to fully respond and fill “all” of the functions of the ICS model as a larger group where the incident was still relatively small.

It is my opinion that the incident received better handling than the search and rescue (SAR) incident presented from the same community which utilized some of the same agencies. A possible reason for the better handling of the incident could be related to the differences in the individual responding units. In this situation, as opposed to the former units that responded to the scene were more “seasoned” and had also gone through more training than those who had responded to the SAR event. One other possible reason for the better handling of the incident could also be related to the larger number of units responding—organization and assignment of duties seems to come easier when there are more people available to handle the tasks.

References
Harrison County Emergency Management Agency. (2010, August 11). 2010 Situation Report File. Incident # 2010-00014115. Cynthiana, KY

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.