Tag: college

Hello;

I hate the introductory part of class. There. I said it. Right off the bat. And I kind of feel better about myself for doing it.

As you might guess from that opening, I’m not much on proper sentence structure either…

<sarcasm>…wouldn’t my elementary grammar teachers be proud?</sarcasm>

But, seriously…

My name is Jeremiah—but I go by Jeremy to close friends, sometimes Palmer to a rare few, and I’m pretty sure I’ve been called a dozen other more colorful names by my ex-wife. And, yeah, I guess I’ll go ahead and delve into that painful subject, as it is a part of my life—whether I’d like it to be or not.

I’m a divorced, single father of three, struggling to provide as best as I can—which is way less than I’d like to; fortunately, the children recognize my struggles, and they handle it remarkably well, considering the hell that it is.

We’d been a family of five up through Easter of 2014—up until that day when our wife and mother decided to leave us for an old male friend of hers that had just returned to the area the day prior. Yes, I’m still a bit bitter about it, and likely will be for years to come. The only good outcome from that mess was her realization that the children would be much better off at home with me than with her and her new beau—and soon to be fourth ex-husband. I suppose I do get a slight feeling of schadenfruede from that last point… But…

[…I could continue to write at great length on that mess—and how wonderful it would be to vent all of that anger and frustration!—but, really, it’d be rather pointless to do so…]

A few months ago I decided to re-enroll in school, since I’ve not had much success in finding better employment. Presently, I’m working on a part-time basis at a local radio station—WCYN. I was originally hired last year to operate the board during remote broadcasts of a neighboring county’s high school sports events on the FM; since that time I’ve taken on the duties of Saturday and Sunday morning productions on both the AM and FM stations. I often fill-in for some of our local sports remotes when the regular guy isn’t available to run the board—I’m kind of hoping that I might just take his spot, but I digress.

…that’s something else about me—I frequently go off rail and give a little side-note or commentary whenever I am speaking in a more personal manner. I’ve been complimented on this odd ability to briefly leave topic and circle right ‘round to the beginning again; oft-times I’ve left people bewildered as to how I can keep separate, yet connected thoughts straight… but, again, I digress—and in a digression, no less!

My interests in Emergency Management stem from my father—our county’s current EM Director. His involvement in EM can trace back to some of his childhood interests—a few of which may come from his father before him. My grandfather had been a fireman at one point in his life—though I sadly must admit that I’m not aware of his position within the local department; I have, however, seen a picture of him posed on a knee in one of the bays, dressed in the old blue work uniform, holding a rather large teddy for a Toys-for-Tots drive. As for my father, though, I believe it was a combination of his dad’s service interests and an interest in CB radio that helped guide him. My dad eventually became involved in a long since defunct REACT team that had been very active in assisting with Civil Defense efforts in the community. At some point in the ‘90s that REACT’s local president was tapped to become the next Disaster and Emergency Services coordinator—a few short years before DES was rebranded and reorganized as EM. The DES coordinator ended up roping my father into helping him rewrite the EOP, and perform a lot of the clerical duties that were becoming more and more “tech” dependant—and it was here that I started to become pulled into helping a bit.

In the late ‘90s—circa 1997, I think—my dad asked me if I could help figure out how to network a couple of computers, set up a Juno email account, and manage a GeoCities page. Eventually, that background work led to my becoming a deputy with the Cynthiana – Harrison County Emergency Management Agency in the latter part of August ’01. I was very “active” through the first couple of years, up until I was married and my son born in 2004. In the years that followed, my role became less of an active “agent”—lack of a better word—to a digital face in the background while I filled greater duties at home as a house-husband. I ended up establishing myself as the guy charged with creating and maintaining an online presence and interacting with the public on social media—long before that even became a “thing.” Yes, our local agency’s Twitter account and Facebook page pre-dates many of Kentucky’s counties’ accounts/pages—and even KYEM’s!

Unfortunately, turmoil at home caused issue with my abilities to maintain things as regularly as I believed I should, and eventually became a repeated point of argument in my marriage; truth be told, so did earlier attempts at schooling here at APU—which is a grand portion of the reason why I am currently enrolled in this class alone for this eight week period. I am on academic probation thanks to numerous failed attempts at schooling during those final years of my marriage.

