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Supported by readings in the course material to this juncture, the open or deep web, the E-Reserve site found in the online library at the EDMG340 Consequence Management | Course Guide page ) and / or other outside sources of interest, student is to choose any NBC device/ or CB agent of interest and provide an overarching analysis of that selection.
At a minimum, analysis should cover the following points:

• State the name of the devise or agent and describe its historical development.
• Describe the physical/chemical/biological properties of the device/agent.
• Discuss the harmful impact of the device or agent – its mechanism of action.
• Cite one case where the device/agent has been used in the field.
• List any treaty/policies covering the device/agent and or prohibiting or controlling its availability or use.
• Cite any current news article referencing the use or development of the device/agent.

Work should be a minimum of 750 – 1000 words and should utilize APA formatting.

Save your work as a Microsoft Word or WordPerfect document entitled:
“EDMG340 Week 7 YourLastName.doc” (i.e., EDMG340 Week 7 Jones.doc) and upload as your Week 7 written assignment.

Initially created in the search for a more potent pesticide, sarin became one of many feared chemical nerve agents of World War II and beyond. German scientists Shrader, Ambros, Rudiger and Van der Linde discovered the chemical compound in 1938; nearly a year later, the chemical was introduced to the German Army Weapons Office. Fortunately—though the agent was manufactured into artillery—Germany decided against the use of the weapon in combating Allied forces. (Sample, 2013; BBC, 2016)

Most applications of sarin have been—historically and militaristically speaking—in the form of chemical payloads in artillery. Oftentimes the weapons are binary in fashion, with the final compound being created from separated components upon activation; mixture of the separate chemicals into sarin typically takes place just prior to weapon impact or immediately before/following weapon’s launch (Sample, 2013). Constructing the weapons in this fashion allows for greater stability of the weapon and a longer-lasting shelf life; extending the shelf-life of sarin is of concern for any group or agency wishing to stockpile the agent, as sarin has the potential to degrade into nontoxic acids within a relatively short amount of time—weeks to months—especially when the mixture contains or picks up impurities in the manufacturing and storage processes.

Medically speaking, sarin reacts similar to other nerve agents, with inhalation and absorption posing the greatest threats; ingestion, too, is of great concern. Initial symptoms of sarin exposure include runny nose, constricted pupils and the feeling of tightness in the chest; respiratory and gastric problems soon follow, along with immediate fecal and urinary incontinence. Finally, the greater effects of nerve damage are seen in involuntary spasms and convulsions, coma, and death due to suffocation. Certain drugs—such as atropine and biperiden—can combat some of the effects of sarin if applied immediately and exposure is limited. (CDC, 2013)

Though the United States had invested into sarin as a chemical weapon and had grown a relatively large stockpile of the agent in weaponized form, no reports of the US deploying sarin in an action have been made. Documents did surface in 2008, however, showing that an interest in field testing sarin and VX on Australian troops. Australian Channel Nine reported that the formerly secret documents indicated that US military scientists wished to perform testing on approximately 200 troops in the 1960s, during heightened involvement in the Vietnam War. It had been suggested that the tests were to study the effectiveness of deployment in a jungle terrain. No further documentation exists to suggest whether testing was ever conducted. (Ansley, 2008; Berkovic & Stewart, 2008)

One of the largest uses—in number of victims—of sarin occurred in the 1988 during Iraq’s war with Iran; approximately 5000 deaths are attributed to Saddam Hussein’s use of sarin against the Iranian people and military. Five years later in 1993, the United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention declared sarin to be a weapon of mass destruction, and called for all nations to cease any production and destroy all stockpiles of sarin, as well as other chemical weapons. At the present time, sarin as well as other chemical stockpiles still exist in the US, and are awaiting destruction; other nations, too still have some decommissioned gaseous weapons awaiting destruction. (Sample, 2013)

Sarin has been used in acts of terrorism, as well, with the most notable being the use by Aum Shinrikyo in the attack on Tokyo’s subway system on March 20, 1995. The group’s release of sarin upon five selected sites near Japanese government buildings killed 12, severely injured approximately 50, and affected an approximate 1,000 people by rendering the victims with temporary vision loss. Aum Shinrikyo had released sarin in the previous year in response to a real-estate dispute.

In 2004 two members of the US military were treated for exposure to sarin in Iraq; exposure was limited, however, due to possible combinations of how the weapon was discharged, and the quality and age of the chemicals contained in the weapon. The soldiers treated were members of an explosives unit, and had been charged with the recovery of the IED. It has been theorized that the militants that constructed and detonated the IED had no knowledge that the chosen payload contained sarin or that it had not been understood that a much greater explosive force would have been required to attempt a better mixture, where the original weapon had been of the aforementioned binary design. (MSNBC, 2004)

Finally, one of the last known incidents involving sarin comes from the use in weapons during the Syrian Civil War on August 21, 2013. Portions of the Syrian capital city of Damascus found itself under attack that morning with weapons releasing the toxic gas; estimates of those killed by the poisonous gas vary in number from approximately 300-1700. It is technically unclear as to who was responsible for the use of these weapons—as both the military and rebel forces deny having used such weaponry and blame another for use; it is of opinion by many countries that the use of the chemical weapons was conducted by the Syrian government (Sample, 2013). Regardless of which party was responsible for the deployment of chemical weapons, most indicators pointed to the weapons having been a part of Syria’s inventory at some point. Since that time, evidence has surfaced of additional use of sarin in Syria, through investigative efforts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The OPCW, however, has not been able to indicate a particular time-frame or responsible party for the evidence found in the blood samples collected from the random sample of Syrian citizens (AFP, 2016; BBC, 2016).

References

Agence-France Presse. (2016, January 4). UN chemical weapons watchdog finds traces of sarin gas exposure in Syria. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/un-chemical-weapons-watchdog-finds-traces-of-sarin-gas-exposure-in-syria

Ansley, G. (2008, July 7). US planned nerve gas attack on Australian troops. The New Zealand Herald. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10520276

BBC. (2016, January 4). Syria conflict: OPCW finds signs of sarin exposure. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35231663

Berkovic, N. & Stewart, C. (2008, July 7). Answers sought over nerve gas plan. The Australian. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic

Center for Disease Control. (2013, May 20). Facts About Sarin. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20220402130536/http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp

MSNBC. (2004, May 17). Bomb said to hold deadly sarin gas explodes in Iraq. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20121103072549/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4997808/

Sample, Ian. (2013, September 17). Sarin: the deadly history of the nerve agent used in Syria. Retrieved January 26, 2016 from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/sarin-deadly-history-nerve-agent-syria-un

In his statement to a Senate Subcommittee, Dr. Peter Chalk—policy analyst for the RAND Corporation’s Washington D.C. office—posited that the United States is ill-equipped to handle terrorist action against the nation’s food industry (2001). Dr. Chalk outlined numerous areas of concern, relating to how easily one could infect the nation’s food supply, the potential national and global economic impacts of an infection, as well as the limits of current policies and control procedures.

