Tag: college

Question 16 (Worth 20 points)

For the last question set up and diagram an Incident Command System for the following scenario. Define all the roles and responsibilities for each function area that would be included in this scenario.

SCENARIO: At 10:05a.m. today, a hurricane/earthquake/tornado/flood hit the community of Edenton. The downtown area was hardest hit. People have reported damage to homes, and businesses have been affected as well. No fatalities have been reported. Three people with injuries have been taken to the Edenton Community Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. As many as 10 people are missing.

The downtown fire station is destroyed/inoperable. Two other fire stations are operational.

Other posssible effects:

A large fire has broken out in downtown
Water mains are cut
10 percent of the population has sustained injuries
Utility lines are down
Animals in the zoo have escaped from their cages
Looters are rampaging downtown
Sewers have backed up, endangering public health
Many houses are destroyed/inhabitable and shleters will be needed
A hazardous spill has occured
A major road has been affected.

ESSAY SUBMISSION

In this incident there would be a unified command (UC) established at the designated EOC–unless it was downtown, in which case the designated secondary-EOC would be used. At the UC level would be the EM director and the community’s top-level elected official(s). Branching off of the UC would be the PIO, safety, and liaison. Below the UC would be the Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG), and Finance/Administration (ADMIN) levels.

OPS would be represented by a head of each agency or department; or represented by an EM staff member, council-member/magistrate. Each OPS member would be charged with collecting/supplying information to/from in-field OICs. Recommended OPS structure would be as follows:

• OPS Chief (representative of all OPS branches)
• FIRE branch
• LAW enforcement branch
• HEALTH branch
• ANIMAL control branch
• public WORKS branch
• UTILITIES branch

PLAN would be represented by either an EM staff member or council-member/magistrate. PLAN would work close with UC, LOG and OPS in gathering information and redistributing SITREPs for all levels. Would also work closely with PIO and top-level liaison.

LOG would be represented by EM staff or council/magistrates. LOG would work with UC, OPS, and PLAN in locating/supplying needs. LOG would work with PLAN to locate the additional support for OPS branches that do not already have MOAs/MUAs with outside agencies; otherwise requests to other agencies are under respective OPS branches. Once LOG/PLAN has gotten an outside agency to agree to assist, the outside agency is forwarded to

ADMIN for filing of MOU/MOA for incident and attached to the respective OPS branch.
ADMIN would be represented by EM staff, council/magistrate. Another possible candidate for this position would be the governing body’s attorney(-ies). ADMIN would work closely with UC, LOG, and PLAN in keeping records on operations, filling/filing/forwarding other necessary documentation, and giving estimates on costs/damages.

In this incident, I would recommend the following actions (not necessarily in this order):

• All available fire units be dispatched to downtown fire. As looting/rioting is taking place and could potentially spread—and as additional fires may occur outside the focal area—I would recommended that at least one engine and it’s minimal accompaniment (unless this is a small community) remain at the outer-lying stations. FIRE should contact outside community departments with agreements for assistance.

• WORKS needs to be contacted with regard to main supply lines to downtown area. As a large fire has broken out, this area is a priority. If sections of town can be separated or routed to use other sources, then that switch should be made. Other priorities for water will be care facilities.

• HEALTH needs to get report of hospital situation. Recommend setting up local health department as triage for non- life-threatening injuries. An ambulance needs to be at health department for additional support/supplies and to provide transport to hospital if a life-threatening injury happens to arrive.

• UTILITIES need to be contacted for status. Electric to EOC, dispatch & repeater sites, and hospital are a priority. Other care facilities and emergency services are secondary [making assumption that these facilities have backup generators and can wait, if not will be covered by LOG]

• ANIMAL control will work with zoo officials in locating/capture/holding of lost animals.

• LOG will contact Fish & Wildlife for additional ANIMAL control.

• LAW will respond to downtown area with sufficient officers to make presence known. LAW will not stop active looting until additional support arrives—no need to become a martyr. LAW will safeguard buildings that have not been looted.

• LOG will request National Guard for additional LAW, FIRE, HEALTH, WORKS support.