Following my divorce, I eventually wrote the most difficult email I’d ever written in my life—I resigned from my duties and involvement from the local EM. This was an especially difficult thing to do, where the person I had to notify was now my father—he’d become the director about a year or two after I had been sworn in as a deputy. Though the message was professional and dry, a hidden subtext that only him and I could see was present; “Dear Dad, I’m a f***-up, and can’t do it anymore…”

Sadder still—to me, anyway, as I know the following I’d built—the agency’s domain and hosting were allowed to expire, and posts to social media are few and far between—and less than timely.

Meanwhile, I’ve continued to hang on as best I can in giving the children as close to a “normal” life as possible, while their mother flits in and out of their lives when it’s convenient for her. Back to the point where I say this is hell.

I’m a thirty-five year-old single (divorced) father, with kids at home, no real job to speak of, an incomplete college education, no “real” experience outside that of being a stay at home dad, and I’ve a crazy ex- that only contributes when it’s convenient. It’s hell.

…but that thing of being a dad—and being the custodial parent on top of everything…

…yeah; there’s still a little slice of heaven in my life.

So, for now, I’m praying that I can find a way to better support the kids. I’m also praying that I might find some better sense of the turns life has taken us, and looking forward to the day that someone will join us on this journey. (Ha!—try dating on top of all this; it’s impossible!)

But, I guess that’s about it for now… If for some reason you’d like to know more, you can find almost anything by google-ing my regular Internet handle—which is also my Ham call: KG4VMA. You’ll find me almost everywhere—though I’m not as active online as I’d once been. You might even find a few old assignments for other classes posted to my blog, if you really get to digging. For those that are really daring and bored, you can try and message me and strike up a conversation, though I can’t guarantee an immediate reply—I’m going to be begging, borrowing and stealing Internet access for another month or so. Well, not stealing—everyone around has finally wised up and is using good wireless encryption these days…

…and if by some miracle you’re a cute girl that’s looking to find a broken dad… lol.

Anyway, nice to meet you guys. Hope we have some fun in this class.

– Jeremiah Hall Palmer

The following writing was originally submitted in response to a homework assignment:

Week 5 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG340

Christian Kazmierczak

11/09/2012

I.  INTRODUCTION

In a prior course, students were given the following scenario to respond to on the final exam:

SCENARIO: At 10:05a.m. today, a hurricane/earthquake/tornado/flood hit the community of Edenton. The downtown area was hardest hit. People have reported damage to homes, and businesses have been affected as well. No fatalities have been reported. Three people with injuries have been taken to the Edenton Community Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. As many as 10 people are missing.

The downtown fire station is destroyed/inoperable. Two other fire stations are operational.

Other possible effects:

• A large fire has broken out in downtown
• Water mains are cut
• 10 percent of the population has sustained injuries
• Utility lines are down
• Animals in the zoo have escaped from their cages
• Looters are rampaging downtown
• Sewers have backed up, endangering public health
• Many houses are destroyed/inhabitable and shelters will be needed
• A hazardous spill has occurred
• A major road has been affected.

Students were asked to develop an Incident Command System for the scenario, defining roles and responsibilities for the functions that should be included. For this week’s assignment I am offering a similar response^[1] to the one I had given for the aforementioned scenario.

II. – SCENARIO RESPONSE

Establishing Command

With the events at Edenton being as described above, recommendation should be made for the establishment of a Unified Command (UC) at the community’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). In the event that the primary EOC is located in the downtown area, command should take place at the designated secondary EOC location; if by chance a secondary EOC has not been previously designated, then a temporary base of operations for the EOC needs to be located. Potential secondary locations may include schools, civic buildings, empty factories/warehouses—any location that has relatively easy access to utilities and can be secured if necessary. The relocation of the EOC to a secondary site is advisable, as the primary—assuming it is located downtown—may be affected by the fires and looting.

Structure of Command and Sections

The UC structure of the EOC would be comprised of the local EM director and applicable top-level government heads—mayor and/or judge-executive or local government equivalents and their respective deputies/assistants. Prior to this event, the UC has been structured so that one member is designated as overall IC, while the remaining act in traditional top-level command staff capacities—PIO, safety, liaison.

Below the UC are established the following sections: Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG) and Finance/Administration (ADMIN).

