Tag: EDMG340

The following post was originally written as response to a classroom assignment:

Week 2 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG249

Christian Kazmierczak

11/07/2012

“There are more than a hundred definitions [for terrorism]; but none is wholly satisfactory,” states Walter Laqueur, historian, commentator and author of numerous works on culture, terrorism and warfare.

“No all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations and aims.” (Laqueur, 2009)

The FBI seems to agree with Laqueur, stating “There is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). However the bureau continues in stating that it sees terrorism as “Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28 CFR 0.85).

Elsewhere in US codes and law, terrorism has been defined as:

• violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (31 CFR 561.312; 31 CFR 594.311; 18 USC § 2331).
• premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (22 USC §  2656f).

Further definition is given to terrorist groups, international terrorism and domestic terrorism have also been given as:

• the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism (22 USC § 2656f).
•  the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country (22 USC § 2656f).
• the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 USC § 2331).

Each of these definitions vary slightly, yet commonly, we can see that terrorism is defined as some means of violent or forceful demonstration or action against a certain population; frequently the acts are carried to exact influence or coercion. As is noted in the U.S. definitions having a basis in criminal activity, these acts are typically illegal, as they usually violate federal or state-level laws. Differences in the definitions are slight, with regard to whether the acts are “premeditated”—though arguably, many would be—and whether the acts are politically motivated. Arguing whether an act would be politically motivated or carried out in the name of religion or other concept is moot, as all are simply schools of thought.

References

Act of international terrorism, 31 CFR 561.312

Crimes and Criminal Procedure: Terrorism, 18 USC § 2331

Department of State: Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 22 USC § 2656f

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012). Terrorism: 2002-2005. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005

Federal Bureau of Investigation: General Functions, 28 CFR 0.85

Laqueur, W. (2009). Terrorism: A Brief History. Web. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20210428105107/http://www.laqueur.net/index2.php?r=2&id=71

Terrorism, 31 CFR 594.311

The following post was authored in response to a classroom forum:

In review of Moynihan’s articles, it would seem that there is no clear recommendation other than that of practice and review of the ICS model for implementation in multi-agency disaster response; such a statement is painfully obvious, however desperately in need of constant reiteration. Many of the nation’s lower governments and responders have expressed frustration with coordination in times of crisis; since the advent of the DHS and NIMS, blame is placed upon the gamut of NIMS directives—included is the use of ICS. Moynihan authors his papers to discuss the reasoning behind the declared use of ICS, offers examples of where ICS implementation has succeeded and failed, and finally delivers criticism for the better use of ICS.

The federal government made a wise choice in supporting and requiring the use of ICS. The expectation, however, that all governments and services would be able to implement the structure was somewhat immature; but is this the fault of our federal government? Moynihan has pointed out on numerous occasions in From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina that many entities outside the fire service knew of the ICS concept prior to NIMS; example is given with the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma. During this disaster, coordination between agencies was made possible through establishing a modified Incident Command System, where each service took control of a specific issue and reported back to a centralized command.

Opposing the Oklahoma example, giving what still remains the greatest example of misuse and poor application of ICS, is the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Though the local, state, and even federal governments had been required to develop and practice action plans implementing ICS, none of the involved organizations had a clue of what needs had to be met. Some of this confusion is blamed—somewhat appropriately—on the fact that the mandates were still relatively new; additional confusion came from the restructuring and organization of FEMA under the DHS umbrella, as well as assignment of resources such as military units to Homeland aligned operations.

Finally, Moynihan shows example of how agencies without experience in coordinating efforts possess the ability to implement such a structure in Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools. In this article Moynihan reviewed the use of ICS in the Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) outbreak of 2003. Initially, agencies struggled in organizing efforts as they continued to operate under their normal, respective procedures. Eventually, a networked structure was created; showing the effectiveness of ICS –a system typically considered to be centralized and hierarchal in design—in situations that aren’t traditionally considered for such a system. Interestingly, this example effectively shows how the original concepts of ICS implementation were ignorantly instituted, yet still completely valid.