• WORKS will need to gather more information on damage to sewers. LOG may be able to locate supply of emergency above ground lines and pumps for sewage, storm water.

• FIRE should dispatch one qualified unit (or one of the aforementioned engines on standby) to HAZMAT area for spill/release identification. Use ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA for recommended evacuation area and evacuate. Contact area HAZMAT team.

• LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for status and forward them to WORKS. Highway should be closed at junctions nearest the damage and surveyed. If possible, the highway should be opened for emergency vehicle traffic only until proper clearing/repair efforts are made.

• LOG should contact local schools, churches, civic buildings for sheltering possibilities. LOG should contact Red Cross for shelter opening. LOG should locate/supply any needs for sheltering (food, water, cots, blankets, portable toilets, etc.). LOG/PLAN should have/designate a representative at shelter for updates.

Points earned on this question: 20

The following scenario would, to my knowledge, be one of the largest table-top exercises conducted in Harrison County. In attempting to think of a disaster scenario, I couldn’t help but think of something on a larger scale than what was requested. The reason behind my thoughts of a larger disaster lies with my beliefs of how ill-prepared the community actually is. To my knowledge, there has never been a disaster scenario played to this scale, nor do I believe that there had ever been a good review of the incidents that had taken place in 1997.

I do know that much has changed since that time, and that there are many unwritten plans of action; however I do not believe that everyone is truly aware of what each other has in mind. I also do not believe that our agencies know how to function if a key member in their organization is absent—a point which would be inserted into sub-scenarios of this larger scenario.

Another hole that I know exists in our community’s plans involve what to do should our dispatch center lose communication. Granted, if the phone lines go down, there isn’t much that can be done; however, what is to be done when there isn’t any CAD ability? All of the radios are routed through a computer based system, and, to my knowledge, there still aren’t any “physical” radios on site—what then?

I believe that I may develop this plan further, and turn it into my EM director and see if it becomes one of the next exercises. I worry, though, that by the end it may turn into something resembling a game of Dungeons and Dragons…

DATE: 		IRRELEVANT
TIME: 		IRRELEVANT
LOCATION: 	MUCH OF CYNTHIANA AND PORTIONS OF HARRISON COUNTY
EVENT: 		“100-YEAR” FLOODING

NARRATIVE:      A large powerful storm system has moved across the US,
                pulling moisture from the gulf, and has stalled over the
                area, releasing copius amounts of rain in a fashion
                similar to that experienced in March of 1997. Cynthiana
                and Harrison County is experiencing flooding akin to that
                of 1997. The main highways are inaccessible once again.
                Fresh and waste water treatment plants have been shut
                down. The western side of Cynthiana is flooded and
                inaccessible. The phone system is down due to AT&T’s
                switching station being flooded.
                One factor of this storm system differed from the one
                previously experienced — high winds skirted along a
                smaller system that preceded this rain event. Winds from
                the line preceding the rains caused structural damage to
                the roof of city hall; however this wasn’t discovered
                until the following rains came, leaking through the
                building into the dispatch center, rendering most of the
                equipment useless. EOC is assumed to have been partially
                self-activated by EMA; however other officials are not
                present.

OBJECTIVES:     1.) Communications are down and infrastructure has been
                crippled. Appropriate measures must be taken to fully
                activate EOC. Establish alternative methods for
                communication with all applicable agencies and public,
                and solve the issues of infrastructure whilst a public
                panics. Alternate agency contact information *may* be
                located in the ERIL section of the EOP and in dispatch
                SOG/SOP. Other necessary items or equipment may be
                readily available or promptly procured from EMA.
                2.) All agencies within Cynthiana exist on eastern side
                of town. An appropriate number of response units and a
                base of operations for these units must be made on
                western side of town. Decide an appropriate number, find
                a location for operations, direct units how to reach
                western side with the existing road closures.
                3.) Contact needs to be made with hospital and care
                facilities to check status of operations and rations.
                Locate means of providing support.
                4.) Contact needs to be made with the city of Berry for
                status. Attempt to provide mayor with any necessary
                supplies.

