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EDMG340 Assignment 2

The following post was originally written as response to a classroom assignment:

Title	Assignment 2 – Terrorist Threats in Historical Perspective
Due	Oct 14, 2012 11:55 pm
Number of resubmissions allowed	Unlimited
Accept Resubmission Until	Feb 14, 2013 11:55 pm
Status	Submitted Nov 7, 2012 5:00 pm – late
Grade Scale	Points (max 100.0)
Modified by instructor	Oct 22, 2012 9:54 am
Instructions: Writers such as Walter Laqueur and Agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of State all have defined the term “Terrorism”. As you read of the different groups do you see similarities in these groups’ definitions? Research the definitions of terrorism as outlined by Laqueur, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of State, etc. After reading the various definitions in our reading for this week, provide the respective definitions and discuss the similarities and differences between them. Your work should be a minimum of 500 words and should utilize APA formatting. Save your work as a Microsoft Word or WordPerfect document entitled: “CMT2 YourLastName.doc” (i.e., CMT2-Jones.doc) and upload as your Week 2 written assignment.

Week 2 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG249

Christian Kazmierczak

11/07/2012

“There are more than a hundred definitions [for terrorism]; but none is wholly satisfactory,” states Walter Laqueur, historian, commentator and author of numerous works on culture, terrorism and warfare.

“No all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations and aims.” (Laqueur, 2009)

The FBI seems to agree with Laqueur, stating “There is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). However the bureau continues in stating that it sees terrorism as “Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28 CFR 0.85).

Elsewhere in US codes and law, terrorism has been defined as:

violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (31 CFR 561.312; 31 CFR 594.311; 18 USC § 2331).
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (22 USC § 2656f).

Further definition is given to terrorist groups, international terrorism and domestic terrorism have also been given as:

the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism (22 USC § 2656f).
the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country (22 USC § 2656f).
the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 USC § 2331).

Each of these definitions vary slightly, yet commonly, we can see that terrorism is defined as some means of violent or forceful demonstration or action against a certain population; frequently the acts are carried to exact influence or coercion. As is noted in the U.S. definitions having a basis in criminal activity, these acts are typically illegal, as they usually violate federal or state-level laws. Differences in the definitions are slight, with regard to whether the acts are “premeditated”—though arguably, many would be—and whether the acts are politically motivated. Arguing whether an act would be politically motivated or carried out in the name of religion or other concept is moot, as all are simply schools of thought.

References

Act of international terrorism, 31 CFR 561.312

Crimes and Criminal Procedure: Terrorism, 18 USC § 2331

Department of State: Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 22 USC § 2656f

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012). Terrorism: 2002-2005. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005

Federal Bureau of Investigation: General Functions, 28 CFR 0.85

Laqueur, W. (2009). Terrorism: A Brief History. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20210428105107/http://www.laqueur.net/index2.php?r=2&id=71

Terrorism, 31 CFR 594.311

EDMG340 Week 5 Forum — Managing the Event – Incident Command System

The following post was authored in response to a classroom forum:

Week 5 Forum Post your response to the week 5 forum question here. Do you support the analyses, conclusions and recommendations of the author? State your agreement / disagreement. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

After reading both “From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command” by Donald P. Moynihan and “Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S.” by Donald P. Moynihan”, please answer the following questions in terms of each article:

• Do you support the author’s analyses; his conclusions; his recommendations? If you disagree with his positions – so state.

• Why do you agree / disagree?

Both articles are available under “Course Tools”. Follow the “Lessons” link and look for the Week Five Lesson.

In review of Moynihan’s articles, it would seem that there is no clear recommendation other than that of practice and review of the ICS model for implementation in multi-agency disaster response; such a statement is painfully obvious, however desperately in need of constant reiteration. Many of the nation’s lower governments and responders have expressed frustration with coordination in times of crisis; since the advent of the DHS and NIMS, blame is placed upon the gamut of NIMS directives—included is the use of ICS. Moynihan authors his papers to discuss the reasoning behind the declared use of ICS, offers examples of where ICS implementation has succeeded and failed, and finally delivers criticism for the better use of ICS.

The federal government made a wise choice in supporting and requiring the use of ICS. The expectation, however, that all governments and services would be able to implement the structure was somewhat immature; but is this the fault of our federal government? Moynihan has pointed out on numerous occasions in From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina that many entities outside the fire service knew of the ICS concept prior to NIMS; example is given with the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma. During this disaster, coordination between agencies was made possible through establishing a modified Incident Command System, where each service took control of a specific issue and reported back to a centralized command.