Dr. Chalk suggests that a portion of the nation’s lack of attention toward these issues relates to there not yet being a “major” disruption in agriculture and food-supply. Chalk believes evidence of said neglect is easily viewed in under-developed agricultural response plans and in what he calls  “woefully inadequate” security and surveillance systems at numerous food-processing facilities nationwide (Chalk, 2001). Additionally, Chalk notes low numbers of trained professionals available to recognize certain animal and agrarian disease, as well as a decline in numbers of professionals capable of performing diagnostic medicine in the veterinary field. Chalk further discusses how easily a terrorist might contaminate food sources—through direct or indirect contamination of vegetation consumed by the population, or otherwise poisoning livestock through the introduction of a toxin or poison. As an example, Chalk explains how quickly an infection could spread among dairy cattle in any of the nation’s major dairy farms. Following up, Chalk discusses the difficulty of conducting a recall of contaminated products; said discussion continues to that of the nation’s produce.

Economically speaking, Chalk addresses how contaminating the food-supply might affect other linear and non-linear services, such as the food service industry and the shipping and transport industries. Food service—grocers and restaurants alike—would receive a rather obvious impact from the inability to provide goods they once carried, and would likely feel the effects of an alarmed and frightened consumer base. Transport and logistics industries would also be impacted through less-frequent shipment of goods. From here, Chalk hints to a potential “domino effect” across the majority of the economy, including those of foreign nations’ economies that rely upon exportation of American produce.

Countering these potential threats, Chalk proposes a number of solutions. First, Chalk underlines the need to strengthen sectors responsible for treatment, diagnosis & control, and planning & preparation of natural and man-made disasters; intensification of these areas would come from increasing numbers of and furthering the education of personnel. Additionally, Chalk suggests restructuring the curriculum of veterinary sciences, placing emphasis on mass-effect distribution and the treatment of foreign/exotic disease. Related, Chalk states that greater influence is needed for veterinarians to be involved in USDA emergency planning and management operations. (Chalk, 2001)

Regarding concerns of security and insurance, Chalk suggests a national plan of insurance for compensating farmers that might find themselves in need in a disaster like one of those identified. Though policies exist for crops affected by natural, meteorological disasters, none exist for necessary destruction of crops or livestock due to large-scale disease or contamination. Development of such an insurance plan could possibly aid in developing incentives or mandates for inclusion, which could bring about changes related to Chalk’s final suggestion: the need for heightened surveillance and security in farming and food production/distribution. A national policy for insurance could require that farms and facilities establish protocols for reviewing and keeping record of employees and facility access, as well as establishing preventative actions and developing mitigation plans.

Personally, I do not believe that any of Chalk’s suggestions would do much to deter acts of terrorism; although I do agree with the points discussed. It is a rather sickening thought that it would be relatively easy for a person can enter a facility or walk onto a farm and affect our nation’s food supply. Such potential for danger shouldn’t be overlooked; yet we have for decades—and the public has seen example of these possibilities so many times while watching the evening news. Numerous times we have seen “inside” reports from food processing plants from the viewpoints of animal rights activists, extremists, and journalists; many of these reports have been conducted covertly, with a person entering the facility under the guise of being a regular employee. This kind of espionage appears to be fairly easy to perform, and exemplifies the ease at which a person could enter a factory and deliver hazardous or otherwise poisonous agent.

To the contrary, however, I’m comforted that one can be able to enter such a facility with such ease; the unintentional allowance for the entrance of an outsider enables a certain type of transparency. Many of these covert operations, along with numerous “whistle-blowers” have given the public knowledge of events that would have otherwise been kept quiet. In some ways, I suppose that Dr. Chalk’s pleas for security could be to our detriment; still, if one were determined to taint an element of the food supply, it could be done regardless of heightened security.

References

Chalk, P. Dr. (2001, October 10). Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection, and the U.S. Food and Agricultural Sector. Testimony given before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate. Retrieved January 17, 2016 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20170221051515/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399957.pdf

1. INTRODUCTION

In a prior course, students were given a doomsday like scenario to respond to on the final exam; for the purposes of this assignment, I have used portions of that scenario as a premise, and retooled it to be more “over the top” and to fit my hometown. The revised scenario is as follows:

SCENARIO:

At 09:17 today, an earthquake shook the city of Cynthiana, Kentucky; this coming on the heels of a storm system that struck the community a day prior. The previous evening’s events unleashed a torrential amount of rain downstream, bringing rising floodwaters overnight. In addition, what appears to have been an F-2 tornado skirted and touched down along the southern portion of the city, in the commercial shopping district at approximately 03:33 hours; an NWS survey team is scheduled to arrive later this afternoon. The downtown area—primarily the buildings along Pike Street—seem to have suffered the greatest quake damage. Multiple reports of damage to homes, and businesses have been made to varied agencies and social media outlets. So far, no fatalities have been reported from any of the events. Thirteen people with injuries sustained from debris and partial collapse of Walmart were taken to the Harrison Memorial Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. Reports of injuries and damages are only starting to come in, related to the quake. An estimated 100 people may have been at work in the Pike Street area—estimates for occupied residential apartments in the area are presently unknown. Two people have been reported missing from Walmart in relation to the tornado event; the school district reports two families truant—five children from the Southside district, specifically—and two of the local nursing homes cannot account for three of their patients.

The City of Cynthiana’s downtown fire station has been temporaily rendered inoperable due to collapse and mechanical failure of the doors; fortunately all engines stationed were still on scene at Walmart—equipment not already in the field from this station will be unavailable. The city’s other fire station and all county stations are operational. All other emergency services are fully functional and operational.

Other effects and simultaneous events occurring:

• A large fire has broken out at the Rohs Opera House.
• Water mains along Pike Street between Main and Walnut are damaged.
• 10 percent of the population has sustained injuries.
• Multiple utility lines are down, including electrical and phone.
• Animals from a traveling circus have escaped from their cages at the 4-H fairgrounds.
• Looters are moving through the west-side of town, in the areas of Louis Stout Way and Poplar Streets.
• Sewers have backed up, endangering public health in the aforementioned area.
• Many houses are assumed to be destroyed/inhabitable and others will be evacuated; shelters will be needed.
• A hazardous spill has occurred on Main & Pike; a fuel tanker turning right from Main onto Pike received damage from a falling utility pole at the time of the quake.
• One of the aforementioned animals—an elephant—made it to the roundabout, laid down, and has gone into labor between the US27 South exit and the US27 North business exit.

In response to the original scenario, students were asked to develop an Incident Command System for the scenario, defining roles and responsibilities for the functions that should be included, much like the prompt of this assignment. As such, I am offering a somwhat similar response[1] to the one I had given—tailored, of course, to my new outrageous scenario.

1. – SCENARIO RESPONSE

Establishing Command

With the events in Cynthiana being as described above, recommendation should be made for the establishment of a Unified Command (UC) at the community’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC), if these plans have not yet been executed. Fortunately, Cynthiana’s primary EOC location has been established on the northeastern side of the community on Oddville Avenue, away from the action described in the area above. Were the events described taking place in the area of Oddville Ave., command would take place at a temporary base of operations—perhaps one of the elementary schools, or Harrison County Fire Station 1—as there is no designated location for a secondary EOC, and no other administrative facilities that would not potentially be affected. Other potential secondary locations may include schools, civic buildings, empty factories/warehouses—any location that has relatively easy access to utilities and can be secured if necessary.

Structure of Command and Sections

The UC structure of the EOC would be comprised of the local EM director and applicable top-level government heads—Mayor James Smith, Judge-Executive Alex Barnett, and their respective deputies/assistants. Prior to this event, the UC has been structured so that one member is designated as overall IC, while the remaining act in traditional top-level command staff capacities—PIO, safety, liaison.

Below the UC are established the following sections: Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG) and Finance/Administration (ADMIN).