DIRECTIONS:     Complete objectives by utilizing all available plans and
                by brainstorming to fill any gaps in plans. For areas
                which are decided on the spot without an established plan
                backing the decision, city/county attorney(-ies) may
                provide advice if decision could have legal ramifications.
                EM deputies and attornies will be assigned to represent-
                atives of EOC to record decisions and provide further
                information on departmental decisions from a randomized
                list of sub-scenarios—EXAMPLE: EMS dispatches two EC units
                to western side; deputy assigned to EMS in scenario
                announces to EMS representative that one EC has arrived in
                x-minutes while other EC has experienced mechanical
                trouble along the way.
                Notes will be collected and compiled at the end of the
                scenario. Review of the scenario will be conducted next-
                day, with discussion.

Initially, there would be two somewhat separate IC operations going on until a Unified Command was established with the activation of the EOC. IC-1 would be the EMA preparing for the rains, assumedly a week or so in advance—this timeframe estimation comes from the recent history of the NWS communicating with KYEM and local EM agencies on forthcoming weather events. During the EM preparation the EOC would be partially activated. IC-2 would involve the damage within the dispatch center. During this phase, dispatch would be attempting to return to a non-preferred working state. Concurrently EM would be continuing efforts in relaying messages to the county Judge-Exec and Cynthiana mayor’s office and assumedly assisting in bringing dispatch online. As the waters continue to rise, dispatch would come back to a crippled operating state (likely relying upon spare mobiles and HTs) and attempts would be made to contact other officials and bring the EOC to full activation.

All representatives in the EOC would fulfill Operations and some Planning roles. In regard to the exercise itself, additional staff or volunteers would act in planning capacities in order to keep the exercise going to provide additional documentation of the actions taken for the following day’s critique.

Logistics would primarily be headed by the EM, with communications between the agencies taking place in the EOC for additional brainstorming. All actions under logistics, unless the responsibility of another agency or another agency volunteers, would be the responsibility of EM.

Finance/Administration would be handled by the heads of the governments and/or their appointed representatives/staff. How this would be handled with the event affecting two to three governmental bodies (Berry, Cynthiana, and Harrison County) would be questionable and likely an issue which would need to be addressed—part of the point of an exercise. One could speculate that Berry would not be present and rely upon Harrison County, and that the county and Cynthiana would work mutually for the entire event while keeping separate records.

Other elements of ICS would be the responsibility of respective agencies.

Since I have the opportunity to share these items with a new audience…
NOTE: This post is not serving as my graded submission–it will come later. I just wanted to get in on a little show and tell. 😉

As you know, many agencies and organizations are required, or have made it part of their normal operations, to perform table-top and full-scale drills and exercises. When we have had the ability to, our EM has taken photographs or video of the events. Below are some of the photos and videos that I’ve had time to publish online.

1999 – Motor vehicle accident w/ multiple injuries and casualty.

This exercise involved members of the Harrison County Volunteer Fire Department, Browns Ambulance Service, and Harrison Memorial Hosptial. The incident was staged outside of city limits, so city fire and police were not involved directly. Victims were transported and “treated” at HMH. Actors were members of KY51 AFJROTC.

2003 – Shooting situation at school function w/ multiple injuries and casualties.

Please excuse the quality of the videos–this was recorded before I had a nice camera and computer with enough power to edit/process videos.
WARNING: Audio for the videos is extremely LOUD–you may want to turn your volume all the way down and then slowly bring it up…

This incident was perhaps one of the largest (and most entertaining) exercises conducted to date. Agencies involved were the Cynthiana Police Department, Cynthiana Fire Department, Harrison County Sheriffs Office, Harrison County Fire Department, Browns Ambulance Service, Harrison Memorial Hospital, Harrison County Board of Education, and the Harrison County Coroner. Actors were members of the local police and fire explorers, and emergency management.

2007 – Motor vehicle accident involving school bus w/ multiple injuries and casualties.

This incident was tailored more toward fire-rescue involvement, whereas the last major exercise had been tailored more for law enforcement. Agencies involved in this incident were the Cynthiana Police Department, Cynthiana Fire Department, Harrison County Sheriffs Office, Harrison County Fire Department, Browns Ambulance Service, and Harrison Memorial Hospital. Actors were junior members of Harrison County Fire.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

Global warming; it’s a very hot topic. (Pun half-intended.)