OPS could potentially have a section chief, or could operate without one; operating without a section chief may create difficulty in OPS branches communicating with the IC and UC, but is feasible. OPS section chief should be someone experienced in managing a crisis and knowledgable of communication and practices of the OPS branches—communication issues should be negligible as plain-language is supposed to be used across the board. Potential candidates for OPS Chief are the Deputy EM or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate sitting over public safety. The OPS section would be comprised of several operating branches for this incident, each headed by their respective chief/top-level administrator:

• FIRE branch;
• LAW enforcement branch;
• public HEALTH branch;
• ANIMAL control branch;
•  public WORKS branch;
• UTILITIES branch.

The remaining sections would not necessarily have the need for branches; supporting staff might be advisable to aid in any “gopher” activities.

Structure and Duties of Sections

PLAN could easily be filled by an EM staff member or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate. PLAN would work closely with UC, LOG and OPS in compiling information and keeping all sections and command briefed with SITREPs. PLAN would also work closely with the PIO in gathering and distributing information to and from the public.

LOG could be staffed in a manner similar to PLAN. LOG would be in constant communication with OPS and PLAN for the purposes of locating and supplying any necessary resources or materials. LOG would be responsible for locating outside sources for assistance that do not already have an MOU/MOA with OPS branches (agencies with pre-existing MOU/MOA would be contacted by the respective OPS branch); should an agency be located, LOG would forward said agency to ADMIN for event-specific MOU/MOA processing.

ADMIN could be staffed similarly to PLAN and LOG; however recommendation should be made for the city/county attorney to fill this position. ADMIN would work closely with OPS, PLAN, LOG and the UC for record keeping, document processing/filing as well as tallying costs and damages.

Operations and Functions of Branches and Sections

In regards to particular actions to take in this incident, recommended actions are—though not necessarily in this exact order:

FIRE should dispatch available units to control and suppress the fires downtown. Since the possibility exists that looting and fire could spread to other locations, FIRE should attempt to keep at least one engine and its crew at out-lying stations; this is, of course, at FIRE’s discretion. FIRE will have notified outside agencies with established MOU/MOA per SOP/SOG; additional fire support may be located by LOG.

WORKS should make attempts to feed water to mains in downtown area for FIRE activities. Water supply to HEALTH facilities are next priority. All areas of town outside of the active FIRE area should be restricted, limited, or shut-off at WORKS discretion. WORKS may attempt to patch or divert sewage systems to keep issues from occurring at HEALTH facilities. LOG may be able to locate emergency above-ground lines and pumps for both potable and non-potable water systems.

HEALTH should obtain a SITREP from the local hospital and establish satellite medical centers for the purposes of First Aid and lower priority medical cases; potential locations for these satellite medical centers are established clinics and health departments. At least one ambulance—if the service(s) allow capacity—should be located at each satellite center for emergency transport and assistance should a case present itself with higher degree of trauma at a satellite. HEALTH should coordinate with PLAN and LOG for acquisition of additional supplies and personnel.

UTILITIES will coordinate with all public service utilities—save those covered by WORKS—for SITREPs. Electricity and communications lines to the EOC, dispatch and repeater sites as well as HEALTH sites will be priority. Emergency services bases and satellites will be secondary, prioritizing by location’s capacity and ability to generate alternate power. UTILITIES will want to coordinate with LOG for locating generators and fuel for these affected locations should they not be previously equipped.

ANIMAL control will assist with the operations at the local zoo for the locating/capture/holding of lost/escaped animals. ANIMAL will receive additional assistance from Fish & Wildlife—Fish & Wildlife will be contacted by LOG.

LAW will establish a presence in the areas affected by looting; however, LAW will not make any arrests or use force to counteract the looting in progress—any such maneuver may incite additional rioting. Instead, LAW will act to protect properties that have not been looted.

LOG will contact National Guard for additional support for LAW, FIRE, HEALTH and WORKS; most Guard units—especially engineer battalions—are trained for all of these situations.

FIRE—if not equipped as a HAZMAT team—should dispatch one qualified unit to the HAZMAT area for identification. FIRE unit will make use of ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA software for recommendation of evacuation/SIP area. FIRE will coordinate with PLAN for contacting NRC/state EOC/NWS with SITREP of HAZMAT incident, per established SOP/SOG. Evacuation of area shall be conducted by LAW. HAZMAT operations will be conducted by team sent by NRC/state EOC.

LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for SITREP and forward highway department to WORKS. Affected highway should be closed at junction/intersect nearest reported damage; damage will be surveyed. If possible, highway will be restricted to emergency traffic until proper clearing/repairs are made.