OPS could potentially have a section chief, or could operate without one; operating without a section chief may create difficulty in OPS branches communicating with the IC and UC, but is feasible—and very likely as Cynthiana is such a small community. The OPS section chief should be someone experienced in managing a crisis and knowledgeable of communication and practices of the OPS branches—communication issues should be negligible as plain-language is supposed to be used across the board. Potential candidates for OPS Chief are the Deputy EM or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate sitting over public safety. The OPS section would be comprised of several operating branches for this incident, each headed by their respective chief/top-level administrator:

• FIRE branch;
• LAW enforcement branch;
• Public HEALTH branch;
• ANIMAL control branch;
• Public WORKS branch;
• UTILITIES branch;
• SAR

The remaining sections would not necessarily have the need for branches; supporting staff might be advisable to aid in any “gopher” activities.

Structure and Duties of Sections

PLAN could easily be filled by an EM staff member or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate. PLAN would work closely with UC, LOG and OPS in compiling information and keeping all sections and command briefed with SITREPs. PLAN would also work closely with the PIO in gathering and distributing information to and from the public.

LOG could be staffed in a manner similar to PLAN. LOG would be in constant communication with OPS and PLAN for the purposes of locating and supplying any necessary resources or materials. LOG would be responsible for locating outside sources for assistance that do not already have an MOU/MOA with OPS branches (agencies with pre-existing MOU/MOA would be contacted by the respective OPS branch); should an agency be located, LOG would forward said agency to ADMIN for event-specific MOU/MOA processing.

ADMIN could be staffed similarly to PLAN and LOG; however recommendation should be made for the city/county attorney to fill this position. ADMIN would work closely with OPS, PLAN, LOG and the UC for record keeping, document processing/filing as well as tallying costs and damages.

Operations and Functions of Branches and Sections

In response to the previous events, it would be assumed that the EM director had self-activated earlier in the day in response to a potential weather threat, as this is his usual practice, and the typical practice of all Kentucky emergency managers. Customarily, the NWS and KYEM work very closely in monitoring weather upcoming situations, and alert all counties of what’s to come; similarly, the local EM director places himself in an “activated” state hours beforehand, and camps out at his office, which is located at the EOC. Here, we can see that certain elements of the process were already in play, prior to the rest of this morning’s unforeseen events.

In regards to what actions to take in this morning’s event scenario, recommended actions are—though not necessarily in this exact order:

FIRE should dispatch available units to control and suppress the fires downtown, as well as the HAZMAT incident. FIRE may have to shift any focus that they have on SAR operations at Walmart to accomplish this—further mention of SAR to follow. FIRE will have notified outside agencies with established MOU/MOA per SOP/SOG; additional fire support may be located by LOG. Since a possibility does exist that looting and fire could spread to other locations, FIRE should attempt to keep at least one engine and its crew at out-lying stations; this is, of course, at FIRE’s discretion, and may prove difficult, as the City of Cynthiana has but only two stations. Harrison County does, however, have one unmanned station near the area that is currently being looted; this station is also a few blocks away from the HAZMAT incident.

SAR will most likely have been conducting efforts at the Walmart scene, in conjunction with FIRE, up until the quake incident. It will be assumed that overnight SAR had contacted other teams for additional manpower and equipment, per SOP/SOGs, and would have been coordinating with FIRE, as well. With the new quake event, local SAR operations will have now become further strained as much of the SAR team is comprised of FIRE personnel that have now been activated for the newly active FIRE events. SAR will contact and coordinate with LOG once more, to acquire additional resources for the location of the nursing home escapees and for SAR operations at the quake damaged structures, once FIRE has extinguished and established control at the FIRE and HAZMAT scenes.

WORKS should make attempts to feed water to mains in downtown area for FIRE activities. Water supply to HEALTH facilities are next priority. All areas of town outside of the active FIRE area should be restricted, limited, or shut-off at WORKS discretion, in order to guarantee adequate flow to the FIRE areas. WORKS may attempt to patch or divert sewage systems to keep issues from occurring; it would be recommended, however, to hold off on doing so, until LAW has established order in the active looting area; furthermore, quick judgment must be made as to the severity of the sewage problems, as this area is flood-prone. LOG may be able to locate emergency above-ground lines and pumps for both potable and non-potable water systems.

HEALTH should obtain a SITREP from the local hospital and establish satellite medical centers for the purposes of First Aid and lower priority medical cases; potential locations for these satellite medical centers are the HMH Physicians’ Clinic on North Pleasant and the Harrison County Health Center on Oddville Avenue. At least one ambulance—if the service(s) allow capacity—should be located at each satellite center for emergency transport and assistance should a case present itself with higher degree of trauma at a satellite. HEALTH should coordinate with PLAN and LOG for acquisition of additional supplies and personnel.

UTILITIES will coordinate with all public service utilities—save those covered by WORKS—for SITREPs. Electricity and communications lines to the EOC, dispatch and repeater sites, as well as HEALTH sites will be priority. Emergency services bases and satellites will be secondary, prioritizing by location’s capacity and ability to generate alternate power. UTILITIES will want to coordinate with LOG for locating generators and fuel for these affected locations should they not be previously equipped. Most repeater sites in Cynthiana and Harrison County are already equipped with or have allocated for them portable generators; a person should be designated by LOG to make rounds to check generator status and repeater functionality.

ANIMAL control will assist with the operations at the fairgrounds for the locating/capture/holding of lost/escaped animals. ANIMAL will have to receive additional assistance from Fish & Wildlife, where Harrison County has one animal control officer—Fish & Wildlife will be contacted by LOG.

LAW will establish a presence in the areas affected by looting; however, LAW will not make any arrests or use force to counteract the looting in progress—any such maneuver may incite additional rioting. Instead, LAW will act to protect properties that have not been looted.

LOG will contact National Guard for additional support for LAW, FIRE, HEALTH and WORKS; most Guard units are trained for all of these situations. With any luck, KYARNG will activate the unit located in Cynthiana without hesitation.

FIRE should dispatch at least one qualified unit to the HAZMAT area for identification and verification of the fuel spilling from the tanker. FIRE unit will make use of ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA software for recommendation of evacuation/SIP area. FIRE will coordinate with PLAN for contacting NRC/state EOC/NWS with SITREP of HAZMAT incident, per established SOP/SOG. Evacuation of area shall be conducted by LAW; though it is very likely that any persons located within the area have already evacuated the nearby structures in order to gain a “better view”. This may make crowd-control concerns difficult, and make efforts to verify building occupancy more difficult. Where this HAZMAT incident is of capacity that local FIRE can handle, initial efforts could be handled by FIRE, further HAZMAT operations should be conducted by team sent by NRC/state EOC. PLAN/LOG should coordinate with NRC/state EOC to see if the additional FIRE units contacted via MOU/MOA are equipped for HAZMAT, in order to refrain from duplicating resources.

LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for SITREP and forward highway department to WORKS. Roads leading to the roundabout should be limited to emergency traffic, in order to keep the area surrounding the birthing elephant calm. Traffic from US 27 South traveling northward into Cynthiana may be diverted onto the “old” section of highway, in order to bypass the elephant; further south, traffic on US 27 South should be diverted to the access road—KY 918—before the fairgrounds. Other affected highways—if any—should be closed at junction/intersect nearest reported damage; damage will be surveyed. If possible, highways will be restricted to emergency traffic until proper clearing/repairs are made.