Opposing the Oklahoma example, giving what still remains the greatest example of misuse and poor application of ICS, is the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Though the local, state, and even federal governments had been required to develop and practice action plans implementing ICS, none of the involved organizations had a clue of what needs had to be met. Some of this confusion is blamed—somewhat appropriately—on the fact that the mandates were still relatively new; additional confusion came from the restructuring and organization of FEMA under the DHS umbrella, as well as assignment of resources such as military units to Homeland aligned operations.

Finally, Moynihan shows example of how agencies without experience in coordinating efforts possess the ability to implement such a structure in Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools. In this article Moynihan reviewed the use of ICS in the Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) outbreak of 2003. Initially, agencies struggled in organizing efforts as they continued to operate under their normal, respective procedures. Eventually, a networked structure was created; showing the effectiveness of ICS –a system typically considered to be centralized and hierarchal in design—in situations that aren’t traditionally considered for such a system. Interestingly, this example effectively shows how the original concepts of ICS implementation were ignorantly instituted, yet still completely valid.

A portion of the original idea of mandating ICS was the creation of a simple, no-fuss solution of command and responsibility; the ICS structure was chosen for its wide use and assumed effectiveness in the fire service. It has been argued that these beliefs were premature; furthermore, analysis and critiques have been given, stating that the traditional concepts of an ICS are neither modular nor adaptable to any given situation. In his END example, Moynihan shows that through simple modification, an ICS can exist and operate effectively, given the time and resources necessary to implement, practice and make adjustments as necessary—a concept which was behind the intent of ICS implementation.

I agree that the stiff definition of an ICS may not work in all situations; ICS will work, however, if it is not seen as a centralized command with a single head. A modified approach, viewing ICS as a management system with a unified command is, perhaps, the most appropriate method for organizing efforts during multi-agency operations. Practice of such a system is also a must for successful implementation in a time of crisis—agencies asking for assistance in understanding the concepts as events are unfolding will cause great delay and further confusion.

References

Moynihan , D. (2007). From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command System. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

Moynihan , D. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. Crises Management. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administrations, and Institutions, 21(2), 205-229. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-

EDMG340 Week 3 Forum

The Following post was originally written as a response to a classroom forum:

Week 3 Forum Post your response to the week 3 forum question here. Do you support the analyses, conclusions, recommendations of the authors? State your agreement / disagreement. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

Read Stephen E. Flynn’s, “America the Resilient: Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters” and Bruce Hoffman’s, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters”. Both articles are available under “Course Tools”. Follow the “Lessons” link and look for the Week Three Lesson.

Respond to the following questions:

Do you support each author’s analyses; their conclusions; their recommendations?
If you disagree with the authors’ positions – so state. Why do you agree / disagree?

Comparing the two writings before us for this week’s forum is an interesting, if not slightly challenging task; both writings are quite opinionated—Flynn’s being an original commentary, Hoffman’s a response to a different author’s work. Flynn and Hoffman also seem to take opposing sides on the argument of response and preparation for foreign terrorism on our native soil. In their respective writings, it appears that Flynn prefers standing behind the idea of rebuilding the public, while Hoffman is found supporting the idea of a government taking stronger action abroad. Personally, it is somewhere between these schools of thought that I stand.

In his review of Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad, Hoffman counterpoints arguments that Mid-Eastern groups such as al Qaeda are no longer the threats that they had once been. According to Hoffman, the author had suggested that without the self-proclaimed/designated cell leader, Osama bin Laden, played such a key role in the organization that, once removed, the al Qaeda we knew could no longer function. Hoffman suggests that such a viewpoint is misguided and not understanding of how societies work; Hoffman supports his stance with claims from American and foreign intelligence communities, undermining Sageman’s notion that Western al Qaeda-like splinters or sects are a greater threat. I find Hoffman’s criticisms of Sageman’s work entertaining, where part of his point is that Sageman doesn’t understand how a society might work; in supporting his opinion, Hoffman seems to do the same, missing Sageman’s point of view.

While Hoffman’s argument is valid—others may rise to revive and lead foreign terrorist groups—he doesn’t comprehend that the same can happen with any of those that might have lost communication with their foreign leaders. Though Hoffman may be correct with his underlining of faults in Sageman’s supporting evidence and theories, the point is missed—a community of terrorists residing domestically without the instruction and ties that had once existed might serve themselves in reorganizing with differing tactics, potentially posing a greater risk. Newly formed or organized splinter groups may not act in the manner as they once had; likewise, new incarnations may become an addition to the pre-existing issues, should the original organization survive and rebuild itself.