LOG will contact schools, churches and civic buildings for potential sheltering operations. LOG will contact Red Cross and/or Salvation Army for sheltering support and staff. Red Cross/Salvation Army will coordinate with LOG for additional supply/support. LOG/PLAN will designate a representative at each shelter site as a point of contact for SITREPs and communication needs.

III. – EXPLANATION & REVIEW

ICS is typically seen as a simple type of hierarchal command; one Incident Commander (IC) is charged with the overall control of the situation at hand, while other functions branch off below. In my model of response, I do not stray from this traditional view/use, with the exception of declaring a Unified Command (UC). In my studies—through those at this school and those taken at varying EM workshops—I have heard and seen issue related to the declaration of “who’s in charge” in multi-agency efforts; NIMS recognizes these issues as well (DHS, 2008). Enter the Multi-Agency Command System (MACS)/ICS and UC/ICS concepts, as applied to NIMS ICS.

The traditional IC structure and nomenclature work perfectly fine in individual agency settings, yet when multiple agencies begin to work together—especially with governmental heads overseeing the events—the desire to point fingers and place blame, or steal credit when matters go favorably, grows. To combat the potential bickering and scope of responsibility, we simply adjust the terminology—without dramatic change to the structure—and perform an interesting psychological play; instead of saying one man is in charge, we declare that there is a Unified Command with an overall IC, a Safety Officer (SO), Public Information Officer (PIO) and a Liaison (LNO). The National Incident Management System (NIMS) allows for this variation in ICS, so long as compliance with NIMS standards are met (DHS, 2008). In the MACS/ICS system with a UC, OPS must have a designated OPS Section Chief (DHS, 2008).

The example of ICS use given above shows how complex—yet simple—structuring and organizing efforts can be. To a lay-person, the example given would likely seem to be an over-expanded and drawn out mess—why not simply state that law enforcement can go about their business while fire services do theirs, etc.? The truth is, this model does state that; however it ensures that there isn’t any confusion or replication of services that could potentially lead to making the situation more damaging and costly. The system also ensures that resources are being placed in a prioritized fashion, without having any one agency respond to a situation in one location when a greater threat exists elsewhere. Additionally, the system allows for the creation of points of contact, where agency representatives can communicate with another clearly and effectively, stating which needs are being met, which needs aren’t, and what additional actions or resources are necessary.

Again, the lay-person or member of an outside agency may question the structuring of this ICS, wondering how a MACS stylized ICS affects the normal operations and individual ICS structure of involved agencies. Honestly, it doesn’t; all agencies are independently working together, following their own hierarchy—an ICS, even if it is not named such within the organization—with the addition of the respective agency’s IC reporting to the MACS/ICS/UC back at the EOC.

The ICS is a system that simply works when applied properly—as such, ICS and slight variations had been employed by many agencies and governing bodies across the nation prior to the establishment and direction of NIMS (“NIMS and the Incident Command System”, n.d.). The only differences between these pre-existing ICS versions and variations and the ICS concept as described by NIMS is the attempt at better clarification and designation of ICS structure and terminology across the entire nation, reinforcing the concepts of ICS—a common, understandable organization of personnel and resources without duplication and confusion.

IV. – FINAL THOUGHTS

The ICS described in response to the scenario given is, for the most part, NIMS compliant. Some functions are not fully described or included in this example; this is due—in part—to the length at which this paper was written versus the brevity that was requested—the author has responded to a 500 word minimum with over 2,000 words! Comparing the ICS supplied, however, with the system described in NIMS Appendix B (DHS, 2008) reveals an understanding of NIMS requirements. Review of NIMS Appendix B also shows how complex a task of writing a description of an ICS structure for a particular scenario can be.

For additional information on ICS structure, and visual representation of the ICS organizational tree, review of NIMS Appendix B is recommended.

References

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Incident Management System. Web. Retrieved November 9, 2012 from: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

“NIMS and the Incident Command System.” (n.d.). Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt

Palmer, J. (2011). Incident Command – Final Exam. Web. Retrieved November 9, 2012 from http://kg4vma.wordpress.com/2011/06/22/incident-command-8211-final-exam/

The following post was originally submitted as a homework assignment:

Week 3 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG340

Christian Kazmierczak

11/08/2012

For the purposes of this assignment, students were asked to compare and contrast domestic and international terrorist groups or individuals; attempting to satisfy the domestic terrorism element of this assignment became a challenge. Researching domestic terror groups can prove to be a difficult task, assumedly due to the desire to keep current investigations quiet; groups and individuals that have been prosecuted or publicly named, however, are easier to research by the public. A brief search for domestic terrorists did not yield any list of published groups or individuals, other than those published on the FBI’s “Most Wanted” list; as of the time of this writing, only seven “domestic terrorists” were listed.