LOG will contact schools, churches and civic buildings for potential sheltering operations; potential candidate structures are Cynthiana Baptist, Cynthiana Christian, Cynthiana Presbyterian and the elementary schools. LOG will contact Red Cross and/or Salvation Army for sheltering support and staff. Red Cross/Salvation Army will coordinate with LOG for additional supply/support. LOG/PLAN will designate a representative at each shelter site as a point of contact for SITREPs and communication needs.

III. – EXPLANATION & REVIEW

ICS is typically seen as a simple type of hierarchal command; one Incident Commander (IC) is charged with the overall control of the situation at hand, while other functions branch off below. In the model of response supplied here, I do not stray from this traditional view/use, with the exception of declaring a Unified Command (UC). Throughout my studies—those at school and those taken at varying EM workshops—I’ve seen and heard so many times mention of the issue related to declaration of “who’s in charge” in large multi-agency efforts; NIMS recognizes these issues as well (DHS, 2008). Enter the Multi-Agency Command System (MACS)/ICS and UC/ICS concepts, as applied to NIMS ICS.

The traditional IC structure and nomenclature work well in individual agency settings, however when multiple agencies begin to work together the tendency to point fingers and place blame, or steal credit when matters go favorably, grows. In order to combat potential bickering and define a scope of responsibility, adjustment is made to the terminology—without any dramatic change to structure—and we thus perform an interesting psychological play; instead of saying one man is in charge, we declare a Unified Command with an overall IC, a Safety Officer (SO), Public Information Officer (PIO) and a Liaison (LNO). The National Incident Management System (NIMS) allows for this variation in ICS, so long as compliance with NIMS standards are met (DHS, 2008). In the MACS/ICS system with a UC, OPS must have a designated OPS Section Chief (DHS, 2008).

The example of ICS use given above shows how complex—yet simple—structuring and organizing efforts can be. To a lay-person, the lengthy, yet brief example given would seem to be an over-expanded, drawn out mess; why not simply state that law enforcement can go about their business while fire services do theirs, and so on? Truth is, this model does state that; however it ensures that there isn’t any confusion or replication of services that would lead to making the situation more damaging and costly. This system also ensures that resources are being placed in a prioritized fashion, without having any one agency respond to a situation in one location when a greater threat exists elsewhere. Additionally, the system allows for the creation of points of contact, where agency representatives can communicate with another clearly and effectively; stating which needs are being met, which needs aren’t, and what additional actions or resources are necessary.

Again, the lay-person or member of an outside agency may question the structuring of this ICS, wondering how a MACS stylized ICS affects the normal operations and individual ICS structure of involved agencies. In reality, it doesn’t; all agencies are independently working together, following their own hierarchy—an Incident Command System, even if it is not named such within the organization—with the addition of the respective agency’s Incident Commander reporting to the MACS/ICS/UC back at the EOC.

ICS is a system that simply works when applied properly—as such, ICS and slight variations have been employed by many agencies and governing bodies across the nation prior to the establishment and direction of NIMS (“NIMS and the Incident Command System”, n.d.); the only differences between those pre-existing ICS variations and the ICS concept as described by NIMS is the clarification and designation of ICS structure and terminology across the nation, reinforcing the concepts of ICS—a common, understandable organization of personnel and resources without duplication and confusion.

1. – FINAL THOUGHTS

The ICS described in response to the scenario given is, for the most part, NIMS compliant. Some functions are not fully described or included in this example; this is due—in part—to the length of at which the author wished to take for such an odd scenario of events—at over 3,000 words we’ve still yet to cover all of the response, and haven’t touched on a bit of recovery! Comparing the ICS supplied, however, with the system described in NIMS Appendix B (DHS, 2008) reveals an understanding of NIMS requirements. Review of NIMS Appendix B also shows how complex and difficult a task of writing a description of an ICS structure for a particular scenario can be.

For additional information on ICS structure, and visual representation of the ICS organizational tree, review of NIMS Appendix B is recommended.

References

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Incident Management System. Web. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

“NIMS and the Incident Command System.” (n.d.). Web. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from: http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt

Palmer, J. (2011). Incident Command – Final Exam. Web. Retrieved January 10, 2016 from https://kg4vma.wordpress.com/2011/06/22/incident-command-8211-final-exam/

Identify both a current or suspected domestic terrorist group or individual and a current or suspected international terrorist group or individual and share at least one web site dedicated to the respective group / individual (one for domestic and one for international). Review selected individuals / groups to discuss:

•           Key similarities and differences between the groups / individuals.

•           At least one terrorist activity, which is attributable to each group / individual.

•           The primary motive(s) behind each of the above identified terrorist acts.

•           Your opinion as to which network or individual poses the greatest threat to the U.S.

 
“Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man.” (Gen 9:6 King James Version)

“So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are: for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it.” (Num 35:33 King James Version)

These are just two of many scriptures used by the Army of God—a loosely organized “Christian” terrorist group—to justify the “retaliatory” violence used against clinics and supporters of abortions in the United States. Though an “official” site on the Internet does boast the expected rhetoric of how to become a Christian—accepting Christ as the Savior and welcoming him into one’s heart [one may have to look a bit to find these words on the site, but they are there]—the organization, or the webmaster at least, dedicates the majority of the digital publicity to imagery of aborted fetus, text vilifying supporters and performers of abortions, and praises to those that have committed killings and bombings at clinics and residences. Also among the varying texts and links posted on the aforementioned site are suggested readings and links to documentation for indoctrination into terrorist activities—e.g. the IRA’s and PIRA’s later revision of “The Green Book.” (Pro-Life Virginia, n.d.)

One of the most effective attacks—in terms of lives taken and persons injured—associated with the AOG is that of the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, on July 27, 1996. Eric Robert Rudolph was later identified in 1997 as the Centennial Park bomber following clues from two additional bombings—one at an abortion clinic and one at a lesbian nightclub within the Atlanta region. Rudolph was not captured until 2003, when he was stopped by an officer for suspicious activity near a grocery in Murphy, North Carolina (CNN, 2003). In 2005, Rudolph stated that the bombing at the Olympics was politically motivated, drawing the world’s attention to the American government “…for its abominable sanctioning of abortion on demand.” (NPR, 2005). Rudolph’s ALICE pack of three pipe-bombs left at the park had claimed one life, injured 111, and triggered a fatal cardiac arrest in another. The Army of God claimed responsibility of this and Rudolph’s other incidents (Global Terrorism Database, 2015)

A well known name in terrorism throughout modern history in the western world is that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Originally born of ideas of Irish separation from British rule during the World War I era, the IRA has found itself splinter off into many different groups with varying sets of politics throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, with an image of a unified Ireland remaining a common and central ideal. Today, most remaining descendants of the “old IRA” have disbanded their armaments and turned to the political warfare of words, however a few groups still remain somewhat active in violent activities.