Flynn writes an interesting piece, speaking of the need of a stronger public; stronger in self-sufficiency and self-esteem. Flynn outlines his beliefs that the American public has grown somewhat lazy, and has regressed to the status of a public depending heavily upon the government; something that seemed to grow rather than diminish following the attacks on September 11, 2001. Exactly how, where and when this phenomena occurred is—like all political discussion—up for debate; yet the argument remains that the people aren’t as resilient as they had been generations prior. Fortunately, time has passed since Flynn’s writing, and American society seems to be improving in this regard.

Two years prior to Flynn’s publication, our nation was astounded at the response—on civilian and all governmental levels—to the natural disaster commonly known as Hurricane Katrina. Immediately following Katrina came a barrage of studies and reports on the public and the nation’s infrastructure—many of which are referenced or hinted at in Flynn’s work. These reports helped supply Flynn in stating that we—as a nation—are ill-prepared for almost anything, and believe that the federal government will serve our better interests and fix these issues. In response, Flynn suggests that the entire public needs to take cue from those that had been aboard United Airlines Flight 93—to believe that they are capable of recognizing and challenging/preventing/overcoming disaster. Though United 93 did result in “martyrdom” of the passengers and crew, the actions showed that the public has the power to change their fate.

In his writing, Flynn suggested that the next president should take steps to re-enforce the public, and enact changes to allow for better distribution of power and aid to the people. As of late, we can see that some of these changes have taken place—whether or not one would want to attribute these changes to the current government. Despite political differences, the majority should be capable of agreeing that public involvement and opinion has increased, and that federal dependence—with regard to emergency/disaster situations—has changed and is continuing to change.

Personally, I believe that we—as a nation—do still need to keep an eye on foreign organizations; though we must not forget that the possibility exists for domestic terrorism. I also believe that we must do as much as possible to continue to raise the spirit and involvement of our public. Supporting both of these ideas should not be a difficult task to accomplish, nor should one detract from another. Through rebuilding public resiliency, we can better ourselves and nation—providing stronger abilities to respond in crisis, at home and abroad.

…throughout this response I have tried to refrain from offering political opinion; I prefer not to enter political debate. I will, however, offer this as my only political thought: It’s no coincidence that there has been improvement and change since Flynn’s writing—in 2009 a new President was sworn in, and a new director to FEMA was appointed… 😉

References:

Hoffman, B. (2008). The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism. Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 133-138. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=31701303&site=ehost-live

Flynn, S. E. (2008). America the Resilient: Defying terrorism and mitigating natural disaster. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

EDMG340 Week 2 Forum

The following post was originally submitted in response to a classroom forum:

Week 2 Forum Post your response to the week 2 forum question here. Does it matter that there is no common or universally developed definition for terrorism? State your position. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

Obviously, there is no complete agreement about the definition of terrorism. In preparing to write his “consensus definition” as adopted by the United Nations in 1988, Schmid examined over 100 definitions and found that they could be ranked according to emphasis by frequency in this order:

Goals (political)
Purposes (fear)
Targets (direct victims and reactions)
Methods (combat strategy or tactic)
What seems common to most definitions are:
An act or threat of violence…
…the immediate victims of which are not the primary target nor the violence the primary objective…
…but which, instead, is intended to induce fear in third parties (political, religious, ethnic, social, etc.) in order to effect behavioral changes in those parties…
…OR to exact revenge upon them for perceived grievances.

Most acts of terrorism are, in fact, crimes as defined by most nations (murder, destruction of property, etc.), particularly when the immediate victims are noncombatants and the violent act is not committed within the “traditional” conventions of warfare. In the latter case, the violent act may be “legitimate combat”, or it may still be a war crime, depending upon the circumstances. The incident at My Lai during the Vietnam War was certainly not “legitimate combat”, for instance, although it occurred during the prosecution of a war.

What makes an act Terrorism?

Few words are as politically or emotionally charged as terrorism. A 1988 study by the U.S. Army (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB207.pdf) counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements. Terrorism expert Walter Laquer in 1999 also has counted over 100 definitions and concludes that the “only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence”. Other definitions of terrorist are; the use of violence and intimidation to achieve political ends, the killing and maiming of innocent people, and the act of scaring people for a social or political reason using violence. Nevertheless, one thing they all have in common; is that terrorist believe that if others are afraid of them, they will have more power over other people.