Personally, I buy it.

Though there are those that say we are merely repeating old weather patterns that haven’t been seen in some time and theories that it’s simply our movement in space–theories that do make sense, as well–I believe in the theories and evidence of our roles in the climatic changes. Unfortunetly, I am not capable of saying much more than that, as it isn’t a topic that I’ve read much on.

Whether or not global warming is real, and whether or not the effects can be reversed, I do believe that we should act as if it is a real threat. Making efforts for conservation, clean energy, reducing “carbon footprints”, etc., is not only good for the environment, but good for the person as well.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

On the evening of August 11, 2010, the Cynthiana E-911 Dispatch Center received a call at 19:31 from the Cynthiana-Harrison County Airport of a downed aircraft. According to the contact person at the airport, the pilot of a 2003 Cirrus SR22, #N160EU, left the airfield radar approximately one mile northwest of the field after having made radio contact regarding the need of an emergency landing. The pilot reported that while at an altitude of 8,000 feet the “engine started to sputter and oil leaked” from the engine compartment onto the windshield (HCEMA, 2010). The pilot managed to blindly find and make a landing on the runway, finally coming to rest off the end of the runway in a neighboring crop of soybeans.

Cynthiana Police Department (CPD) unit 33 arrived on scene at 19:36. Shortly after 33′s arrival, Cynthiana Fire Department (CFD) and Brown’s Ambulance Service were dispatched to the scene. Deputies from the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office (SO) also announced that they were en route. At 19:44 Brown’s EC-5 arrived on scene, and Harrison County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) unit 806 advised he was en route. Shortly thereafter CFD Engine 2 and Unit 4 arrived on scene with 274 declaring Officer in Charge (OIC) for CFD. SO units 370 and 383 arrived at 19:46. CFD, after investigating the scene, left at 20:00. EC-5 left the scene as well, after making sure the pilot was fine at 20:03, three minute before 806′s arrival. The final units to leave the scene were 370 and 383 at 20:19, 379 and 33 at 20:35 and 806 at 20:39. (HCEMA, 2010)

During the event, members from many of Cynthiana and Harrison County’s emergency services were activated. Initially, CPD unit 33 was dispatched to investigate the call; an EC unit, CFD, SO and EMA units were later dispatched for additional support and management of the incident. Within their separate agencies elements of ICS were present. Overall, a variation of ICS was also present. As with most traditional interpretations of ICS the first to the scene was placed as the incident command until a more qualified representative arrived. In this incident, 33 was the first to arrive, giving an idea of direction to other agencies upon arrival. Overall, 33 remained in an IC capacity until the arrival of 806, at which time 33 resumed his primary role of law enforcement. During 33′s role as IC, he coordinated with dispatch the relay of information to 806, who then relayed the necessary and available information to the Commonwealth Emergency Operations Center’s (CEOC) duty officer. As this was a fairly large incident involving multiple agencies involving an aircraft, the CEOC had to be made aware in order for the FAA and NTSB to be notified. Upon notification of the incident, the CEOC contacted the Area EM Manager – EM-47—as well as the FAA, Kentucky State Police, and Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (HCEMA, 2010).

Where the incident did not involve any larger damage to life or property, the response to the incident was allowed to de-escalate. Agencies involved were also allowed to follow their normal lower-scaled operations and leave the scene when their services were no longer needed. The remainder of the operations were closed by the local EMA and the scene was left for an FAA representative to investigate the following day (HCEMA, 2010).

Communications and general Operations for the event were initially handled by the E-911 Dispatch Center and unit 33. Overall, these communications and handling of information went well, with the exception of dispatch taking time to notify unit 806. Unit 806 should have been notified of the incident almost immediately after the call was received, as the situation required notification of agencies outside of the area and there was the potential of a “hazmat” and ecological situation with the release of any fluids from the craft. The delay in notifying 806 may have been related to an influx of calls in the dispatch center—this is merely speculation based upon other inconsistencies in the E-911 Computer Aided Dispatch Incident Report. Fortunately, 806 is also a member of the city and county fire departments and was already aware and en route prior to being notified. While en route, 806 handled the remainder of the communications with outside agencies by notifying the CEOC.