The “old IRA”—which had been formed of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizens’ Army—found itself reborn in 1922, shortly after having achieved the goal of Ireland’s independence; this reformation of the IRA came from members of the newfound state’s disgust from Northern Ireland electing to return to the UK—an allowance written into the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which had brought an end to the Irish War of Independence. This IRA of anti-Treaty followers of thought remained active through 1969, committing numerous acts of terrorism against British targets in Ireland and Great Britain, and aided in intelligence gathering efforts for the Soviet Union in trade for organizational funding and munitions support. The “success” of the IRA during this period eventually led to a model of organization and training that later generations adopted, and that other non-related terrorist groups have attempted to follow world-wide—e.g. “The Green Book.” In 1969, however, the IRA found itself split into two factions, shortly following the beginning of “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland. While Northern Ireland soon found itself in turmoil over differences between “unionist” and “parliamentary” as well as Catholic and Protestant thoughts and beliefs, the IRA split over a difference in opinion of political systems; one sect of the IRA supporting the ideas of communism and Marxist theory became the Official IRA (OIRA), while the remaining members formed the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Both IRA factions continued terrorist activities against British targets, and participated in rallies and protests. (Stanford University, 2012)

Eventually, the OIRA and the PIRA, as well as other paramilitary groups within Ireland, were ordered to have all weapons decommissioned in 1998 per the Good Friday Agreement—a set of political agreements established to calm relations between the Republic of Ireland & Northern Ireland, and to calm relations between the Republic of Ireland & Great Britain. The OIRA allegedly decommissioned all weapons in 2010, and the PIRA in 2005; rumors, however, insist that both organizations still retain certain secretive operational and munitions support. Additionally, other IRA groups—such as the Real IRA [commonly known as the New IRA]—continues to operate and commit terrorist acts. One of the more recent IRA-related attacks occurred in March of 2014, when a Northern Ireland police cruiser was hit with an explosive projectile; the RIRA claimed responsibility for the attack (Global Terrorism Database, 2015).

Though separate in specific motives and targets, as well as geographic locations and nations, the varied incarnations of the IRA and the AOG are both seen as terrorist groups and recognized as such by the United States. While the IRA-based groups are focused primarily on matters involving Ireland and the UK, the IRA still poses some threat to the US—or should at the very least remain on the US radar—due to previous actions of espionage. Granted, the IRA can no longer sell information to the Soviet Union—as that original incarnation of the group and the former Red State no longer exist; however we cannot discount the possibilities that the New IRA might take to conducting similar acts with other countries or terrorist states in order to progress in their movement. Additionally, other factions of the IRA had been known to be involved in the weapons trade business in order to collect weapons for their own use; in our “Global War on Terror” we must keep tabs on activities such as this, if we are to try and better serve our own nation and the world.

The AOG, on the other hand, perhaps raises a greater threat to our nation’s public as they provide “homegrown” terror within our borders, and have committed numerous crimes against neighbors and loved ones in our communities. Furthermore, the AOG has been successful in aiding to influence or otherwise “support the cause” of domestic terrorists acting out against homosexuality and abortion. Though the bombing at the Summer Olympics of 1996 may have been the grandest gesture of embarrassment that the AOG has handed us yet, their principles and examples live on and continue today—and are echoed by the likes of lone assailants like Robert Dear and his attack on the Planned Parenthood Westside Health Center this past November.

References

CNN (May 31, 2003.) Atlanta Olympic Bombing Suspect Arrested. Retrieved 27 December 2105 from: https://web.archive.org/web/20220929082405/http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/31/rudolph.main/

Global Terrorism Database. (2015.) Retrieved 27 December 2105 from: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/

National Public Radio (Apr. 14, 2005.) Full Text of Eric Rudolph’s Confession. Retrieved 27 December 2105 from: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4600480

Pro-Life Virginia (n.d.) Army of God – Pro-Life Virginia. Retrieved 27 December 2105 from: http://www.armyofgod.com/

Stanford University (Aug. 25, 2012.) Mapping Militant Organizations – Official Irish Republican Army. Retrieved 27 December 2105 from: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/317

Assignment Instructions
Investigate four terrorist attacks and provide a short paper delineating the methods and motives associated with each of your selected attacks. For each attack, please include one website URL as a reference.

Terrorism has been used in many ways and on many occasions throughout history as a means to further some form or fashion of personal, political or religious agenda. One might find it possible to imagine acts of terrorism having taken place in the extreme early days of human development. Picture some megalomaniacal Neolithic man baiting sites surrounding his tribe, drawing fearsome predatory creatures nearer to his people, in order to aid in his push to overtake or establish leadership; is the thought that far-fetched? And does it honestly differ that greatly from the event that we see in today’s society? This illustration may not fit what we’ve grown accustomed to declaring terrorism; today, terrorism is more “clearly’ defined by the general population as an action against a certain sect of people by extremists subscribing to some form of religious zealotry—much like the Judea’s Zealots of the first century, if certain historical records and theories are held to be true.

For the purposes of this assignment, however, we shall focus on more modern times and events, where the battle has been between those holding ideological and political differences between the “Islamic” and “Christian” communities, as well as the “Christian” and more “secular” divide. The events and actions described hereon are not necessarily representative of the greater communities, to which the perpetrators claim to either be a member or faction of, thus the use of quotes in the preceding sentence, implying merely an “alleged” tie thereto.

As of the time of this writing, the most recent event occurring on United States soil is that of the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California, on December 2, 2015, conducted by a married couple declaring allegiance to the caliphate—the present leader of ISIL, self-proclaimed earthly successor to the Muslim prophet Mohammed, and self-proclaimed leader of Islam (Calamachi 2015; Ryan, 2015). Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, conspired to and conducted an attack at a private training event and holiday party at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, using weapons that had been modified to become fully automatic assault rifles. Farook and Malik had also planted a remotely operated explosive device outside the location that failed to activate or be detonated; it is assumed that the device was planted in order to cause harm to emergency responders upon arrival (Bruton, 2015). In their attack on the center, Farook and Malik killed 14, and injured 17. The couple fled the scene to their apartment, where investigators discovered an arsenal of munitions and plans for future devices and events. Farook and Malik evaded police at their apartment, and led law enforcement on a chase, before stopping the vehicle they were occupying and entering a gunfight with police. The couple was shot to death in said vehicle by authorities (KABC-TV, 2015). Despite declaring their allegiance to the Islamic State, ISIL has not acknowledged any affiliation with the couple, or any plans for what had transpired. As of the present time, the federal government’s investigations have not found valid ties between the couple and ISIL, other than similarities between the IEDs constructed by Farook and Malik and documentation known to be of al-Queda descent or inspiration. Where the event was perpetrated by “radicalized” Islamists, it is viewed as and has been declared an act of domestic terrorism.

A few short weeks prior to the mass shooting in San Bernardino, multiple bombings and shootings took place in the city of Paris, France in an act of retaliation by ISIL against the French government for their involvement in air-strikes in Syria and Iraq (Dalton, 2015). Between the evening hours of November 13 and early hours of November 14, six different locations became sites for nine ISIL affiliated EU nationals. In total, 130 lives were taken—not including seven of the nine perpetrators—and 368 were injured; of those injured, 80-99 were listed as being in critical condition (BBC, 2015), depending upon information sources. As stated, ISIL did declare responsibility for the attacks, and investigators have positively identified 7 of the perps, and have enough evidence to identify and eighth; the eight are known to have been associated with the Islamic State. The ninth suspect, who was killed during the attacks, remains unknown.