There is a long-standing legal code called Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2331 which is entitled “Terrorism” and attempts to define it, but it is essentially all about international terrorism and represents America’s version of outlawing internecine conflict on its soil. Internecine conflict is when someone else’s battle spills over on your land, which might not seem important, but terrorists often disregard any respected areas of combat or demarcated battlefields.

Does it matter that there isn’t a globally accepted, clear-cut definition for the term terrorism? Yes; but will there ever be?

For the most-part, man-kind can agree that an act of terrorism is one in which one entity acts against another in such a manner that one by-product—if not the main goal—is the creation of fear; the reason or aim of the act and creation of terror may vary greatly. The trouble is, as varying collectives and societies have differing cultures and practices, we extend the definition further and impose a larger degree of differing responses to said acts; as such any one person may be considered a terrorist—even within our own societies—and may be persecuted in manners seen unjust by others.

In the U.S., terrorism has been defined as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” This definition works fairly well—and applies to foreign and domestic perpetrators. Unfortunately, this definition allows room for interpretation and application to any number of individuals and acts, depending upon how one chooses to define force and violence, and whether the act in question had the purpose of gaining a political or social objective.

Due to the differences in people in general—let alone societies—I doubt that there will ever be a globally accepted definition of terrorism unless there comes a point at which the entire world comes to terms with all her inhabitants; according to Star Trek mythology, this won’t occur for another 50-60 years, following World War III. After this—once Zefrem Cochrane has discovered “warp” and the Vulcans have accepted us into the Federation of Planets—we will then be working on drafting a universal definition of terrorism.

PBHE413 Week 6 Forum – Natural Disasters

The following post was originally written in response to a classroom forum:

For what natural disaster is your local community at highest risk? Considering this information, answer these questions: what are the triage, mass casualty care and public health challenges involved in a response to this disaster?

If you have had experience in natural disaster response, please share your stories and insights with the class.

It would seem that Harrison County, her two cities, and sparsely distributed communities are at greater risk of flooding events, with other meteorological events following close in ranking. Frequently our communities are faced with flooding events, with the areas of primary concern being Cynthiana, the county seat. At least once a year Cynthiana is faced with waters rising near, if not above, flood-stage. Often-times the rising waters become more of a hindrance and nuisance rather than a disaster; the closing of one commonly traveled roadway is practically guaranteed, and the potential of damages to structures and land alongside said road is equally frequent.

Floodwaters also provide the potential of rising higher with decent frequency, and causing problems with the lower west-side of Cynthiana, commonly overtaking storm sewers and backfilling into intersections and roadways a few blocks away that lie at a lower elevation than the river banks. At times, this backfill enters into basements, creeps toward homes on the surface, and reduces/removes street access to certain residential areas; similar situations occur in rural areas of the county. Fifteen years ago, however, flood waters challenged the boundaries of the 100-year floodplain, and created quite a bit of trouble for the entire county and her emergency services.

With the threats of flooding—and most natural disasters—there generally occurs issues with transportation; heavily traveled roads may become more congested due to the closing of secondary routes, or vice-versa. In flooding events that are “normal” for this area, congestion is seen on our main highways due to the closing of some secondary streets; during the extraordinary flooding event of 1997, congestion was seen on many single-lane, two-way roads outside of the city limits, due to the closure of two main highways. The blockage of these roadways made travel difficult for emergency vehicles and increased response time. Since that event, measures are taken to stage a temporary “station” for fire and ambulance on the opposing side of the river; both the city fire department and ambulance service take extra precautions to verify that they are equipped and stocked slightly above normal capacity when operating out of this satellite location. Additionally, crews sent to operate in this area are familiarized with alternate routes back to the city and hospital, so as to limit the needs of asking dispatch for directions.

When the potential threat of flooding exists, plans are made in advance—typically two days, up to one week—for the coordinating, opening and operations of shelters for potential victims; these efforts are another example of lessons learned from 1997. Voluntary evacuation of the potentially affected areas occurs 4-12 hours before the expected flood-crest. During these planning and preparation phases all emergency and medical services are notified of the potential risks. Further medical response and preparation for these events has not been tested—to my knowledge—as none of the events since 1997 have caused issues that would specifically impact the local hospital, outside of their concerns of staffing.