Planning for the incident was initially handle by 33 and then handed to 806 upon his arrival. During the event, planning elements such as gathering information was handled by 33, with more being gathered and reported back from units 274, 370, 383 and EC-5.
Logistics were initially handled by the dispatch center, through the activation of the various local agencies per standard operating procedures. Once the respective agencies were notified, unit 806 planned and prepared for the possibility of further needs by contacting the CEOC. Fortunately, there weren’t any other needs to be met in this incident.

In general, this incident was handled well. All agencies were notified and responded in a relatively timely manner. Coordination of efforts went fairly smoothly; however, as seems to be the case, the local agencies were not able to fully respond and fill “all” of the functions of the ICS model as a larger group where the incident was still relatively small.

It is my opinion that the incident received better handling than the search and rescue (SAR) incident presented from the same community which utilized some of the same agencies. A possible reason for the better handling of the incident could be related to the differences in the individual responding units. In this situation, as opposed to the former units that responded to the scene were more “seasoned” and had also gone through more training than those who had responded to the SAR event. One other possible reason for the better handling of the incident could also be related to the larger number of units responding—organization and assignment of duties seems to come easier when there are more people available to handle the tasks.

References
Harrison County Emergency Management Agency. (2010, August 11). 2010 Situation Report File. Incident # 2010-00014115. Cynthiana, KY

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

There are a number of military incidents which occur daily which the public may not be made aware of. Reasons for keeping these events quiet may be related to worries of national security, or the simple fact that the incident was small and there was no need to report to the public. These reasons can make it difficult for anyone without a good connection or knowledge of how to conduct research into military incidents.

In an attempt to locate an incident, preferably with an officially approved and publicly released report or case study, I found instead one of the types of incidents which had been unknown to the public at one time. Unfortunately, while some of the story is known, there are many details which still remain unclear—an issue which may, in fact, show how strongly the military can abide by a form of ICS. It is also possible that these unknown elements may remain unknown simply to hide the fact that the incident was not handled properly. We may never know.

On November 7, 2003, a ladder was mistakenly left in USS Georgia’s # 16 tube after a sailor had climbed down to attach the necessary cabling to hoist the nuclear missile out. As the weapon was being lifted out of the tube it’s nose struck the bottom of the ladder. Hoisting operations were quickly halted when the err was discovered; by that time a large gash was in the nose of the weapon and the foot of the ladder was a few inches from the detonation device. (Fitzpatrick, 2004)

It is unclear as to what actions took place next, however it can be assumed that higher ranking officers took charge of the event and reports eventually made their way back to D.C. In December of 2003, Capt. Lyles, commander of the Navy Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific—the Bangor, WA location where the incident occurred—was relieved of duty and transferred to another base. While word of Lyles’ removal was made public, details other than there being a “lack of confidence” in his command were not available.(Barber, 2003) At the time, the public was still unaware of the November incident; details of the damaged nuclear missile were not released until March 7, when published by a former Navy officer (unrelated to the incident). Walter Fitzpatrick broke the story on a blog.

Fitzpatrick’s story eventually gained the attention of area news organizations, two Washington US Representatives, and a Canadian member of parliament.(Associated Press, March 12, 2004) Inquiry was made by the news outlets and the Representatives. Navy officials declined comment to the media. Media outlets reported that the offices for the Sheriff and Emergency Management for the county were never notified of the incident (Bryant, 2004).

US Representatives Inslee and Dicks were eventually briefed on the situation, and released a statement to what they learned on March 19. Rep. Inslee stated that the Navy had a dire need to find better ways of communicating with the public. He went on to say that the Navy appeared to take the event seriously and had kept things fairly quiet and internal in order to conduct a thorough investigation and review of policies and practices. (Associated Press, March 19, 2004)

Approximately one month later, it was announced that the facility in question and the base which Capt. Lyles was transferred to were merging. This merger was approved after a six-month review of the merger proposal. (Associated Press, April 27, 2004)

Command over the incident was assumedly under the direction of Capt. Lyles at some point, as well as anyone else further up the chain, depending upon how you choose to view the incident. There was also NCIS involvement at some point (Barber, 2003), though it has not been published which of the persons involved at the base or scene were investigated.