Continuing the ISIL threat, and returning to the United States, mention can be made of the first “attack” on American soil by Islamic extremists with ISIL claiming responsibility; on May 3, 2015, two men attempted to wage an attack at an event hosted by the AFDI at the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas. On said date, when ISIL—known by the then preferred ISIS—had declared jihad and rallied for support in Syria, American citizens Ernest Simpson and Nadir Soofi drove to the Center and opened fire upon a parked police cruiser, occupied by one police officer and security guard. Simpson and Soofi soon had fire returned upon them by other officers and members of Federal law enforcement that were already on scene for security detail. The event which attracted Simpson and Soofi was the unveiling and judging of artwork depicting—and, thus mocking, according to Islamic tradition—the Muslim prophet Mohammed (Hallman, 2015). Simpson and Soofi had been armed with three assault rifles and three handguns. Only one person was injured in the attempted attack—the security guard occupying the cruiser was shot in his ankle. Simpson and Soofi were killed on scene. ISIS declared responsibility of the event; however, Federal investigations have not revealed any evidence of direct involvement or inspiration, and continue to view the event as an act of ill-planned domestic terrorism. Critics view the event as poor attempt at AFDI drawing attention and attempting to incite action; AFDI has been regarded as an anti-Muslim group. Conspiracy theories abound surrounding this event, where the perpetrators had been flagged as potential threats, yet were capable to acquire weaponry legally through a shop known for participating in what became known as the ATF Gunwalking Scandal (Serrano, 2015).

Finally, we return to more recent events with a “true” case of domestic terrorism, and look to the Colorado Springs shootings of November 27, 2015. Robert Lewis Dear, Jr.—known by some for his radical Christian views, views against abortion, and voiced support of the Army of God—armed with a semi-automatic rifle opened fire in the vicinity of and in the Planned Parenthood Westside Health Center (Fausset, 2015). In his attack, Dear took three lives and injured nine. After a five-hour standoff, police breached the front of the health center with an armored vehicle, and captured Dear (Paul, 2015). Dear has maintained that he was the sole conspirator, and has even admitted his guilt in court, though an official guilty plea has not been entered. On at least two occasions Dear has alluded to motivation for his attack having to do with “baby parts”; it has been theorized that Dear is referring to one extremists group’s alleged undercover videos discussing the sale of aborted fetal tissue. Other evidence related to the case has been sealed at the request of the prosecution (Gurman, 2015).

As one can see in the cases above, terrorism can have many faces and occur in varied places. Motivations, methods, planning, skill—and degree of sanity or intelligence—can vary and be as subjective as well. Review of these instances, however, do suggest that the more common instances of terrorism seem to revolve around notions associated with a religious belief system, and that many of the incidents have and may continue to involve indirect or more “impersonal” targets and relatively easily accessible weaponry. This generalization, however, will not continue to hold true as terrorist groups will undoubtedly continue to gain strength and following, as has been seen in other events. Therefore, we must prepare ourselves for a range of possibilities; the question, however, is to what degree or cost.

References

BBC (November 17, 2015.) Paris attacks: Search goes on for missing. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34836330

Bruton, F. B.; Lucht, K.; Ortiz, E. (Dec. 2015.) San Bernardino Massacre Suspects Appear to Have Been Radicalized. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-shooting/san-bernardino-massacre-suspects-appear-have-been-radicalized-n473261

Calamachi, R. (Dec. 5, 2015.) Islamic State Says ‘Soldiers of Caliphate’ Attacked in San Bernardino. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/world/middleeast/islamic-state-san-bernardino-massacre.html?_r=0

Dalton, M.; Horobin, Wm.; Varela, T.; Landauro, I. (Nov. 14, 2015.) Seven Militants Led Deadly Paris Attacks. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-attacks-were-an-act-of-war-by-islamic-state-french-president-francois-hollande-says-1447498080

Fausset, R (Dec. 1, 2015.) For Robert Dear, Religion and Rage Before Planned Parenthood Attack. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/us/robert-dear-planned-parenthood-shooting.html

Gurman, S. (Nov. 30, 2015.) Suspect in Colorado clinic attack will face murder charges. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article47206975.html

Hallman, T; Leszynski, R. (May 4, 2015.) Police: Men killed in Garland shooting had assault rifles, body armor. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20150503-breaking-gunfire-reported-at-anti-islam-event-at-garland-isd-facility.ece

KABC-TV (Dec. 2, 2015.) WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT SAN BERNARDINO MASS SHOOTERS SYED FAROOK, TASHFEEN MALIK. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://abc7.com/news/2-suspects-in-san-bernardino-mass-shooting-identified/1107640/

Paul, J.; Steffan, J.; Ingold, J. (Nov. 27, 2015.) Planned Parenthood shooting: 3 killed, including 1 police officer in Colorado Springs. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_29172660/colorado-springs-firefighters-respond-active-shooter-at-planned

Ryan, M.; Goldman, A.; Phillip, A.; Berman, M. (Dec. 8, 2015.) Officials: San Bernardino shooters pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-san-bernardino-shooting-20151208-story.html

Serrano, R. (Aug. 1, 2015.) Garland, Texas, shooter bought gun in 2010 during Fast and Furious. Retrieved 12 December 2105 from: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/la-na-garland-gun-20150801-story.html#page=1

Hello;

I hate the introductory part of class. There. I said it. Right off the bat. And I kind of feel better about myself for doing it.

As you might guess from that opening, I’m not much on proper sentence structure either…

<sarcasm>…wouldn’t my elementary grammar teachers be proud?</sarcasm>

But, seriously…

My name is Jeremiah—but I go by Jeremy to close friends, sometimes Palmer to a rare few, and I’m pretty sure I’ve been called a dozen other more colorful names by my ex-wife. And, yeah, I guess I’ll go ahead and delve into that painful subject, as it is a part of my life—whether I’d like it to be or not.

I’m a divorced, single father of three, struggling to provide as best as I can—which is way less than I’d like to; fortunately, the children recognize my struggles, and they handle it remarkably well, considering the hell that it is.

We’d been a family of five up through Easter of 2014—up until that day when our wife and mother decided to leave us for an old male friend of hers that had just returned to the area the day prior. Yes, I’m still a bit bitter about it, and likely will be for years to come. The only good outcome from that mess was her realization that the children would be much better off at home with me than with her and her new beau—and soon to be fourth ex-husband. I suppose I do get a slight feeling of schadenfruede from that last point… But…

[…I could continue to write at great length on that mess—and how wonderful it would be to vent all of that anger and frustration!—but, really, it’d be rather pointless to do so…]

A few months ago I decided to re-enroll in school, since I’ve not had much success in finding better employment. Presently, I’m working on a part-time basis at a local radio station—WCYN. I was originally hired last year to operate the board during remote broadcasts of a neighboring county’s high school sports events on the FM; since that time I’ve taken on the duties of Saturday and Sunday morning productions on both the AM and FM stations. I often fill-in for some of our local sports remotes when the regular guy isn’t available to run the board—I’m kind of hoping that I might just take his spot, but I digress.

…that’s something else about me—I frequently go off rail and give a little side-note or commentary whenever I am speaking in a more personal manner. I’ve been complimented on this odd ability to briefly leave topic and circle right ‘round to the beginning again; oft-times I’ve left people bewildered as to how I can keep separate, yet connected thoughts straight… but, again, I digress—and in a digression, no less!