Another potential disaster concern for the entire community is that of winter storms bringing large amounts of snow and/or ice. Similar to the effects of flooding, snow/ice have the potential of closing roadways. Again, this issue does not seem to cause the local hospital much concern, other than the potential impact on staffing. Frequently, members of the emergency community volunteer to aid in the transport of nursing staff to the hospital—typically transport is volunteered by the members of Harrison County’s volunteer fire department and the Harrison County Sheriff. As I understand it, the hospital encourages employees to find a location in town to spend the night, or find alternate transportation methods; no other efforts or accommodations are made by the hospital for their staff.

Finally, the most common potential for disaster lies in damages associated with thunderstorm activity. Any thunderstorm may potentially bring damaging winds or tornadic activity, which would again cause issues with transportation and utilities. Similar to the other previously mentioned events, all emergency services plan accordingly.

I realize that I have failed to discuss the challenges associated with a mass casualty event during these potential disasters; I’ve done so, in part, due to the ignorance of the local medical community. To the best of my knowledge, the local hospital has never truly planned for any potential for a disaster beyond the concerns of whether there will be enough staff on hand, “just-in-case”. In my experience of observing a number of disaster exercises—all dealing with other extraordinary hazards outside the norms mentioned—the hospital has never exercised anything other than processing the list of staff and calling off-duty personnel to see if they would be able to give an ETA for response. Not once have I seen or heard of an instance where the hospital has truly tested their abilities beyond their routine operations.

In reality, even the more mundane of events—such as the norms I have listed—have the potential of creating a mass-casualty event. Every disaster mentioned has an effect on transportation to some degree; every transportation issue has the potential of creating any number of traffic accidents. During any one of these events, the potential exists for a traffic accident to involve any number of victims with a variety of injuries and the potential involvement of any chemical; one fully occupied mini-van could potentially inundate our hospital’s emergency room. Unfortunately, it seems that our medical community—save those that respond on-scene—is ignorant of these possibilities, and takes for granted the time for transport locally and involvement of flight-crews from regional hospitals; time associated with ambulance response and transport allows for calling additional staff, while patients being air-lifted are the responsibility of another hospital.

Not meaning to sound grim, or wanting to wish ill upon others, but I would thoroughly enjoy seeing a true mass-casualty event befall our community, just so that the local hospital could see how idiotic and dangerous their smugness truly is.

PBHE413 Biological Terrorism

The following was originally published in response to a classroom forum:

One of the concerns in the emergency preparedness community relates to the ability to rapidly recognize a biological event if it were to occur in a community. This can involve recognition of an unusual cluster of illnesses, such as those spread by contaminated food (salmonella, e. coli, etc). Once recognized, then a determination must be made regarding whether this public health event was a natural occurrence or a man-made, deliberately caused outbreak. Does your community have mechanisms in place for early detection? What are the reporting procedures? Have they been practiced or drilled?

Please note that the majority of this response is speculative and based on assumed or third-hand knowledge, and has not been verified for accuracy…

—

To the best of my knowledge, there are not any facilities or agencies within Harrison County equipped or prepared for the early detection of biological terrorism, beyond the normal expectations of doctors and associated clinicians performing general diagnostics and evaluations of symptoms. Our hospital laboratory can process a variety of tests, however many samples are processed at larger metropolitan facilities; I would have to assume that certain biological agents would be amongst these. I will say that I have heard from reliable sources involved in the local medical community that when an initial need for testing occurs, our laboratory evaluates the need for materials and procedures necessary to conduct the tests in house.

Reporting procedures are likely unclear, with respect to alerting the public. Normal procedures of health concerns eventually reach the public in the form of an article published in the weekly newspaper, a memorandum passed along to school-children and discussion on the local radio station’s Monday through Friday morning hour-long talk show. Within recent history our E-911 dispatch center has gained the ability to contact citizens that have opted into an auto-dialing program for notification of varied public concerns; our medical community has not yet had a need to pass along a message to dispatch, though the opportunity exists. All agencies and organizations within the community know that it is possible to contact the broadcast media in Lexington in order to relay the message on their televised newscasts and social media channels. I believe that the medical community knows that notification of the local EM, dispatch center, and government officials are required; whether this would be practiced as policy dictates is unknown—to my knowledge there has never been a drill or exercise related to a bio-terror incident. There have, however been notifications to the public in years past concerning MRSA—notification came in the form of an article in the local paper and memos from the local board of education.

Reporting to higher medical authorities are routinely practiced per policies and regulations; there are, however, frequent hiccups—according to my sources—in the order to which these procedures are to be carried out.