Though it may seem that domestic terrorism isn’t much of an issue—where so few results were discovered—other sources reveal that the existence and threats of domestic terrorism are quite real and an area of concern. In a document obtained by George Washington University’s National Security Archive (Richelson, 2012), it is seen that the FBI still actively trains their agents and law enforcement for domestic terrorism—domestic terrorism defined as U.S. nationalists committing terroristic acts “at home”, as opposed to foreign or alien nationalists committing acts on U.S. soil. In this document—A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism 2005-2006—the bureau references the “classic” examples of domestic terrorism: anarchists, extremists, activists, supremacists and militia groups (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). Of these examples, two organizations are specifically named under the activist/extremist category; these named organizations are also associated with three of the seven individuals listed as “most wanted” by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation: Domestic Terrorism, 2012).

Animal rights activist/extremists are noted to hold the belief that animals are not of the rights of man; many—particularly those on the extremist side—are not against taking action against those seen as exploiting animals. Eco-terrorists have similar views as the animal rights extremists, with regard to—as the name suggests—the exploitation of earth’s natural resources, flora and fauna. Both groups of activists/extremists may work in unified sects or individually, and can potentially use elevated force or violence in order to gain attention or prove a point. Named examples of such activist/extremists are the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF). The FBI notes that these organizations typically attempt to cloak communications via unknown Internet sites and protocols unaffiliated with known/published sites claiming to be “official” or otherwise; as such, many of those involved are young and somewhat “tech-savvy”. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007)

Though there might be some decline in animal and eco- terrorism—due in part to the enacting of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act—the Bureau warns that the fanaticism of the respective groups’ members will not allow for the dampening of spirits (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007); instead groups may find alternate avenues to relay points to those committing acts against animals and nature, until a time when a corporation or scientist “goes too far.”

Researching international terrorism seems to be quite an easy task, as it seems the government hasn’t much fear in allowing the world to know of our enemies. The FBI has listed a number of individuals wanted for terrorism—the majority having ties to various Muslim/Islamic organizations, save a few communist and Columbian terrorists. The Department of State has also published a listing of terrorist organizations, the vast majority being Islamic as well, with the exception of a few Columbian, communist organizations and two factions of the Irish Republican Army (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

There is no real difference between the actions of domestic and international terrorists with regards to methods of action; both of these broad classes act in violent or forceful manners, wreaking havoc upon a community and deeply affecting others lives. Differences, however, do exist in the targets of terroristic acts; for example:

Joseph Mahmoud Dibee, Rebecca J. Rubin and Josephine Sunshine Overaker—three of the FBI’s wanted domestic terrorists—were indicted for terroristic acts, including arson; the three are/were members of an ALF/ELF group known as “The Family”. Rubin and Overaker were named in connection of the burning of structures at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado (Cable News Network, 2008; Federal Bureau of Investigation: Eco-Terrorist Sentenced, 2012; PR Newswire, 2006). This sort of action is fairly common of an animal extremist/eco-terrorist; the property involved was that of a profit organization and not a government entity. Had there not been notification and claims of responsibility made to local media (Cable News Network,1998), the case would have most likely been investigated as an act of domestic terrorism anyway.

Husayn Muhammad al-Umari, a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim, has been wanted by the FBI since 2009 for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 830 on August 11, 1982 (Federal Bureau of Investigation: Most Wanted Terrorists, 2012). Al-Umari, though not the direct perpetrator of the event, is wanted for his role in connection to the bombing. The bombing of Flight 830 was conducted by Mohammed Rashed, a.k.a. Rashid Mohammed, for the 15 May Organization—a faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – External Operations (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). The 15 May Organization, like many Palestinian radical/extremist groups, target Israeli and American civilians and governmental leaders over Israel’s “right to exist”. Al-Umari is the founder of the 15 May Organization.