Operations took place over an unknown period of time, as the full details of the incident were not released to the public. As the incident was relatively small in nature, one can imagine that operations did not go much farther than examining the area for possible radiation leaks, carefully extracting the ladder, removing the missile from the tube, and either sending it off for repair or destruction. It would be possible for some conspiracy-theorist to look at all of the information that has been provided and assume that there was actually something slightly larger than what was described, and that the true incident/action/operation took place over a six month period or greater. [The “incident” took place in November, CO transferred to another base as reprimand, and six months later the two bases merge. Coincidence? Likely, but still an entertaining thought.]

Planning had assumedly started some-time beforehand and following the incident. The Navy would have had some sorts of plans in place for an accident similar to what had happened. The degree to which these plans were enacted is unclear, however we can assume that the incident was determined to be fairly insignificant where no action was taken in notifying the public.

Financial aspects of the incident are not mentioned in any of the articles found about the event, and are likely negligible.

Overall, the incident was likely handled properly. While I agree with the concerns of the Representatives and believe that the public should have been made aware at some point sooner than four-five months after it occurred, keeping it quiet was likely a good thing. Had there been an announcement of an accident on the base, the public could have gotten unnecessarily frightened by the news. Still, had it not been for the leak of information, would we have known at all?

…then again, how can I say that the incident was handled properly when I know none of the details? It is possible that the unknown points of the incident are being kept quiet because there was a failure somewhere else in the handling of the incident.

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References

Associated Press. (2004, March 12). Canadian lawmaker upset over missile accident. [Online] Retrieved May 24, 2011 from LexisNexis Academic.

Associated Press. (2004, March 19). STATEMENT ON BRIEFING BY NAVY ABOUT BANGOR MISSILE ACCIDENT. [Online] Retrieved May 24, 2011 from LexisNexis Academic.

Associated Press. (2004, April 27). Navy will merge bases at Bangor, Bremerton. [Online] Retrieved May 24, 2011 from LexisNexis Academic.

Barber, M. (2003, December 24). Bangor officer in charge of key missile systems loses his command. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from: http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Bangor-officer-in-charge-of-key-missile-systems-1133028.php

Bryant, M. (2004, March 12). Missile reportedly damaged at Bangor sub base. Associated Press. [Online] Retrieved May 24, 2011 from LexisNexis Academic.

Fitzpatrick, W. (2004, March 7). BROKEN ARROW: Hood Canal, WA. The JAG Hunter [blog]. Retrieved May 24, 2011 from: http://jaghunters.blogspot.com/2004/03/broken-arrow-hood-canal-wa.html

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

On a Monday evening, Fairfax County School Security received an alarm at Dogwood Elementary School for a possible intrusion. As this was a regular occurance related to a sensitive system being triggered by the rattling or shaking of an entrance by normal weather phenomena, the alarm was reset without any further investigation. Nine minutes later, the alarm was tripped again—this time a security officer and police officer were dispatched to the scene to investigate. Eight minutes following the dispatch of security and police, an officer arrived on scene to find that the building was on fire. During the time between the dispatch and arrival more alarms, intrusion and fault alarms for the fire alarm systems alerted.

The first officer to the scene notified his dispatcher that there was an active fire at the school. Fire units arrived to the scene at 22:40, twenty-three minutes after the initial intrusion alarm which sounded at 22:17. Additional support was called for, and arrived in a timely fashion. Police, fire, and medic units were at the incident, as well as additional support for the fire units including a canteen and gasoline truck for refueling of the engines. The fire department was also in contact with the public works department for controlling and regulation of the water needed in the area for suppression operations.

Communication and organization for the incident, as reported by the investigative report moved quickly and ran smoothly. All necessary supportive units and equipment were made available to the incident. From a management standpoint, it would seem that the incident was handled very effectively with regard to the various public services entities involved. Only one issue (other than structural concerns, which did meet requirements for the time-period in which the building was built) stands out for criticism—the disregard of the initial intrusion alarm.