I do know that there are plans in place for possible bio-terroristic events, with the expectation that the event would take place in a different area, and that our community would have to take preventative action. In late 2002, early 2003, our nation became concerned about the possibility of the terroristic release of the variola virus—smallpox—into the population. The entire medical and EM community responded by planning for such an instance, developing plans for distribution centers and prioritizing sectors of officials and the public for inoculation should the President order the release and distribution of the vaccine. In a three-part informational column then Public Health Administrator of the Wedco District Health Department, Dr. Julie W. McKee, described the plans for Harrison County (Barnes, 2003). In the plans, McKee stated that Wedco would initially be responsible for its own staff as would Harrison Memorial Hospital; following the inoculation of respective medical staff, Wedco and HMH would proceed to inoculating members of local emergency services and government. Once the local medical and emergency communities were supplied, two named locations would be opened, staffed by Wedco and HMH personnel, for the purposes of reaching the general public. Fortunately, the need never came; unfortunately—to my knowledge—the plan was never tested.

I do know that this specific plan did bring about discussion amongst emergency services personnel, with many of the agency leaders asking their respective personnel whether they would receive the vaccine should the voluntary inoculation take place—I had been asked if I would partake. Though I cannot remember my exact response, I wouldn’t doubt that I made a joke about the federal cataloging of citizens through smallpox vaccination that had been dreamed up in The X-Files.

Similar plans are in place for other vaccination possibilities—I had heard that the local hospital had established a plan based on the aforementioned smallpox plan during the 2009 H1N1 scare. It would be safe to assume that similar plans would be applied for other incidents, with modifications to include the addition of other vaccination stations—most likely separated by school or voting district.

References

Barnes, B. (2003) Health Officials Plan for Threat of Small Pox. The Cynthiana Democrat. Retrieved October 30, 2012 from: http://harrisonema.com/2003/01/29/officials-plan-for-threat-of-small-pox/

—

I have no clue if I referenced the articles properly, considering I pulled the three of them from a single page that I published seven years ago… When I re-published the articles I failed to note the exact date of publication; additionally, the Cynthiana Democrat does not offer an online archive for articles prior to December 2007…

PBHE413 Week 3 Forum – Medical Disaster Response

The following was written in response to a classroom forum:

Respond to one or both of these questions (respond to the second one only if you have experience with this):

Experience has shown that the hospitals nearest the scene of a disaster are often overwhelmed with self-triaged patients before the first EMS transports are dispatched from the scene. In your opinion, why do the “worried well” seek emergency services during these times, even if they are not sick or injured? How can organizations prepare for this expected influx of non- or mildly injured patients while still retaining the ability to care for the truly injured?

OR

Does your local law enforcement community have a program such as Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) in place? Have you had experience with it? What are some of the challenges tactical medics face?

There are many reasons as to why anyone classified amongst the “worried well” might seek care during a disaster situation; the most common reasons likely being connected to some incarnation of fear, misinformation, ignorance, or a combination of these elements. If we were to take an individual off the street and poll them on how they would respond to a given scenario, we might find that their response is one that differs from what we—varying members of the emergency community—would necessarily expect or recommend; this is simple ignorance of the proper methods, procedures or actions. The individual would, however, likely supply some sort of response based on the level of knowledge they possess of the given scenario, or some similar situation, referring to their simplest and most basic training in life—which, in this case, would likely be to seek immediate assistance from a professional.

To the medical professionals in this course—you have likely seen, responded, or worked on cases where a patient did not need treatment—or if they did, it could have came from a first-aid kit or a trip to the corner drugstore. Many of these patients may have been ignorant to the simplicity of their injury/ailment; some may have been knowledgeable—or would have been—had they not been influenced by the situation in some manner, triggering a flash of fear and confusion.

[Fear, confusion and other emotional responses can come at odd times and have quite an effect on our behavior. I had known a person that had broken their arm, and responded to it with an “Awe, cool!” mentality, chasing their siblings with a wildly flailing arm. Later in life, that very same person fainted from the sight of the pinkish skin he revealed on a finger after pulling back and ripping off a nail-cuticle. An odd tale–but one that shows how an individual can react differently to varying stimuli. In this tale, we can see how a single person may calmly respond and await treatment—arm flailing—or seek immediate treatment—cuticle—based upon their reaction to the event.]