Personally, when it comes to acts of terrorism, I see domestic terrorism as a greater risk than those of international terrorism; while there may be a greater number of potential acts and actors on the international spectrum, there tends to be a greater unknown on the domestic side. International terrorists will most likely select targets which are representative of, or facilitate governmental function or policy. Due to the patterns and targets of international terrorists, our nation has been able to implement a number of policies and protocols for investigating and gathering intelligence related to international terrorism. Domestic terrorists, on the other hand, have the greater potential of evading preventative measures and going unnoticed. Additionally, domestic terrorists are more likely to be the “guy next-door”—a notion which I find quite unsettling.

Others may disagree, and say that someone overseas, acting in a capacity akin to Osama bin Laden is the greatest danger; personally, I’d prefer a bin Laden-like character over Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, or the latest breed of domestic terrorist—James Eagan Holmes.

References

Cable News Network. (1998). Group claiming credit for Vail fires says the aim was to help lynx. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from:

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2007). A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism 2005-2006. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/402525-doc-30-threat-assessment-domestic-terrorism.html

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Eco-Terrorist Sentenced: Help Us Find Remaining Operation Backfire Fugitives. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20160604205007/https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/march/eco-terrorist_032012/eco-terrorist_032012

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Wanted by the FBI: Domestic Terrorism. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Wanted by the FBI: Most Wanted Terrorists. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists

PR Newswire. (2006) Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front Members Sentenced in Oregon for Acts of Eco-Terrorism in Five Western States. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20160111103240/http://www.prnewswire.com:80/news-releases/animal-liberation-front-and-earth-liberation-front-members-sentenced-in-oregon-for-acts-of-eco-terrorism-in-five-western-states-57884802.html

Richelson, J. (2012) Documenting the FBI: Declassified Documents Provide New Detail on Confronting the Terrorist Threat – from al-Qaeda to Skinheads. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 386. National Security Archive, George Washington University. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB386/

U. S. Department of Justice. (2006). Jordanian Man Sentenced In 1982 Bombing Of Pan Am Flight From Tokyo To Honolulu. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06_crm_172.html

U. S. Department of State. (2012). Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20190514225518/https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

The following post was originally written as response to a classroom assignment:

Week 2 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG249

Christian Kazmierczak

11/07/2012

“There are more than a hundred definitions [for terrorism]; but none is wholly satisfactory,” states Walter Laqueur, historian, commentator and author of numerous works on culture, terrorism and warfare.

“No all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations and aims.” (Laqueur, 2009)

The FBI seems to agree with Laqueur, stating “There is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). However the bureau continues in stating that it sees terrorism as “Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28 CFR 0.85).

Elsewhere in US codes and law, terrorism has been defined as:

• violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (31 CFR 561.312; 31 CFR 594.311; 18 USC § 2331).
• premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (22 USC §  2656f).

Further definition is given to terrorist groups, international terrorism and domestic terrorism have also been given as:

• the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism (22 USC § 2656f).
•  the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country (22 USC § 2656f).
• the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 USC § 2331).

Each of these definitions vary slightly, yet commonly, we can see that terrorism is defined as some means of violent or forceful demonstration or action against a certain population; frequently the acts are carried to exact influence or coercion. As is noted in the U.S. definitions having a basis in criminal activity, these acts are typically illegal, as they usually violate federal or state-level laws. Differences in the definitions are slight, with regard to whether the acts are “premeditated”—though arguably, many would be—and whether the acts are politically motivated. Arguing whether an act would be politically motivated or carried out in the name of religion or other concept is moot, as all are simply schools of thought.

References

Act of international terrorism, 31 CFR 561.312

Crimes and Criminal Procedure: Terrorism, 18 USC § 2331

Department of State: Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 22 USC § 2656f

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012). Terrorism: 2002-2005. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005

Federal Bureau of Investigation: General Functions, 28 CFR 0.85

Laqueur, W. (2009). Terrorism: A Brief History. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20210428105107/http://www.laqueur.net/index2.php?r=2&id=71

Terrorism, 31 CFR 594.311

The following post was authored in response to a classroom forum:

In review of Moynihan’s articles, it would seem that there is no clear recommendation other than that of practice and review of the ICS model for implementation in multi-agency disaster response; such a statement is painfully obvious, however desperately in need of constant reiteration. Many of the nation’s lower governments and responders have expressed frustration with coordination in times of crisis; since the advent of the DHS and NIMS, blame is placed upon the gamut of NIMS directives—included is the use of ICS. Moynihan authors his papers to discuss the reasoning behind the declared use of ICS, offers examples of where ICS implementation has succeeded and failed, and finally delivers criticism for the better use of ICS.