A portion of the original idea of mandating ICS was the creation of a simple, no-fuss solution of command and responsibility; the ICS structure was chosen for its wide use and assumed effectiveness in the fire service. It has been argued that these beliefs were premature; furthermore, analysis and critiques have been given, stating that the traditional concepts of an ICS are neither modular nor adaptable to any given situation. In his END example, Moynihan shows that through simple modification, an ICS can exist and operate effectively, given the time and resources necessary to implement, practice and make adjustments as necessary—a concept which was behind the intent of ICS implementation.

I agree that the stiff definition of an ICS may not work in all situations; ICS will work, however, if it is not seen as a centralized command with a single head. A modified approach, viewing ICS as a management system with a unified command is, perhaps, the most appropriate method for organizing efforts during multi-agency operations. Practice of such a system is also a must for successful implementation in a time of crisis—agencies asking for assistance in understanding the concepts as events are unfolding will cause great delay and further confusion.

References

Moynihan , D. (2007). From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command System. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

Moynihan , D. (2008). Combining Structural Forms in the Search for Policy Tools: Incident Command Systems in U.S. Crises Management. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administrations, and Institutions, 21(2), 205-229. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-

The Following post was originally written as a response to a classroom forum:

Week 3 Forum Post your response to the week 3 forum question here. Do you support the analyses, conclusions, recommendations of the authors? State your agreement / disagreement. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

Read Stephen E. Flynn’s, “America the Resilient: Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters” and Bruce Hoffman’s, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters”. Both articles are available under “Course Tools”.  Follow the “Lessons” link and look for the Week Three Lesson.

Respond to the following questions:

Do you support each author’s analyses; their conclusions; their recommendations?
If you disagree with the authors’ positions – so state. Why do you agree / disagree?

Comparing the two writings before us for this week’s forum is an interesting, if not slightly challenging task; both writings are quite opinionated—Flynn’s being an original commentary, Hoffman’s a response to a different author’s work. Flynn and Hoffman also seem to take opposing sides on the argument of response and preparation for foreign terrorism on our native soil. In their respective writings, it appears that Flynn prefers standing behind the idea of rebuilding the public, while Hoffman is found supporting the idea of a government taking stronger action abroad. Personally, it is somewhere between these schools of thought that I stand.

In his review of Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad, Hoffman counterpoints arguments that Mid-Eastern groups such as al Qaeda are no longer the threats that they had once been. According to Hoffman, the author had suggested that without the self-proclaimed/designated cell leader, Osama bin Laden, played such a key role in the organization that, once removed, the al Qaeda we knew could no longer function. Hoffman suggests that such a viewpoint is misguided and not understanding of how societies work; Hoffman supports his stance with claims from American and foreign intelligence communities, undermining Sageman’s notion that Western al Qaeda-like splinters or sects are a greater threat. I find Hoffman’s criticisms of Sageman’s work entertaining, where part of his point is that Sageman doesn’t understand how a society might work; in supporting his opinion, Hoffman seems to do the same, missing Sageman’s point of view.

While Hoffman’s argument is valid—others may rise to revive and lead foreign terrorist groups—he doesn’t comprehend that the same can happen with any of those that might have lost communication with their foreign leaders. Though Hoffman may be correct with his underlining of faults in Sageman’s supporting evidence and theories, the point is missed—a community of terrorists residing domestically without the instruction and ties that had once existed might serve themselves in reorganizing with differing tactics, potentially posing a greater risk. Newly formed or organized splinter groups may not act in the manner as they once had; likewise, new incarnations may become an addition to the pre-existing issues, should the original organization survive and rebuild itself.

Flynn writes an interesting piece, speaking of the need of a stronger public; stronger in self-sufficiency and self-esteem. Flynn outlines his beliefs that the American public has grown somewhat lazy, and has regressed to the status of a public depending heavily upon the government; something that seemed to grow rather than diminish following the attacks on September 11, 2001. Exactly how, where and when this phenomena occurred is—like all political discussion—up for debate; yet the argument remains that the people aren’t as resilient as they had been generations prior. Fortunately, time has passed since Flynn’s writing, and American society seems to be improving in this regard.