My interests in Emergency Management stem from my father—our county’s current EM Director. His involvement in EM can trace back to some of his childhood interests—a few of which may come from his father before him. My grandfather had been a fireman at one point in his life—though I sadly must admit that I’m not aware of his position within the local department; I have, however, seen a picture of him posed on a knee in one of the bays, dressed in the old blue work uniform, holding a rather large teddy for a Toys-for-Tots drive. As for my father, though, I believe it was a combination of his dad’s service interests and an interest in CB radio that helped guide him. My dad eventually became involved in a long since defunct REACT team that had been very active in assisting with Civil Defense efforts in the community. At some point in the ‘90s that REACT’s local president was tapped to become the next Disaster and Emergency Services coordinator—a few short years before DES was rebranded and reorganized as EM. The DES coordinator ended up roping my father into helping him rewrite the EOP, and perform a lot of the clerical duties that were becoming more and more “tech” dependant—and it was here that I started to become pulled into helping a bit.

In the late ‘90s—circa 1997, I think—my dad asked me if I could help figure out how to network a couple of computers, set up a Juno email account, and manage a GeoCities page. Eventually, that background work led to my becoming a deputy with the Cynthiana – Harrison County Emergency Management Agency in the latter part of August ’01. I was very “active” through the first couple of years, up until I was married and my son born in 2004. In the years that followed, my role became less of an active “agent”—lack of a better word—to a digital face in the background while I filled greater duties at home as a house-husband. I ended up establishing myself as the guy charged with creating and maintaining an online presence and interacting with the public on social media—long before that even became a “thing.” Yes, our local agency’s Twitter account and Facebook page pre-dates many of Kentucky’s counties’ accounts/pages—and even KYEM’s!

Unfortunately, turmoil at home caused issue with my abilities to maintain things as regularly as I believed I should, and eventually became a repeated point of argument in my marriage; truth be told, so did earlier attempts at schooling here at APU—which is a grand portion of the reason why I am currently enrolled in this class alone for this eight week period. I am on academic probation thanks to numerous failed attempts at schooling during those final years of my marriage.

Following my divorce, I eventually wrote the most difficult email I’d ever written in my life—I resigned from my duties and involvement from the local EM. This was an especially difficult thing to do, where the person I had to notify was now my father—he’d become the director about a year or two after I had been sworn in as a deputy. Though the message was professional and dry, a hidden subtext that only him and I could see was present; “Dear Dad, I’m a f***-up, and can’t do it anymore…”

Sadder still—to me, anyway, as I know the following I’d built—the agency’s domain and hosting were allowed to expire, and posts to social media are few and far between—and less than timely.

Meanwhile, I’ve continued to hang on as best I can in giving the children as close to a “normal” life as possible, while their mother flits in and out of their lives when it’s convenient for her. Back to the point where I say this is hell.

I’m a thirty-five year-old single (divorced) father, with kids at home, no real job to speak of, an incomplete college education, no “real” experience outside that of being a stay at home dad, and I’ve a crazy ex- that only contributes when it’s convenient. It’s hell.

…but that thing of being a dad—and being the custodial parent on top of everything…

…yeah; there’s still a little slice of heaven in my life.

So, for now, I’m praying that I can find a way to better support the kids. I’m also praying that I might find some better sense of the turns life has taken us, and looking forward to the day that someone will join us on this journey. (Ha!—try dating on top of all this; it’s impossible!)

But, I guess that’s about it for now… If for some reason you’d like to know more, you can find almost anything by google-ing my regular Internet handle—which is also my Ham call: KG4VMA. You’ll find me almost everywhere—though I’m not as active online as I’d once been. You might even find a few old assignments for other classes posted to my blog, if you really get to digging. For those that are really daring and bored, you can try and message me and strike up a conversation, though I can’t guarantee an immediate reply—I’m going to be begging, borrowing and stealing Internet access for another month or so. Well, not stealing—everyone around has finally wised up and is using good wireless encryption these days…

…and if by some miracle you’re a cute girl that’s looking to find a broken dad… lol.

Anyway, nice to meet you guys. Hope we have some fun in this class.

– Jeremiah Hall Palmer

The following writing was originally submitted in response to a homework assignment:

Week 5 Assignment

Jeremiah Palmer (4145412)

AmericanPublicUniversity

EDMG340

Christian Kazmierczak

11/09/2012

I.  INTRODUCTION

In a prior course, students were given the following scenario to respond to on the final exam:

SCENARIO: At 10:05a.m. today, a hurricane/earthquake/tornado/flood hit the community of Edenton. The downtown area was hardest hit. People have reported damage to homes, and businesses have been affected as well. No fatalities have been reported. Three people with injuries have been taken to the Edenton Community Hospital, which is also reporting some damage. As many as 10 people are missing.

The downtown fire station is destroyed/inoperable. Two other fire stations are operational.

Other possible effects:

• A large fire has broken out in downtown
• Water mains are cut
• 10 percent of the population has sustained injuries
• Utility lines are down
• Animals in the zoo have escaped from their cages
• Looters are rampaging downtown
• Sewers have backed up, endangering public health
• Many houses are destroyed/inhabitable and shelters will be needed
• A hazardous spill has occurred
• A major road has been affected.

Students were asked to develop an Incident Command System for the scenario, defining roles and responsibilities for the functions that should be included. For this week’s assignment I am offering a similar response^[1] to the one I had given for the aforementioned scenario.

II. – SCENARIO RESPONSE

Establishing Command

With the events at Edenton being as described above, recommendation should be made for the establishment of a Unified Command (UC) at the community’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). In the event that the primary EOC is located in the downtown area, command should take place at the designated secondary EOC location; if by chance a secondary EOC has not been previously designated, then a temporary base of operations for the EOC needs to be located. Potential secondary locations may include schools, civic buildings, empty factories/warehouses—any location that has relatively easy access to utilities and can be secured if necessary. The relocation of the EOC to a secondary site is advisable, as the primary—assuming it is located downtown—may be affected by the fires and looting.

Structure of Command and Sections

The UC structure of the EOC would be comprised of the local EM director and applicable top-level government heads—mayor and/or judge-executive or local government equivalents and their respective deputies/assistants. Prior to this event, the UC has been structured so that one member is designated as overall IC, while the remaining act in traditional top-level command staff capacities—PIO, safety, liaison.

Below the UC are established the following sections: Operations (OPS), Planning (PLAN), Logistics (LOG) and Finance/Administration (ADMIN).

OPS could potentially have a section chief, or could operate without one; operating without a section chief may create difficulty in OPS branches communicating with the IC and UC, but is feasible. OPS section chief should be someone experienced in managing a crisis and knowledgable of communication and practices of the OPS branches—communication issues should be negligible as plain-language is supposed to be used across the board. Potential candidates for OPS Chief are the Deputy EM or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate sitting over public safety. The OPS section would be comprised of several operating branches for this incident, each headed by their respective chief/top-level administrator:

• FIRE branch;
• LAW enforcement branch;
• public HEALTH branch;
• ANIMAL control branch;
•  public WORKS branch;
• UTILITIES branch.

The remaining sections would not necessarily have the need for branches; supporting staff might be advisable to aid in any “gopher” activities.

Structure and Duties of Sections

PLAN could easily be filled by an EM staff member or a commissioner/council-man/magistrate. PLAN would work closely with UC, LOG and OPS in compiling information and keeping all sections and command briefed with SITREPs. PLAN would also work closely with the PIO in gathering and distributing information to and from the public.

LOG could be staffed in a manner similar to PLAN. LOG would be in constant communication with OPS and PLAN for the purposes of locating and supplying any necessary resources or materials. LOG would be responsible for locating outside sources for assistance that do not already have an MOU/MOA with OPS branches (agencies with pre-existing MOU/MOA would be contacted by the respective OPS branch); should an agency be located, LOG would forward said agency to ADMIN for event-specific MOU/MOA processing.