The federal government made a wise choice in supporting and requiring the use of ICS. The expectation, however, that all governments and services would be able to implement the structure was somewhat immature; but is this the fault of our federal government? Moynihan has pointed out on numerous occasions in From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina that many entities outside the fire service knew of the ICS concept prior to NIMS; example is given with the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma. During this disaster, coordination between agencies was made possible through establishing a modified Incident Command System, where each service took control of a specific issue and reported back to a centralized command.

Opposing the Oklahoma example, giving what still remains the greatest example of misuse and poor application of ICS, is the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Though the local, state, and even federal governments had been required to develop and practice action plans implementing ICS, none of the involved organizations had a clue of what needs had to be met. Some of this confusion is blamed—somewhat appropriately—on the fact that the mandates were still relatively new; additional confusion came from the restructuring and organization of FEMA under the DHS umbrella, as well as assignment of resources such as military units to Homeland aligned operations.

Finally, Moynihan shows example of how agencies without experience in coordinating efforts possess the ability to implement such a structure in Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools. In this article Moynihan reviewed the use of ICS in the Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) outbreak of 2003. Initially, agencies struggled in organizing efforts as they continued to operate under their normal, respective procedures. Eventually, a networked structure was created; showing the effectiveness of ICS –a system typically considered to be centralized and hierarchal in design—in situations that aren’t traditionally considered for such a system. Interestingly, this example effectively shows how the original concepts of ICS implementation were ignorantly instituted, yet still completely valid.

A portion of the original idea of mandating ICS was the creation of a simple, no-fuss solution of command and responsibility; the ICS structure was chosen for its wide use and assumed effectiveness in the fire service. It has been argued that these beliefs were premature; furthermore, analysis and critiques have been given, stating that the traditional concepts of an ICS are neither modular nor adaptable to any given situation. In his END example, Moynihan shows that through simple modification, an ICS can exist and operate effectively, given the time and resources necessary to implement, practice and make adjustments as necessary—a concept which was behind the intent of ICS implementation.

I agree that the stiff definition of an ICS may not work in all situations; ICS will work, however, if it is not seen as a centralized command with a single head. A modified approach, viewing ICS as a management system with a unified command is, perhaps, the most appropriate method for organizing efforts during multi-agency operations. Practice of such a system is also a must for successful implementation in a time of crisis—agencies asking for assistance in understanding the concepts as events are unfolding will cause great delay and further confusion.

References

Moynihan , D. (2007). From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command System. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

Moynihan , D. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. Crises Management. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administrations, and Institutions, 21(2), 205-229. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-

The Following post was originally written as a response to a classroom forum:

Week 3 Forum Post your response to the week 3 forum question here. Do you support the analyses, conclusions, recommendations of the authors? State your agreement / disagreement. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

Read Stephen E. Flynn’s, “America the Resilient: Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters” and Bruce Hoffman’s, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters”. Both articles are available under “Course Tools”.  Follow the “Lessons” link and look for the Week Three Lesson.

Respond to the following questions:

Do you support each author’s analyses; their conclusions; their recommendations?
If you disagree with the authors’ positions – so state. Why do you agree / disagree?

Comparing the two writings before us for this week’s forum is an interesting, if not slightly challenging task; both writings are quite opinionated—Flynn’s being an original commentary, Hoffman’s a response to a different author’s work. Flynn and Hoffman also seem to take opposing sides on the argument of response and preparation for foreign terrorism on our native soil. In their respective writings, it appears that Flynn prefers standing behind the idea of rebuilding the public, while Hoffman is found supporting the idea of a government taking stronger action abroad. Personally, it is somewhere between these schools of thought that I stand.

In his review of Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad, Hoffman counterpoints arguments that Mid-Eastern groups such as al Qaeda are no longer the threats that they had once been. According to Hoffman, the author had suggested that without the self-proclaimed/designated cell leader, Osama bin Laden, played such a key role in the organization that, once removed, the al Qaeda we knew could no longer function. Hoffman suggests that such a viewpoint is misguided and not understanding of how societies work; Hoffman supports his stance with claims from American and foreign intelligence communities, undermining Sageman’s notion that Western al Qaeda-like splinters or sects are a greater threat. I find Hoffman’s criticisms of Sageman’s work entertaining, where part of his point is that Sageman doesn’t understand how a society might work; in supporting his opinion, Hoffman seems to do the same, missing Sageman’s point of view.