Two years prior to Flynn’s publication, our nation was astounded at the response—on civilian and all governmental levels—to the natural disaster commonly known as Hurricane Katrina. Immediately following Katrina came a barrage of studies and reports on the public and the nation’s infrastructure—many of which are referenced or hinted at in Flynn’s work. These reports helped supply Flynn in stating that we—as a nation—are ill-prepared for almost anything, and believe that the federal government will serve our better interests and fix these issues. In response, Flynn suggests that the entire public needs to take cue from those that had been aboard United Airlines Flight 93—to believe that they are capable of recognizing and challenging/preventing/overcoming disaster. Though United 93 did result in “martyrdom” of the passengers and crew, the actions showed that the public has the power to change their fate.

In his writing, Flynn suggested that the next president should take steps to re-enforce the public, and enact changes to allow for better distribution of power and aid to the people. As of late, we can see that some of these changes have taken place—whether or not one would want to attribute these changes to the current government. Despite political differences, the majority should be capable of agreeing that public involvement and opinion has increased, and that federal dependence—with regard to emergency/disaster situations—has changed and is continuing to change.

Personally, I believe that we—as a nation—do still need to keep an eye on foreign organizations; though we must not forget that the possibility exists for domestic terrorism. I also believe that we must do as much as possible to continue to raise the spirit and involvement of our public. Supporting both of these ideas should not be a difficult task to accomplish, nor should one detract from another. Through rebuilding public resiliency, we can better ourselves and nation—providing stronger abilities to respond in crisis, at home and abroad.

…throughout this response I have tried to refrain from offering political opinion; I prefer not to enter political debate. I will, however, offer this as my only political thought: It’s no coincidence that there has been improvement and change since Flynn’s writing—in 2009 a new President was sworn in, and a new director to FEMA was appointed… 😉

References:

Hoffman, B. (2008). The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism. Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 133-138. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=31701303&site=ehost-live

Flynn, S. E. (2008). America the Resilient: Defying terrorism and mitigating natural disaster. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/xsl-portal/site/196993/page/25ba99e3-522d-450c-ba01-7968f4ab10c7

The following post was originally submitted in response to a classroom forum:

Does it matter that there isn’t a globally accepted, clear-cut definition for the term terrorism? Yes; but will there ever be?

For the most-part, man-kind can agree that an act of terrorism is one in which one entity acts against another in such a manner that one by-product—if not the main goal—is the creation of fear; the reason or aim of the act and creation of terror may vary greatly. The trouble is, as varying collectives and societies have differing cultures and practices, we extend the definition further and impose a larger degree of differing responses to said acts; as such any one person may be considered a terrorist—even within our own societies—and may be persecuted in manners seen unjust by others.

In the U.S., terrorism has been defined as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” This definition works fairly well—and applies to foreign and domestic perpetrators. Unfortunately, this definition allows room for interpretation and application to any number of individuals and acts, depending upon how one chooses to define force and violence, and whether the act in question had the purpose of gaining a political or social objective.

Due to the differences in people in general—let alone societies—I doubt that there will ever be a globally accepted definition of terrorism unless there comes a point at which the entire world comes to terms with all her inhabitants; according to Star Trek mythology, this won’t occur for another 50-60 years, following World War III. After this—once Zefrem Cochrane has discovered “warp” and the Vulcans have accepted us into the Federation of Planets—we will then be working on drafting a universal definition of terrorism.

The following post was originally submitted in response to a class forum:

Post your response to the week 1 forum question here. Just because it is a terrible act, is it an act of terrorism? State your position. Remember to respond to the posts of at least two of your classmates for full credit.

Terrorism is associated with violence, politics, toppling governments and religion. Terrorism is difficult to define because it is a value term. It implies that the violence used to achieve the goals of the group is not justified. However, the use of terrorism is common to many “good” causes in history, including the American Revolutionary War, the American Civil War, and the French Revolution.

Terrorists do not try to achieve military victory but count on creating public opinion that will result in the changes they seek. Terrorists do not call themselves “terrorists”. Terrorism is a label used by the dominant power to create an image of the terrorists as “evil”. Terrorists see the world in Black and White. There is no middle ground. They believe they have the higher moral ground and often believe they have divine knowledge. Terrorists do not recognize the concepts of innocent bystanders, neutral parties, civilians, or noncombatants.