The school had apparently made it a policy to disregard the first of a possible series of intrusion alarms sent from that building due to the nuisance associated with dispatching security and police to investigate for an alarm which could have been triggered by a strong wind. This policy contributed to the delay in response and could have played a key role in the spread of the fire throughout the structure.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

It can be difficult to attempt to find a police incident which follows the principles of ICS. This difficulty can come from some of the mentality of police organizations, the scale of incidents, or some combination of the two. Many police incidents act on a small scale, where an officer or a pair of officers respond to a scene as the only agency involved. Larger scaled inidents where more than a small number of police units arrive occur somewhat regularly across the nation, yet in these instances, organization is still fairly limited, with all of the junior officers simply reporting to whomever has assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC) or Officer in Charge (OIC). With this mentality, many of the functions within an ICS fall back to one officer.

For a period of time, the Police Department of Gretna, LA gained notoriaty for turning away victims of Hurricane Katrina. Most of the reports available freely on the Internet from varied media outlets point back to the entire incident being handled by the Gretna Police Chief, Arthur Lawson. In an interview with 60 Minutes’ Ed Bradley, even the mayor for Gretna, Ronnie Harris, stated that the decision to close a bridge crossing the Mississippi was that of the police chief. Further details are unclear, however it can be easily imagined that in some meeting with other officials, likely in an equivilent to an EOC, discussion was made on how to handle evacuees fleeing New Orleans. Somewhere during the discussion, Lawson likely made the suggestion of closing the bridge and turning people away. From that point forward, Lawson was given command of that particular incident. Following older models of being an OIC, rather than an IC, Lawson would have developed further plans of preparing, commanding and managing the incident. Obviously, communication between other law enforcement agencies took place, as agents from Gretna Police, the Jefferson Parish Sherrif’s Office and Crescent City Connection Police were on scene; Jefferson being the parish in which Gretna lies, and Crescent City Connection being the authority for the Crescent City Bridge. Resources were managed between the policing agencies most likely via a Memorandum of Agreement which would have been called into action by Lawson.

Communications for the event would have taken place at the bridge as the officers on scene repeated the message that they had been briefed to give earlier from higher ranks, likely Lawson via subordinates, that the bridge and city was closed to outside parties for the duration. Ongoing management of the incident would, again, have come from the top and trickled down the chain of command.

So, can this incident truly be broken down and a diagram be drawn? Not really. To draw a diagram of the police actions in this event would be to lay out one big box with the Gretna Police Chief placed in the middle, even though it is evident that all the stages/core components were present.

Was this incident handled properly? That question is up for debate. In my opinion, no. The mayor allowing the police chief to close an entrance to the city and order, using forceful maneuvers, the nomadic victims to return whence they came was wrong. Granted, the police department had arranged for busing of the victims prior to the escalation which made the media frenzy, but once their services were seemingly exhausted they should have acted more appropriately. Furthermore, I am curious as to why the incident was handled by the police. Why were the police charged with gathering the resources necessary to divert refugees? Yes, the police should have been there to enforce the event; they should not have been handling the event as it was of such a large scale.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

Without using the text, one should be able to guess that a “normal” temperature would refer to an average temperature. The text, tells us that normal temperatures are in fact an average—an average mean temperature based on thirty years worth of recorded temperature data (Ahrens, 2008, p.69). In the example provided in the text, we are shown a table displaying the recorded data from 1970-2000 (Ahrens, p.69, figure 2). Averaging that dataset reveals a “normal” or mean average temperature of 68°F for the community. A more common, or mode, temperature for the dataset is 60°F. Though, as explained in the text, it could be possible to call a temperature falling within the temperature range given from the lowest to the highest record within that thirty years worth of data “normal”, though it would be even more misleading as it would be taking the definition very loosely.

Frequently, especially after the viewers have expressed negative opinions on the television meteorologists giving misleading information, I have seen the “weatherman” go back and explain that the “normal” temps are averages over a period of time, and that what the more common temperature lies elsewhere. On rare occasions I have seen the weatherman go so far as to explain how an odd event in our history affected the dataset by either raising or lowering the “normal” by a degree or two.