While Hoffman’s argument is valid—others may rise to revive and lead foreign terrorist groups—he doesn’t comprehend that the same can happen with any of those that might have lost communication with their foreign leaders. Though Hoffman may be correct with his underlining of faults in Sageman’s supporting evidence and theories, the point is missed—a community of terrorists residing domestically without the instruction and ties that had once existed might serve themselves in reorganizing with differing tactics, potentially posing a greater risk. Newly formed or organized splinter groups may not act in the manner as they once had; likewise, new incarnations may become an addition to the pre-existing issues, should the original organization survive and rebuild itself.

Flynn writes an interesting piece, speaking of the need of a stronger public; stronger in self-sufficiency and self-esteem. Flynn outlines his beliefs that the American public has grown somewhat lazy, and has regressed to the status of a public depending heavily upon the government; something that seemed to grow rather than diminish following the attacks on September 11, 2001. Exactly how, where and when this phenomena occurred is—like all political discussion—up for debate; yet the argument remains that the people aren’t as resilient as they had been generations prior. Fortunately, time has passed since Flynn’s writing, and American society seems to be improving in this regard.

Two years prior to Flynn’s publication, our nation was astounded at the response—on civilian and all governmental levels—to the natural disaster commonly known as Hurricane Katrina. Immediately following Katrina came a barrage of studies and reports on the public and the nation’s infrastructure—many of which are referenced or hinted at in Flynn’s work. These reports helped supply Flynn in stating that we—as a nation—are ill-prepared for almost anything, and believe that the federal government will serve our better interests and fix these issues. In response, Flynn suggests that the entire public needs to take cue from those that had been aboard United Airlines Flight 93—to believe that they are capable of recognizing and challenging/preventing/overcoming disaster. Though United 93 did result in “martyrdom” of the passengers and crew, the actions showed that the public has the power to change their fate.

In his writing, Flynn suggested that the next president should take steps to re-enforce the public, and enact changes to allow for better distribution of power and aid to the people. As of late, we can see that some of these changes have taken place—whether or not one would want to attribute these changes to the current government. Despite political differences, the majority should be capable of agreeing that public involvement and opinion has increased, and that federal dependence—with regard to emergency/disaster situations—has changed and is continuing to change.

Personally, I believe that we—as a nation—do still need to keep an eye on foreign organizations; though we must not forget that the possibility exists for domestic terrorism. I also believe that we must do as much as possible to continue to raise the spirit and involvement of our public. Supporting both of these ideas should not be a difficult task to accomplish, nor should one detract from another. Through rebuilding public resiliency, we can better ourselves and nation—providing stronger abilities to respond in crisis, at home and abroad.

…throughout this response I have tried to refrain from offering political opinion; I prefer not to enter political debate. I will, however, offer this as my only political thought: It’s no coincidence that there has been improvement and change since Flynn’s writing—in 2009 a new President was sworn in, and a new director to FEMA was appointed… 😉

References:

Hoffman, B. (2008). The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism. Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 133-138. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=31701303&site=ehost-live

Flynn, S. E. (2008). America the Resilient: Defying terrorism and mitigating natural disaster. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

The following post was originally submitted in response to a classroom forum:

Does it matter that there isn’t a globally accepted, clear-cut definition for the term terrorism? Yes; but will there ever be?

For the most-part, man-kind can agree that an act of terrorism is one in which one entity acts against another in such a manner that one by-product—if not the main goal—is the creation of fear; the reason or aim of the act and creation of terror may vary greatly. The trouble is, as varying collectives and societies have differing cultures and practices, we extend the definition further and impose a larger degree of differing responses to said acts; as such any one person may be considered a terrorist—even within our own societies—and may be persecuted in manners seen unjust by others.

In the U.S., terrorism has been defined as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” This definition works fairly well—and applies to foreign and domestic perpetrators. Unfortunately, this definition allows room for interpretation and application to any number of individuals and acts, depending upon how one chooses to define force and violence, and whether the act in question had the purpose of gaining a political or social objective.

Due to the differences in people in general—let alone societies—I doubt that there will ever be a globally accepted definition of terrorism unless there comes a point at which the entire world comes to terms with all her inhabitants; according to Star Trek mythology, this won’t occur for another 50-60 years, following World War III. After this—once Zefrem Cochrane has discovered “warp” and the Vulcans have accepted us into the Federation of Planets—we will then be working on drafting a universal definition of terrorism.