Early terms associated with terrorism, such as zealot, assassin, thug, terror, and class warfare, come from many countries around the world. The use of terrorism can be found in early American history in the American Revolutionary War, the treatment of Native Americans, the American Civil War, and the interracial violence that occurred following the American Civil War.

One of the most horrific terror campaigns in the United States was the lynching of African Americans. Lynching’s were common from 1870 to 1915 and continue up to the present day. Lynching were much more than extra-legal justice. The victims were brutalized, tortured, and put on public display as a warning to others. This display was intended to change and alter behavior of a portion of society this making it terror. What do you think?

The Ku Klux Klan was one of the most notorious domestic American terrorism groups. In the twentieth century, Americans feared the terror posed by Communist revolutionaries and other Communist-Marxist-inspired governments and groups. The reaction of the U.S. public and government to Red Scare in many ways resembles the reaction to reaction to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent war on terrorism.

 

As stated in the prompt of this forum and in other course materials, terrorism can be a difficult term to define. It seems to be agreed upon that the basic concept of terrorism is an act in which fear is either employed from the start or becomes an end result of actions taken in resistance to or against some law, practice or ideology; the element of fear may also be the trigger of a terroristic—possibly revolutionary—act.
In more modern times, terrorism has been defined by the United States government as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

Terrorism has also been defined as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

With these definitions—the loosely accepted common concept, as well as the two defined by our government—it is fairly easy to question what actions are terroristic with an evil or immoral undertone, and which are a more natural and acceptable movement of civil unrest. One good example of such questioning raised in the course material as well as this forum prompt is the American Revolutionary War.

The Revolutionary War and acts leading up to the drafting of the Declaration of Independence could easily be defined as an act of terrorism, with both sides—Britain and the Colonies—being equal participants in feeding the fears and creating violence. An oppressive government body led to unrest among the people, who then began to organize and protest—one of the most noted protests being what became known as the Boston Tea Party. Though the Tea Party itself may not have necessarily been a violent act—with physical harm coming to a person—it still bore elements of terroristic acts. Additionally, varying American Patriots did perform terroristic acts causing physical harm, such as the tarring and feathering of customs agents, ships captains and Royal sympathizers; Patriot actions such as this aided in raising levels of fear amongst British serviceman, eventually leading to events such as the Boston Massacre.

Were any of the measures and actions taken prior to the Declaration justified? Were they terroristic? Time has shown that the later results of the acts led to “good” with the creation of a “great” nation, spawning the movement toward democratic republics across the globe. Over two and a quarter centuries later, we can easily justify the actions of the Patriot movement; but if we attempt to place ourselves in that time, we might find the question difficult to answer, as the actions were terroristic.

The following was originally posted as a response to a class forum.

Call me Ishmael.

No, actually, don’t call me Ishmael—that’s not my name; but it’s a catchy first line! It’s also the extent of what I know of Moby Dick…

My name is Jeremiah—if you somehow missed seeing the title and author lines of this post. I’m in my early thirties, and haven’t done much with my life, aside from raising a family and attending school; I’ve three children, Taron (8), Nivea (6) and Violet (2). The Mrs.—Diana—is the bread-winner, and I’m the homemaker. We live in a quiet little town in Kentucky, called Cynthiana—maybe you’ve heard of it, there’s some sort of fictional cop turned vampire hunter from here.

I play around with the local EM from time to time, maintaining all the social media outlets as best as I can—voluntarily, and frequently from my phone. I’ve helped out in a few disasters—potential ones, more than actual ones—usually in a clerical or “gopher” capacity. I’ve been volunteering with the local EM for about ten years, became interested through my dad—he’s been attached to the agency for about twenty, director for the past eight. My mother is an RN at the local hospital—ICU and TCU, with the fun of pulling house every couple of weeks and the occasional ER duties.

I really can’t think of much more to say about myself, family or schooling, so feel free to Google me if you’re curious; the full name is Jeremiah Hall Palmer and the Internet handle is my amateur license, KG4VMA.