ADMIN could be staffed similarly to PLAN and LOG; however recommendation should be made for the city/county attorney to fill this position. ADMIN would work closely with OPS, PLAN, LOG and the UC for record keeping, document processing/filing as well as tallying costs and damages.

Operations and Functions of Branches and Sections

In regards to particular actions to take in this incident, recommended actions are—though not necessarily in this exact order:

FIRE should dispatch available units to control and suppress the fires downtown. Since the possibility exists that looting and fire could spread to other locations, FIRE should attempt to keep at least one engine and its crew at out-lying stations; this is, of course, at FIRE’s discretion. FIRE will have notified outside agencies with established MOU/MOA per SOP/SOG; additional fire support may be located by LOG.

WORKS should make attempts to feed water to mains in downtown area for FIRE activities. Water supply to HEALTH facilities are next priority. All areas of town outside of the active FIRE area should be restricted, limited, or shut-off at WORKS discretion. WORKS may attempt to patch or divert sewage systems to keep issues from occurring at HEALTH facilities. LOG may be able to locate emergency above-ground lines and pumps for both potable and non-potable water systems.

HEALTH should obtain a SITREP from the local hospital and establish satellite medical centers for the purposes of First Aid and lower priority medical cases; potential locations for these satellite medical centers are established clinics and health departments. At least one ambulance—if the service(s) allow capacity—should be located at each satellite center for emergency transport and assistance should a case present itself with higher degree of trauma at a satellite. HEALTH should coordinate with PLAN and LOG for acquisition of additional supplies and personnel.

UTILITIES will coordinate with all public service utilities—save those covered by WORKS—for SITREPs. Electricity and communications lines to the EOC, dispatch and repeater sites as well as HEALTH sites will be priority. Emergency services bases and satellites will be secondary, prioritizing by location’s capacity and ability to generate alternate power. UTILITIES will want to coordinate with LOG for locating generators and fuel for these affected locations should they not be previously equipped.

ANIMAL control will assist with the operations at the local zoo for the locating/capture/holding of lost/escaped animals. ANIMAL will receive additional assistance from Fish & Wildlife—Fish & Wildlife will be contacted by LOG.

LAW will establish a presence in the areas affected by looting; however, LAW will not make any arrests or use force to counteract the looting in progress—any such maneuver may incite additional rioting. Instead, LAW will act to protect properties that have not been looted.

LOG will contact National Guard for additional support for LAW, FIRE, HEALTH and WORKS; most Guard units—especially engineer battalions—are trained for all of these situations.

FIRE—if not equipped as a HAZMAT team—should dispatch one qualified unit to the HAZMAT area for identification. FIRE unit will make use of ERG and CAMEO/ALOHA software for recommendation of evacuation/SIP area. FIRE will coordinate with PLAN for contacting NRC/state EOC/NWS with SITREP of HAZMAT incident, per established SOP/SOG. Evacuation of area shall be conducted by LAW. HAZMAT operations will be conducted by team sent by NRC/state EOC.

LOG/PLAN should contact highway department for SITREP and forward highway department to WORKS. Affected highway should be closed at junction/intersect nearest reported damage; damage will be surveyed. If possible, highway will be restricted to emergency traffic until proper clearing/repairs are made.

LOG will contact schools, churches and civic buildings for potential sheltering operations. LOG will contact Red Cross and/or Salvation Army for sheltering support and staff. Red Cross/Salvation Army will coordinate with LOG for additional supply/support. LOG/PLAN will designate a representative at each shelter site as a point of contact for SITREPs and communication needs.

III. – EXPLANATION & REVIEW

ICS is typically seen as a simple type of hierarchal command; one Incident Commander (IC) is charged with the overall control of the situation at hand, while other functions branch off below. In my model of response, I do not stray from this traditional view/use, with the exception of declaring a Unified Command (UC). In my studies—through those at this school and those taken at varying EM workshops—I have heard and seen issue related to the declaration of “who’s in charge” in multi-agency efforts; NIMS recognizes these issues as well (DHS, 2008). Enter the Multi-Agency Command System (MACS)/ICS and UC/ICS concepts, as applied to NIMS ICS.

The traditional IC structure and nomenclature work perfectly fine in individual agency settings, yet when multiple agencies begin to work together—especially with governmental heads overseeing the events—the desire to point fingers and place blame, or steal credit when matters go favorably, grows. To combat the potential bickering and scope of responsibility, we simply adjust the terminology—without dramatic change to the structure—and perform an interesting psychological play; instead of saying one man is in charge, we declare that there is a Unified Command with an overall IC, a Safety Officer (SO), Public Information Officer (PIO) and a Liaison (LNO). The National Incident Management System (NIMS) allows for this variation in ICS, so long as compliance with NIMS standards are met (DHS, 2008). In the MACS/ICS system with a UC, OPS must have a designated OPS Section Chief (DHS, 2008).

The example of ICS use given above shows how complex—yet simple—structuring and organizing efforts can be. To a lay-person, the example given would likely seem to be an over-expanded and drawn out mess—why not simply state that law enforcement can go about their business while fire services do theirs, etc.? The truth is, this model does state that; however it ensures that there isn’t any confusion or replication of services that could potentially lead to making the situation more damaging and costly. The system also ensures that resources are being placed in a prioritized fashion, without having any one agency respond to a situation in one location when a greater threat exists elsewhere. Additionally, the system allows for the creation of points of contact, where agency representatives can communicate with another clearly and effectively, stating which needs are being met, which needs aren’t, and what additional actions or resources are necessary.

Again, the lay-person or member of an outside agency may question the structuring of this ICS, wondering how a MACS stylized ICS affects the normal operations and individual ICS structure of involved agencies. Honestly, it doesn’t; all agencies are independently working together, following their own hierarchy—an ICS, even if it is not named such within the organization—with the addition of the respective agency’s IC reporting to the MACS/ICS/UC back at the EOC.

The ICS is a system that simply works when applied properly—as such, ICS and slight variations had been employed by many agencies and governing bodies across the nation prior to the establishment and direction of NIMS (“NIMS and the Incident Command System”, n.d.). The only differences between these pre-existing ICS versions and variations and the ICS concept as described by NIMS is the attempt at better clarification and designation of ICS structure and terminology across the entire nation, reinforcing the concepts of ICS—a common, understandable organization of personnel and resources without duplication and confusion.

IV. – FINAL THOUGHTS

The ICS described in response to the scenario given is, for the most part, NIMS compliant. Some functions are not fully described or included in this example; this is due—in part—to the length at which this paper was written versus the brevity that was requested—the author has responded to a 500 word minimum with over 2,000 words! Comparing the ICS supplied, however, with the system described in NIMS Appendix B (DHS, 2008) reveals an understanding of NIMS requirements. Review of NIMS Appendix B also shows how complex a task of writing a description of an ICS structure for a particular scenario can be.

For additional information on ICS structure, and visual representation of the ICS organizational tree, review of NIMS Appendix B is recommended.

References

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Incident Management System. Web. Retrieved November 9, 2012 from: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

“NIMS and the Incident Command System.” (n.d.). Web. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from: http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt

Palmer, J. (2011). Incident Command – Final Exam. Web. Retrieved November 9, 2012 from http://kg4vma.wordpress.com/2011/06/22/incident-command-8211-final-exam/