To the parents of multiple children in this course—how many times did you rush your first-born infant or toddler to the hospital? Did you transport the child in your personal vehicle or await an ambulance? Did your next child make as many trips to the ER, or had you changed your perception of an emergency? Initial responses to a new situation, such as the care of a child are heightened, where there may not be a base of comparison or a personal knowledge-bank.

[Picture this one—your first-born infant is spiking a nice temperature. You do have knowledge that Tylenol can bring it down; you even have a bottle or two in the medicine cabinet; yet the sight and sounds of the baby in discomfort wipes your memory of this information. What do you do?—you likely respond by seeking a professional, either through calling a doctor, a family member, or by loading the babe in the car and driving to the hospital—and if you drove, it’s because you ‘knew’ that an ambulance wouldn’t come fast enough. Now, with the third or fourth kid, you simply mutter to yourself, grab a doser, and sigh when that sticky pink fluid drips down junior’s chin and all over that clean Onesie…]

With these examples of everyday possibilities to facing the “worried well”, we can understand how the numbers may grow in disaster situations—when people may be relatively fine or unharmed. Facilities must expect that there will be a greater influx of these patients as well as patients in true dire need of assistance. In order to prepare for these scenarios, the involved organizations must work to establish a triage system in which all patients can be evaluated and prioritized according to medical condition. Unfortunately, these efforts are only as effective in relation to the numbers of staff and personnel available, the size of any facilities involved, and the number of patients that arrive. Additionally, efforts will be affected by the communication between any agencies involved, whether any plans laid out are followed, and the unknowns involving the patients/public themselves/itself.

In communities where more than one hospital or medical center exist, multiple locations can be coordinated and organized for the receipt of the varying levels of trauma; clinics and related facilities may be used for low-priority trauma and first-aid, while larger hospitals are reserved for high-priority cases. Organizing, designating and publicizing such locations in such a manner would greatly reduce some of the headaches associated with a massive event; however, there would still be issues related to members of the public incorrectly identifying their injuries to either extreme, or bypassing a designated location out of personal preference. Staffing requirements and transportation may become an issue as well.

With regard to those persons who are more-or-less in a state of shock, suffering little to no injury at all, medical centers would need to respond with staffing persons able to handle the psychological aspects of disaster. Supplying a psychological support staff might be easier than it seems—as many of the patients are in a shock state and not necessarily psychotic, it would be possible to train additional staff in disaster psychology—support staff such as secretaries, housekeeping and maintenance, as well as staff from other supporting emergency services could be utilized to calm and speak with the patients.

In every aspect of the disaster situation, the medical community might benefit from establishing a medical reserve corps or nurses auxiliary; keeping in good contact with such reserves and inclusion of these additional resources in planning and exercises would be mandatory for successful operation and organization, however.

EDMG340 Week 1 – Definition and Scope of Consequence Management

The following post was originally submitted in response to a class forum:

Post your response to the week 1 forum question here. Just because it is a terrible act, is it an act of terrorism? State your position. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

Terrorism is associated with violence, politics, toppling governments and religion. Terrorism is difficult to define because it is a value term. It implies that the violence used to achieve the goals of the group is not justified. However, the use of terrorism is common to many “good” causes in history, including the American Revolutionary War, the American Civil War, and the French Revolution.

Terrorists do not try to achieve military victory but count on creating public opinion that will result in the changes they seek. Terrorists do not call themselves “terrorists”. Terrorism is a label used by the dominant power to create an image of the terrorists as “evil”. Terrorists see the world in Black and White. There is no middle ground. They believe they have the higher moral ground and often believe they have divine knowledge. Terrorists do not recognize the concepts of innocent bystanders, neutral parties, civilians, or noncombatants.

Early terms associated with terrorism, such as zealot, assassin, thug, terror, and class warfare, come from many countries around the world. The use of terrorism can be found in early American history in the American Revolutionary War, the treatment of Native Americans, the American Civil War, and the interracial violence that occurred following the American Civil War.

One of the most horrific terror campaigns in the United States was the lynching of African Americans. Lynching’s were common from 1870 to 1915 and continue up to the present day. Lynching were much more than extra-legal justice. The victims were brutalized, tortured, and put on public display as a warning to others. This display was intended to change and alter behavior of a portion of society this making it terror. What do you think?

The Ku Klux Klan was one of the most notorious domestic American terrorism groups. In the twentieth century, Americans feared the terror posed by Communist revolutionaries and other Communist-Marxist-inspired governments and groups. The reaction of the U.S. public and government to Red Scare in many ways resembles the reaction to reaction to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent war on terrorism.