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References

Ahrens, C. Donald (2008). Essentials of Meteorology, An Invitation to the Atmosphere, Fifth Edition. Belmont, CA. Brooks/Cole, Thomson Learning, Inc.

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.

Incident of Choice:

Harrison County SAR Search for Possible Drowning Victim

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

American Public University

EDMG230 – Spring 2011

George J. Munkenbeck

05/04/2011

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On May 12, 2010, a person on Snakelick Road in Harrison county dialed 911 to report a possible drowning. The person reported that they had seen what appeared to be a body with black hair lashing about in the swollen Richland Creek. Harrison County 911 dispatchers notified the local fire, emergency management, and police agencies of the incident. Harrison County Fire unit 403 arrived on scene first and established Incident Command (HCEMA, 2010). Shortly thereafter, other units en route responded.

Once on scene, SAR coordinator, unit 807 took IC and dispatched responding SAR & Fire units to the last point where the unknown body was seen and a bridge downstream. SO unit 374 took report from the witness for submission to the Sherriff’s Office records, and to brief the IC. (M. Palmer, personal communication, May 13, 2010). Search efforts continued for approximately two hours until a decision was made that the area was unsafe due to the continuing rain and ever-rising waters (HCEMA, 2010). EMA unit 806 and SAR unit 807 requested that 374 and dispatch keep them notified of any further related reports and possible missing persons reports. All units left the scene to report back the following morning.

On May 13, 2010, SAR teams arrived back to the scene and continued search efforts. Approximately two and a half hours into the continued search a witness came forward to say that they had seen the remains of a cow floating downstream matching the vague description given by the initial witness. As no reports of a missing person had been filed, decision was made by 807 to discontinue the search and close the incident. (HCSAR, 2010)

Throughout the search operations, an Incident Command System had been in place. Beginning with arrival of 403, a point of operations and central command was established. Upon arrival of senior/more qualified units IC was turned over. Unit 807 acted as incident command at the top of the chain, EMA unit 806 as logistics. Units 403 and 374 acted as liaisons for their respective agencies; additionally, EMA/SAR unit 812 assumed the role of PIO liaison. All other units were general staff performing the necessary footwork on scene.

This incident was small and did not require all of the possible functions mapped out in larger ICS structures. Though it may seem that in smaller incidents like this there is some ease in operations, there can be found even more confusion. Who, exactly, would a straggling SAR/Fire unit report to upon arrival to the scene? In Harrison County, many of our SAR members are volunteer fireman, understandably. Our EMA director and SAR coordinator are also volunteer fireman. Our SAR coordinator is also an EMA deputy (this stems from local SARs being under guidance of EM). A green fireman could easily become lost in trying to find where they should report.

Naturally, law enforcement on scene took report from the initial witness, so it would be safe to assume that he would fill a role in gathering information on the incident. But who, then, is to continue gathering information? Units 806, 807, and 403 continued to gather information, which is beneficial in the respect to having multiple accounts being taken; however having multiple accounts being gathered from such a small number of involved individuals is seemingly wasteful.

Assigning the role of PIO/liaison to unit 812 is a smart move in many situations as she is more comfortable with the public and fills the administrative positions for the SAR most of the time. In this incident she could have easily been assigned the duties of gathering information as well since the incident was small. Doing so could have enabled her to give a quicker report of the situation to the public.

In this instance, ICS failed overall due to the small scale of the incident. The incident, however, was still managed well and as quickly as possible without any grand complications. To improve this situation, more meetings and table-top exercise need to be conducted in order to iron out these wrinkles and emphasize who acts in which capacity when they are members of multiple agencies.

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References

Harrison County Emergency Management Agency. (2010, May 13). 2010 Situation Report File. Incident # 2010-00007809. Cynthiana, KY

Harrison County Search & Rescue. (2010, May 12). SAR team was called.. [Online Forum Comment]. Retrieved from http://www.facebook.com/hcsar/posts/121758231182521

Mirrored from Being Jeremiah Palmer.