As stated in the prompt of this forum and in other course materials, terrorism can be a difficult term to define. It seems to be agreed upon that the basic concept of terrorism is an act in which fear is either employed from the start or becomes an end result of actions taken in resistance to or against some law, practice or ideology; the element of fear may also be the trigger of a terroristic—possibly revolutionary—act.
In more modern times, terrorism has been defined by the United States government as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

Terrorism has also been defined as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

With these definitions—the loosely accepted common concept, as well as the two defined by our government—it is fairly easy to question what actions are terroristic with an evil or immoral undertone, and which are a more natural and acceptable movement of civil unrest. One good example of such questioning raised in the course material as well as this forum prompt is the American Revolutionary War.

The Revolutionary War and acts leading up to the drafting of the Declaration of Independence could easily be defined as an act of terrorism, with both sides—Britain and the Colonies—being equal participants in feeding the fears and creating violence. An oppressive government body led to unrest among the people, who then began to organize and protest—one of the most noted protests being what became known as the Boston Tea Party. Though the Tea Party itself may not have necessarily been a violent act—with physical harm coming to a person—it still bore elements of terroristic acts. Additionally, varying American Patriots did perform terroristic acts causing physical harm, such as the tarring and feathering of customs agents, ships captains and Royal sympathizers; Patriot actions such as this aided in raising levels of fear amongst British serviceman, eventually leading to events such as the Boston Massacre.

Were any of the measures and actions taken prior to the Declaration justified? Were they terroristic? Time has shown that the later results of the acts led to “good” with the creation of a “great” nation, spawning the movement toward democratic republics across the globe. Over two and a quarter centuries later, we can easily justify the actions of the Patriot movement; but if we attempt to place ourselves in that time, we might find the question difficult to answer, as the actions were terroristic.

PBHE413 Introduction and course goals

The following was originally written in response to a class forum:

In this Forum, please introduce yourself to the class. You may include such things as the type of work you do, your organization or branch of service, where you live, how far along you are on your degree path, family, interests, etc.–anything that will allow us to know you better.

Secondly, please tell me about your goals for this course. What did you think about when you saw the title of this course and registered?

Your initial Forum post must be a minimum of 250 words, and must be submitted by Sunday of Week 1.

Call me Ishmael.

No, actually, don’t call me Ishmael—that’s not my name; but it’s a catchy first line! It’s also the extent of what I know of Moby Dick…

Yours, truly My name is Jeremiah—if you somehow missed seeing the title and author lines of this post. I’m in my early thirties, and haven’t done much with my life, aside from raising a family and attending school. I live in a quiet little town in Kentucky, called Cynthiana—maybe you’ve heard of it, there’s some sort of fictional cop turned zombie hunter from here.

I play around with the local EM from time to time, maintaining all the social media outlets as best as I can—voluntarily, and frequently from my phone. I’ve helped out in a few disasters—potential ones, more than actual ones—usually in a clerical or “gopher” capacity. I’ve been volunteering with the local EM for about ten years, became interested through my dad—he’s been attached to the agency for about twenty, director for the past eight.

Honestly, when I first saw this course, I thought something along the lines of, “Aw, cool! Mom’s gonna like this one!” My mother is an RN at the local hospital—ICU and TCU, with the fun of pulling house every couple of weeks and the occasional ER duties. Though she’s enjoyed hearing me speak about the varying topics I’ve covered in previous courses, I thought she might find it entertaining to hear me speak about a class that has a dose of medical information included.

I really can’t think of much more to say about myself, family or schooling, so feel free to Google me if you’re curious; the full name is Jeremiah Hall Palmer and the Internet handle is my amateur license, KG4VMA.

EDMG340 Welcome to EDMG340!-Introductions

The following was originally posted as a response to a class forum.

Call me Ishmael.

No, actually, don’t call me Ishmael—that’s not my name; but it’s a catchy first line! It’s also the extent of what I know of Moby Dick…

Yours, truly My name is Jeremiah—if you somehow missed seeing the title and author lines of this post. I’m in my early thirties, and haven’t done much with my life, aside from raising a family and attending school; I’ve three children, Taron (8), Nivea (6) and Violet (2). The Mrs.—Diana—is the bread-winner, and I’m the homemaker. We live in a quiet little town in Kentucky, called Cynthiana—maybe you’ve heard of it, there’s some sort of fictional cop turned vampire hunter from here.